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Abstract
Typically, secure channels are constructed from an authenticated key exchange
(AKE) protocol, which authenticates the communicating parties based on long-
term public keys and establishes secret session keys, and a secure data transmission
layer which uses the secret session keys to encrypt transmitting data. In this
research we address the partial leakage of long-term secret keys of key exchange
protocol participants due to various side-channel attacks, and the partial leakage
of plaintexts due to data compression prior to the encryption. Both issues can
negatively a↵ect the security of channel establishment and data transmission.
Security models for two-party authenticated key exchange protocols have
developed over time to provide security even when the adversary learns certain
secret values. In this work, we advance the modelling of security for AKE
protocols by considering more granular partial leakage of long-term secrets of
protocol participants: in our modified version of the extended CanettiKrawczyk
(eCK) security model, the adversary can adaptively request arbitrary leakage
of long-term secrets even after the test session is activated. Our modified eCK
model can be instantiated as a bounded leakage model or continuous leakage
model.
We present generic and concrete constructions of two-pass leakage-resilient key
exchange protocols that are secure in the proposed security models. We introduce
a new concept: the leakage-resilient NAXOS trick, which will be used to construct
a leakage-resilient key exchange protocol. The leakage-resilient NAXOS trick
computationally combines the long-term secret key and the ephemeral secret-key
of a protocol participant, in such a way that even though the long-term secret key
is partially leaked and the ephemeral secret key is fully leaked, the output of the
NAXOS computation is indistinguishable from a random value to the adversary.
We identify a special property for public-key cryptosystems: pair generation
indistinguishability, and show how to obtain the leakage-resilient NAXOS trick
iii
from a pair generation indistinguishable leakage-resilient public-key encryption
scheme.
Compression is desirable for network applications as it saves bandwidth; how-
ever, when data is compressed before being encrypted, the amount of compression
leaks information about the amount of redundancy in the plaintext. This side
channel has led to the successful CRIME and BREACH attacks on web tra c
protected by the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The general guidance
in light of these attacks has been to disable compression, preserving confidentiality
but sacrificing bandwidth. In this work, we examine two techniques–heuristic
separation of secrets and fixed-dictionary compression, for enabling compression
while protecting high-value secrets, such as cookies, from attack. We model the
security o↵ered by these techniques with new definitions of cookie indistinguisha-
bility and cookie recovery security, and report on the amount of compressibility
that these techniques can achieve.
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As the Internet developed, more and more individuals and organizations
connect their computers and private networks to the Internet. Since the Internet
is a publicly available resource, the security of the information exchanged via
the Internet is not guaranteed. Therefore, ensuring the security of the informa-
tion becomes an important task. For many years, confidentiality, integrity and
availability (known as the CIA triad) are known as the core principles of the
information security [McC91].
Cryptography is engaged with communication systems to enforce the security
of the information by establishing a secure channel for communication. A secure
channel assures that no third party can see or modify the actual messages that are
being transferred. Particularly, in the real world scenario the TLS/SSL protocol
suite is used for this purpose. First, the TLS/SSL handshake protocol exchanges
1
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a secret key (session key). Thereafter the TLS/SSL record protocol uses that
session key to encrypt the messages. During the handshake protocol, both parties
agree on an algorithm to encrypt data in the TLS/SSL record layer.
In the key exchange phase, long-term secrets of communicating parties can be
leaked to the adversary, and in the message transmission phase, the secret keys
(session keys) as well as the messages can be leaked to the adversary, due to the
side-channel attacks.
Objective of the Thesis in Brief. As mentioned above, there are two main
things to be done, when establishing and using a secure channel for communication:
1. a secret key (session key) should be exchanged between the intended parties,
2. encrypt the messages using the session key.
Our main objective is to construct cryptographic primitives for secure channel
establishment and communication, which are resilient to the side-channel attacks.
1.1 Side-Channel Attacks and Countermeasures
The revolutionary idea of side-channel attacks was first introduced by Kocher
[Koc96] by presenting timing attacks on Di e-Hellman, RSA, DSS and other
implementations. Although the cryptographic schemes are designed in such a
way that they are hard to break computationally, leaking information from the
implemented system may give su cient power to the adversary to break the
system by recovering the secret parameters such as secret keys. There are various
kinds of side channels available such as timing information, electromagnetic
radiation, acoustic signals, visual or light signals and leaking information about
power consumption. Since it is very di cult to fully stop the information leakage
from cryptosystems, side-channel attacks become a huge threat for the security of
cryptosystems [HR07]. Moreover, it is very useful to study di↵erent types of side-
channel attacks in the literature, to understand how they extract information and
proceed to extract the secrets from the targeted cryptosystem. In the following, we
concentrate on timing attacks, power analysis attacks, electromagnetic emission
based attacks and compression-based leakage attacks, to understand the nature
of side channel attacks.
1.1. Side-Channel Attacks and Countermeasures 3
Timing Attacks. Timing attacks enable the attacker to reveal secrets from the
cryptosystem by measuring the amount of time taken for di↵erent computations.
Cryptosystems take di↵erent amount of time for di↵erent operations. If the
attacker can get the di↵erent timing information from the targeted cryptosystem,
the attacker may be able to determine what is happening inside the system.
As mentioned before, Kocher [Koc96] stated that by measuring the amount of
time required for secret key operations, attackers might be able to find fixed
Di↵e-Hellman exponents, factor RSA keys and break other cryptosystems. He
also stated that these kinds of attacks are computationally inexpensive and often
need only a known ciphertext. Actual systems are potentially at risk whenever
attackers can get accurate timing measurements, especially when the amount of
time required to perform an operation is variable and dependent on a secret key
or protected value. Bernstein demonstrated an attack on the implementation of
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm and showed that the standard
AES algorithm is vulnerable for cache-timing attacks [Ber05]. Even though the
brute-force search takes thousands of years to attack AES, Bernstein’s attack
could be completed within days as long as the adversary has the power to study
the cache-timing information from the targeted system.
Power Analysis Attacks. Power analysis attacks are initiated by measuring
the power consumption of a cryptographic device which is used to implement the
cryptosystem. Messerges et al. [MDS02] applied this idea to attack an actual
smart card, which uses Data Encryption Standard (DES). They examined the
noise characteristics of the power signals and developed an approach to model
the signal-to-noise ratio. They showed that the signal-to-noise ratio can be
significantly improved using a multiple-bit attack. It is not di cult to attach
a device which can measure the power consumption of an ATM machine and
sending that information to the adversary. By analyzing the information an
adversary can reveal the secret keys of smart cards used on the ATM.
Electromagnetic (EM)-Emission-based Attacks. EM-emission-based at-
tacks are another possible type of side-channel attack. Electric circuits generate
EM radiation as they operate. Attackers can use these radiation emission and
analyze them to extract the secrets of the cryptosystem. Hutter et al. [HMF07]
discussed the e↵ectiveness of EM emission based attacks on electronic passports
and contact-less payment systems which use passive 13.56 MHz radio frequency
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identification devices. They stated that these devices can be successfully attacked
with less than 1000 EM traces. Unlike power analysis attacks, EM emission based
attacks can be performed remotely. Receivers can be used to catch emission
radiation and more powerful receivers can get information from distant systems.
Cold Boot Attacks. A cold boot attack is a type of side-channel attack in
which an attacker physically accesses a system and retrieves secret keys from a
running operating system after a cold reboot (boot process in which the system
starts from a powerless state) to restart the system. This attack relies on the
data remanence property of DRAM and SRAM to retrieve memory contents that
remain readable in the seconds to minutes after power has been removed.
Compression-based Leakage. In 2002, Kelsey [Kel02] showed how compres-
sion can act as a form of side-channel leakage. If plaintext data is compressed
before being encrypted, the length of the ciphertext reveals information about
the amount of compression, which in turn can reveal information about the
plaintext. Kelsey notes that this side channel di↵ers from other types of side
channels in two key ways: “it reveals information about the plaintext, rather than
key material”, and “it is a property of the algorithm, not the implementation”.
Kelsey’s most powerful attack is an adaptive chosen input attack : if an attacker
is allowed to choose inputs x that are combined with a target secret s and the
concatenation xks is compressed and encrypted, observing the length of the
outputs can eventually allow the attacker to extract the secret s.
1.1.1 Local versus Remote Side-Channel Attacks.
Side-channel attacks can be mounted locally (local attacks) or remotely (remote
attacks) from the targeted system. Local attacks need some kind of physical
access to the target system or proximity. For instance, side-channel attacks
such as power analysis attacks, EM-emission based attacks, cold boot attacks
need physical access to the targeted system or proximity to capture the leakage.
Alternatively, remote attacks can be mounted from a long distance. For instance,
the side-channel attacks such as timing attacks and compression-based attacks
can be mounted from remotely, as the adversary can measure response time or
ciphertext lengths from a distance system.
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1.1.2 Countermeasures for Side-Channel Attacks.
Considering the countermeasures of side-channel attacks, mainly there are two
approaches. One is a hardware based approach where the focus is to design
hardware that minimizes the leakage of secret information. Bernstein has proposed
ideas to design CPUs which provides protection against timing attacks on cache
memory, as well as many ideas to mask leaking timing information by software
based AES implementations [Ber05]. Besides this there are other software based
countermeasures which are mostly focusing on masking the leaking information.
In a previous work [AJR11], I have presented three methods for masking leaking
timing information: injecting some randomness to the leaking cache-timing
information, dedicating cache portions to fetch data from di↵erent memory
portions and pre-fetching from the memory before the algorithm accesses the
required memory portions and hence inject random timing information and
change the cache access pattern respectively. A few possible countermeasures
against compression-based leakage attacks would be disabling the compression,
randomizing the compressed output length, masking the secrets or randomizing
the secrets per request [GHP13]. Obviously, those types of countermeasures
protect systems only against some specific attacks that are known at the moment.
Those countermeasures are known as ad-hoc solutions.
Above we discussed a few known side-channel attacks and possible counter-
measures against them. There may be many unknown side-channel attacks as
well. Therefore, it is important to defend against both known and unknown
side-channel attacks.
1.2 Leakage-Resilient Cryptography
As discussed above side-channels leak some amount of information about the secret
parameters to the adversary. The basic idea of leakage-resilient cryptography is,
even though some leaking information is visible to the adversary, the security of
the cryptographic scheme remains. Trying to stop the leakage is nearly impossible
because electronic devices have their physical limitations.
Even though a cryptographic scheme may be proven secure in a strong security
model which does not address leakage attacks, it is not possible to say anything
about the security of the cryptographic scheme in an environment where the
adversary is capable of obtaining leakage information. In order to analyze the
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leakage resiliency of cryptographic schemes we need to construct security models
where the adversary is given capability of obtaining leakage information.
Di↵erent leakage models have been introduced to capture side-channel attacks.
They provide leakage based information to the adversary under di↵erent con-
straints. In order to achieve leakage resilience in a particular leakage model, the
scheme should be proven secure even when the adversary is capable of accessing
leakage information in that particular leakage model.
Continuous Leakage Model. In the pioneering work of Micali and Reyzin
[MR04], a general framework was introduced to model the leakage that occurs
when computation takes place on secret parameters. This framework relies on
the assumption that “only computation leaks information”. Further, Micali and
Reyzin mentioned that leakage only occurs from the secret memory portions which
are actively involved in computations, and the amount of leakage per occurrence
is less than the size of the corresponding secret memory portion, hence bounded
by a leakage parameter  . The adversary is allowed to obtain leakage from an
arbitrarily large number of computations, hence the overall leakage amount is
unbounded and it can be larger than the size of the secret key. This leakage model
addresses side-channel attacks such as timing attacks, power analysis attacks
and EM emission based attacks, which obtain leakage of secret values whenever
computations take place on them.
This model is suitable to analyze stateful leakage-resilient cryptographic
schemes [DP08,Pie09a], where at the end of each ith execution round a new secret
key state ski+1 is computed using the current secret key state ski. ski+1 is going
to be used as the secret parameter of the next execution round i+ 1. Before the
ith round an attacker chooses (adaptively) a leakage function fi and after the
execution of the round, it receives fi(ski), under the constrain that |fi(ski)|   .
Bounded Leakage Model. Inspired by “cold boot” attacks Akavia, Gold-
wasser and Vaikuntanathan constructed a general framework to model memory
attacks [AGV09]. The adversary can adaptively choose an e ciently computable
arbitrary leakage function, fi and send it to the leakage oracle. The leakage oracle
gives fi(sk) to the adversary where sk is the secret key. The only restriction
comes here is that ⌃|fi(sk)|   , where   is the leakage parameter, which is
smaller than the size of sk.
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This model is suitable to analyze stateless leakage-resilient cryptographic
schemes which are not using new secret states for each round.
After-the-fact Leakage. Leakage which happens after the challenge is given
to the adversary is considered as after-the-fact leakage. In security experiments
for public-key cryptosystems, the challenge to the adversary is, given a ciphertext,
distinguish the corresponding plaintext. In key exchange security models, the
challenge to the adversary is to identify the real session key of a chosen session
from a random session key [BR93,CK01,LLM07]. In leakage models for public-
key cryptosystems, after-the-fact leakage is the leakage which happens after the
challenge ciphertext is given whereas in leakage-resilient key exchange security
models, after-the-fact leakage is the leakage which happens after the session key
is established.
Earlier leakage models only consider the leakage which happens before the
challenge is given (before-the-fact leakage). Hence the adversary is not allowed to
obtain leakage after the challenge is given. Recent leakage models facilitate more
granular leakage by allowing the adversary to issue leakage functions, and obtain
leakage even after the challenge is given, either under the bounded or continuous
leakage assumptions as explained above.
For leakage-resilient public-key encryption there are three properties which
may be important di↵erentiators for the di↵erent models. One is whether the
model allows access to decryption of chosen ciphertexts before (CCA1) and after
(CCA2) the challenge is known. The second is whether the leakage allowed to the
adversary is continuous or bounded. The third is whether the leakage is allowed
only before the challenge ciphertext is known or also after the fact.
In earlier models, such as that of Naor and Segev [NS09], it was expected
that although the adversary is given access to the decryption oracle (CCA2),
the adversary cannot be allowed to obtain leakage after the challenge ciphertext
is given. This is because the adversary can encode the decryption algorithm
and challenge ciphertext with the leakage function and by revealing a few bits
of the decrypted value of the challenge ciphertext trivially win the challenge.
Subsequently, Halevi and Lin [HL11] introduced after-the-fact leakage-resilient
semantic security (CPLA2) on public-key cryptosystems, in the bounded leakage
model. In their security experiment, the adversary is not allowed to access the
decryption oracle. Dziembowski and Faust [DF11] defined an adaptively-chosen
ciphertext after-the-fact leakage (CCLA2) in which the adversary is allowed to
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access the decryption oracle adaptively and obtain leakage information even after
the challenge ciphertext is given. Furthermore, they allow continuous leakage, so
the total leakage amount is unbounded.
Modelling Compression-based Plaintext Leakage. The compression-based
leakage is somewhat di↵erent from the information leakage we discussed in Sec-
tion 1.1. First, in this scenario the leakage is from the plaintext that is being
encrypted, rather than from the long-term secret keys. Second, this leakage is
due to compression, which only leaks the length of the resulting output. Thus,
previous leakage-resilient approaches are not suitable to model compression-based
side-channel attacks. Let pt be the plaintext that is being encrypted, and f be an
e ciently computable leakage function. If we consider the leakage as the output
of f(pt), then according to the scenario of compression-based leakage, the leakage
function f belongs to a specific class, that only outputs length information. Since
the leakage information of the compression-based leakage attacks is in the form of
length information, it is reasonable to model that leakage using a leakage function
f from a specific class that only output length information.
1.3 Research Objective and Thesis Outline
In this section we explain the objective of our research and the outline of this
thesis in detail.
1.3.1 Objective
Due to the side-channel attacks, the long-term secret keys (in the key exchange
phase), the session keys and the plaintext messages (in the message transmission
phase) can be partially leaked to the adversary. Much research has been carried
out in analyzing the partial leakage of secret keys (session keys) for symmetric-key
encryption schemes and constructing leakage-resilient symmetric-key encryption
schemes [DP08,SPY13,Pie09b], which addresses the issue of side-channel attacks
in the message transmission phase. Therefore, that area is of research is covered to
some extent. In this research, we address leakage of long-term secret keys in the key
exchange phase, compression-based leakage attacks in the data transmission phase,
and construct necessary leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives. Therefore, this
research and the previous works on leakage-resilient symmetric-key encryption,
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together can be used to build a stronger leakage-resilient secure channel suite for
communication.
Leakage of long-term secret keys in the key exchange. With the devel-
opment of side-channel attacks, a necessity arises to develop cryptosystems in a
leakage-resilient manner. Being one of the important cryptographic primitives,
key exchange protocols were considered to be constructed in a leakage-resilient
manner. Even though most of the current key exchange security models like
Bellare-Rogaway (BR) model [BR93], Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) model [CK01],
extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model [LLM07] address di↵erent adversarial
capabilities, they do not address the partial leakage of long-term secret parameters
due to the side-channel attacks. Those do not su ce for analyzing the security of
existing key exchange protocols in a leaky environment. Thus, there is a necessity
to design new leakage security models for key exchange. Using those leakage
security models it is possible to design and analyze leakage-resilient key exchange
protocols.
Our first objective is to study the leakage resiliency of key exchange protocols.
In order to address leakage resilience of key exchange protocols, it is necessary to
construct key exchange security models which allow the adversary to obtain leakage
information about secret parameters of protocol participants. We will introduce
various leakage features such as continuous leakage, bounded leakage, after-the-
fact leakage into key exchange security models. Our ultimate goal is to construct
a security model with strong leakage features, with no additional restrictions than
existing strong security models such as eCK model (bounded/continuous and
after-the-fact leakage in eCK-style security). This way we can introduce stronger
security models allowing more granular partial leakage of long-term secrets.
Leakage of the plaintext messages in the data transmission. We noticed
that constructing a leakage-resilient secure channel for data transmission will not
be completed with leakage-resilient key exchange and leakage-resilient symmetric-
key encryption. We have to consider another gap, which is how to address
compression-based leakage of plaintext data, even if we have a symmetric-key
encryption scheme which is resilient to the secret key leakage. Relatively less
academic research has been carried out in that area, and it is hard to find a
reasonable leakage model which addresses compression-based leakage.
Therefore, our second objective is to present reasonable models to address
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compression-based leakage and construct schemes which combine compression
and encryption, in a way that they can be proven secure in our compression-based
leakage models.
1.3.2 Outline
The organization and main contributions of this thesis are as follows.
Chapter 2: This chapter contains the technical background that will be useful
to understand the technical details in the rest of the thesis. We focus on mathe-
matical background, computational assumptions and cryptographic tools which
will be used in this thesis.
Chapter 3: This chapter contains material for understanding key exchange
protocols and security models for key exchange protocols. We contribute a new
protocol construction and prove its security in an existing security model (the
eCK model). This protocol will serve as the basis for a construction in Chapter 5.
Further, we give a brief introduction about a preliminary leakage security model
for key exchange, the Moriyama-Okamoto model [MO11], which is available in
the literature.
Portions of this chapter have appeared in the following publication.
• Janaka Alawatugoda, Colin Boyd and Douglas Stebila. Continuous After-
the-fact Leakage-Resilient eCK-secure Key Exchange. In Proceedings of
the 15th IMA International Conference Cryptography and Coding (IMACC
2015), pages 277-294, LNCS vol. 9496, Springer, 2015. December 15-17,
2015, Oxford, The United Kingdom. (Available at IACR Cryptology ePrint
Archive, Report: 2015/355)
Chapter 4: This chapter contributes a new leakage security model for key
exchange, which addresses continuous and after-the-fact leakage of long-term
secret keys, while enforcing additional restriction to the freshness condition,
compared to the eCK or Moriyama-Okamoto model. Further, we construct a new
generic protocol which is proven secure in the proposed model, using any suitable
leakage-resilient public-key encryption scheme. Thus, the contributions in this
chapter provide an initial solution for continuous and after-the-fact leakage of
long-term secret keys of key exchange protocol participants.
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Portions of this chapter have appeared in the following publication.
• Janaka Alawatugoda, Colin Boyd and Douglas Stebila. Continuous After-
the-fact Leakage-Resilient Key Exchange. In Proceedings of the 19th Aus-
tralasian Conference in Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2014),
pages 258-273, LNCS vol. 8544, Springer, 2014. July 07-09, 2014, Wollon-
gong, Australia. (Available at IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report:
2014/264)
Chapter 5: This chapter contributes two after-the-fact leakage security models
for key exchange: one addresses bounded leakage and the other one addresses
continuous leakage of long-term secret keys. This model contains eCK-style
freshness condition, which also appears in eCK or Moriyama-Okamoto model.
The eCK-style freshness condition is interesting because it allows the adversary
to learn many combinations of the long-term and the ephemeral secrets from the
target session. Thus, it releases the additional restrictions we enforced for the
freshness condition of the security model in Chapter 4.
First, we present a new generic protocol construction, using any suitable
leakage-resilient public-key encryption scheme and any suitable leakage-resilient
signature scheme. The generic protocol construction is proven secure in either the
bounded or the continuous leakage security model (at this point we use a slightly
weakened version of the bounded/continuous leakage eCK-style model, due to
limitations of existing leakage-resilient signature schemes). Then, we give a new
concrete construction of a key exchange protocol which can be proven secure in
the proposed continuous leakage eCK-like model (now we use the full continuous
leakage eCK-like model without any restriction), using a leakage-resilient storage
scheme and its refreshing protocol. Thus, the contributions in this chapter provide
solutions for continuous/bounded and after-the-fact leakage of long-term secret
keys of key exchange protocol participants, with more powerful eCK-style security.
Portions of this chapter have appeared in the following publications.
• Janaka Alawatugoda, Colin Boyd and Douglas Stebila. Modelling After-the-
fact Leakage for Key Exchange. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM Symposium
in Information, Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS 2014),
pages 207-216, ACM Press, 2014. June 04-06, 2014, Kyoto, Japan. (Avail-
able at IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report: 2014/131)
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• Janaka Alawatugoda, Colin Boyd and Douglas Stebila. Continuous After-
the-fact Leakage-Resilient eCK-secure Key Exchange. In Proceedings of
the 15th IMA International Conference Cryptography and Coding (IMACC
2015), pages 277-294, LNCS vol. 9496, Springer, 2015. December 15-17,
2015, Oxford, The United Kingdom. (Available at IACR Cryptology ePrint
Archive, Report: 2015/355)
Chapter 6: This chapter contributes security notions to analyze compression-
based leakage on symmetric-key encryption schemes. Then, we examine two
possible mitigation techniques; separating secrets from user inputs and fixed-
dictionary compression, and prove their security in new security notions. Further,
we report on the amount of compressibility that they can achieve in an example
application scenario. Thus, the contributions in this chapter provide solutions
and open up new research directions in the context of compression-based leakage
attacks on symmetric-key encryption schemes.
The content of this chapter has appeared in the following publication.
• Janaka Alawatugoda, Colin Boyd and Douglas Stebila. Protecting En-
crypted Cookies from Compression Side-Channel Attacks. In Proceedings
of the 19th International Conference in Financial Cryptography and Data
Security (FC 2015), pages 86-106, LNCS vol. 8975, Springer, 2015. Jan-
uary 26-29, 2015, San Juan, Puerto Rico, The United States of America.
(Available at IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report: 2014/724)
Chapter 7: This chapter summarizes the results obtained in this thesis and
discusses future research directions.
Appendix A Appendix A gives the source code of the experiments done related
to Chapter 6, to report the compressibility of separating secrets from user inputs
and fixed-dictionary compression mitigation techniques.
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In this chapter we describe several background concepts that help to under-
stand the rest of the thesis. We describe the mathematical background, computa-
tional assumptions and cryptographic tools which are useful to understand the
rest of the thesis.
2.1 Mathematical Background
In this thesis, we assume that all the parties (including the adversary) involved
in a cryptographic protocol are probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms.
We now define negligible function which is useful in measuring the advantage of
adversary against a cryptographic challenge or a computationally hard problem.
Definition 2.1.1 (Negligible). A function µ : N ! R is negligible, if for every
positive polynomial p(·) there exists an N 2 N such that for all k > N , µ(k) < 1p(k) .
Hence, the advantage of an adversary against a cryptographic challenge or a
computationally hard problem is called negligible, if the advantage is negligible in
the given security parameter k. A typical security parameter for a cryptographic
algorithm is the length of its key.
2.1.1 Algebra
Definition 2.1.2 (Group). A group G is a set along with an operation   which
satisfies the following axioms:
G 1.   is associative.
G 2. There is an element e 2 G, called the identity, such that e  a = a = a  e
for all a 2 G.
G 3. Each element in G is invertible: for each s 2 G, there exists b 2 G such
that a  b = b  a = e.
Definition 2.1.3 (Abelian Group). A group G is abelian if the operation   is
also commutative.
Definition 2.1.4 (Order of a Group). The order of a group G, denoted |G|, is
the number of elements in G.
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Definition 2.1.5 (Finite Group). If the order is finite, then G is said to be a
finite group.
Sometimes we write groups using multiplicative notion, where the operation
  is ⇥.
Definition 2.1.6 (Subgroup). Let G is a group with operation  . Let H be a
subset of G. Then H be a subgroup of G if H is closed under  , H contains the
identity of G, and H is closed under inversion.
Definition 2.1.7 (Cyclic Subgroup). H is a cyclic subgroup of G if there exists
some element x 2 G such that,
H = {. . . , x 2, x 1, 1, x, x2, . . . }
where we have used multiplicative notation for the group. We say that H is the
subgroup of G generated by x and write H = hxi; x is called a generator of H.
Definition 2.1.8 (Order of an Element). For every x 2 G, < x > is a subgroup
of G. The order of an element x 2 G, denoted ordG(x), is the order of hxi.
2.1.2 Number Theory
Definition 2.1.9 (Greatest Common Divisor). For two integers a, b the greatest
common divisor is denoted gcd(a, b), which is the largest integer g such that g
divides a and g divides b. The two integers a and b are said to be coprime if
gcd(a, b) = 1.
Definition 2.1.10 (The Euler Function). This is also called as Euler totient
function, denoted by  , gives the number of positive integers less than or equal
to n that are coprime to n:
'(n) = |{a : gcd(a, n) = 1  a  n}| .
If n is a prime number, then '(n) = n  1. If n = ab, where a, b 2 Z are coprime,
then '(n) = '(a)'(b).
Definition 2.1.11. A set of integers modulo a positive integer n is denoted Z/nZ
or Zn.
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2.2 Computational Assumptions
We now describe some computational assumptions which form the basis of security
for most cryptographic primitives.
Discrete Logarithm Assumption
Let k be the security parameter, G be a group generation algorithm and (G, q, g) 
G(1k), where G is a cyclic group of prime order q and g is an arbitrary generator
of G. The discrete logarithm of ga 2 G to the base g is the unique integer a 2 Zq.
The discrete logarithm problem (DLP) is computing the discrete logarithm of ga
to the base g, given a random instance (g, ga).
We say that discrete logarithm assumption holds in G if for all PPT algorithms,
the probability of solving the DLP in G is negligible for a given security parameter
k.
2.2.1 Di e-Hellman Problems
Computational Di e-Hellman (CDH) Assumption
Let k be the security parameter, G be a group generation algorithm and (G, q, g) 
G(1k) as described above. The CDH problem is to compute gab given a random
instance (g, ga, gb) for a, b 2 Zq.
We say that computational Di e-Hellman assumption holds in G if for all
PPT algorithms A, the probability of solving the CDH problem in G given as,
PrCDHg,q (A) = Pr
 A(G, g, q, ga, gb) = gab 
is negligible for a given security parameter k.
Decisional Di e-Hellman (DDH) Assumption
Let k be the security parameter, G be a group generation algorithm and (G, q, g) 
G(1k) as described above. Consider the following two distributions:
DHG = {(g, ga, gb, gab); a, b $   Zq}
and
RG = {(g, ga, gb, gc); a, b, c $   Zq} .
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It is said that DDH assumption holds in G if for all PPT algorithms A, the
advantage in distinguishing the two distributions DH and R given as,
AdvDDHg,q (A) =
   Pr[A(DHG) = 1]  Pr[A(RG) = 1]   
is negligible for a given security parameter k.
Gap Di e-Hellman (GDH) Assumption
Let G, q, g be as described above. Given a random instance (g, ga, gb) for a, b 2 Zq,
the GDH problem is to find gab given an oracle O that solves the Decisional
Di e-Hellman problem in G.
It is said that GDH assumption holds in G if for all PPT algorithms A, the
probability of solving the GDH problem is given as,
PrGDHg,q (A) = Pr
 A(G, g, q,O, ga, gb) = gab 
is negligible for a given security parameter k.
Oracle Di e-Hellman (ODH) Assumption [ABR01]
Let G, q, g be as described above, and H be arbitrary e ciently computable
function. A PPT adversary R is interacting with the Oracle Di e-Hellman
challenger, which is defined using the following game:
• u, v $   Zq
• Z0  H(guv);Z1 $   {0, 1}k
• b $   {0, 1}
• b0  ROODH(gu, gv, Zb)
• R wins if b0 = b
OODH Oracle
• If X = gu, return ?
• Else return H(Xv)
It is said that ODH assumption holds in G if for all PPT algorithms R, the
the advantage of winning the ODH challenge is negligible in k.
In the security proof of protocol ⇡ in chapter 5, we will use this ODH challenger,
where the function H is replaced by a key derivation function KDF.
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2.3 Cryptographic Tools
We now present the cryptographic tools which will be useful in understanding
the later chapters of this thesis.
2.3.1 The Random Oracle Model
In the random oracle model, it is assumed that there is an oracle which is capable
of answering each distinct query with a truly random value, and any query which
is previously asked from the random oracle will be answered with the exact same
value. This is an ideal world assumption rather than a real world assumption.
Actually, it is assumed that the random oracle can answer any query within
polynomial time. Every party, even the adversary, has access to the random
oracle.
Random oracles are widely used in cryptography as abstract functions. By
using random oracles, proofs can often be done e ciently and cleanly. The
main limitation of the random oracle model is that no function computable by
a finite algorithm can implement a true random oracle. Nevertheless, for any
natural protocol a proof of security in the random oracle model gives very strong
evidence of the practical security of the protocol; If a protocol is proven secure in
the random oracle model, attacks to the protocol must either be outside what
was proven, or break one of the assumptions in the proof. In the real world
implementations random oracles are often replaced with a hash function. Then,
to break the random oracle assumption, one must discover some unknown and
undesirable property of the actual hash function. For good hash functions where
such properties are believed unlikely, therefore the considered protocol can be
considered secure.
2.3.2 Public-Key Encryption
A public-key encryption scheme consists of three algorithms as follows:
• KG: This is a PPT algorithm that takes as input the security parameter and
outputs a public/secret key pair (pk, sk). This also specifies the message
(plaintext) space M and the ciphertext space C.
• Enc: This is a PPT algorithm that takes as input m 2M and a public-key
pk, and outputs a ciphertext c 2 C.
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• Dec: This is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a ciphertext
c 2 C and a secret key sk, and outputs either a message m 2M or the
error symbol ?.
A public-key encryption scheme must satisfy the correctness property: for all
valid key pairs (pk, sk), if c = Encpk(m) for any m 2M, then Decsk(c) = m.
We now review two security notions for public-key encryption schemes: in-
distinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) and
indistinguishability against adaptive chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA), referring
Bellare et al. [BDPR98].
Definition 2.3.1 (Indistinguishability against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext At-
tacks (IND-CCA2)). Let A = (A1,A2) be any PPT adversary in the security
parameter k, against a public-key encryption scheme PKE = (KG,Enc,Dec).
The IND-CCA2 security experiment for the public-key encryption scheme PKE,
ExpIND-CCA2PKE,A (1
k), is defined as follows:
1. (pk, sk)
$   KG(1k)
2. (m0,m1, state)  ADec(sk,c)1 (pk)
such that |m0| = |m1|
3. b
$   {0, 1}
4. c⇤  Enc(pk,mb)
5. b0  ADec(sk,c)c⇤6=c2 (pk, c⇤, state)
6. A wins if b0 = b
Decryption Oracle
• Dec(sk, c)! m where m is the cor-
responding plaintext c.
• returns m to A
The public-key encryption scheme PKE is IND-CCA2-secure, if for every PPT
adversary A the advantage of winning the security experiment ExpIND-CCA2PKE (A):
AdvIND-CCA2PKE (A), is negligible in the security parameter k.
Definition 2.3.2 (Indistinguishability against Adaptive Chosen Plaintext Attacks
(IND-CPA)). Let A = (A1,A2) be any PPT adversary in the security parameter
k, against a public-key encryption scheme PKE = (KG,Enc,Dec). The IND-CPA
security experiment for the public-key encryption scheme PKE, ExpIND-CPAPKE,A (1
k),
is defined as follows:
1. (pk, sk)
$   KG(1k)
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2. (m0,m1, st) A1(pk) such that |m0| = |m1|
3. b
$   {0, 1}
4. c⇤  Enc(pk,mb)
5. b0  A2(pk, c⇤, st)
6. A wins if b0 = b
The public-key encryption scheme PKE is IND-CPA-secure, if for every PPT
adversary A the advantage of winning the security experiment ExpIND-CPAPKE,A (1k):
AdvIND-CPAPKE (A), is negligible in the security parameter k.
2.3.3 Digital Signature
A digital signature scheme SIG = (KG, Sign,Vfy) consists of three algorithms as
follows:
• KG: This is a PPT algorithm that takes as input the security parameter 1k
and outputs a public-verification/secret-signing key pair (vk, sk). This also
specifies the message (plaintext) space M and the signature space S.
• Sign: This is a PPT algorithm that takes as input m 2M and a secret
signing key sk, and outputs a signature   2 S.
• Vfy: This is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a signature   2 S
and a public verification key vk, and outputs a boolean value: true if   is a
valid signature under vk or false otherwise.
We now describe the security notion called existential unforgeability under
chosen message attacks (UFCMA).
Definition 2.3.3 (Existential Unforgeability under Chosen Message Attacks
(UFCMA)). Let A be any PPT adversary in the security parameter k, against
signature scheme SIG = (KG, Sign,Vfy).
A signature scheme SIG = (KG, Sign,Vfy) is UFCMA-secure if the advantage
of any PPT adversary A in the following game: AdvUFCMASIG (A), is negligible in
the security parameter k.
1. (sk, vk)
$   KG(1k)
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2. (m⇤,  ⇤) ASignm⇤6=m(sk,m)(vk)
3. If Vfy(vk,m⇤,  ⇤) = true, then A wins
2.3.4 Key Derivation Functions
We review the definitions of key derivation functions by Krawczyk [Kra08]. Secure
and e cient key derivation functions are available in the literature, for example
based on HMAC [Kra08].
Definition 2.3.4 (Key Derivation Function). Let k be the security parameter.
A key derivation function KDF is an e cient algorithm that accepts as input
four arguments: a value   sampled from a source of keying material ⌃, a length
value ` and two additional arguments, a salt value r defined over a set of possible
salt values and a context variable c, both of which are optional i.e., can be set to
a null. The KDF output is a string of ` bits.
Definition 2.3.5 (Source of Key Material). A source of keying material ⌃ is a
two-valued ( ,) probability distribution generated by an e cient probabilistic
algorithm, where   is the secret source key material to be input to the KDF and
 is some public knowledge about   or its distribution.
Definition 2.3.6 (Security of key derivation function with respect to a source of
key material). A key derivation function KDF is said to be secure with respect
to a source of key material ⌃, if no feasible attacker B can win the following
distinguishing game with probability significantly better than 1/2. In other words
the advantage: AdvKDF(B) of winning the following game is negligible in k.
1. ( ,)
$   ⌃(1k). (Both the probability distribution as well as the generating
algorithm have been referred to ⌃)
2. A salt value r is chosen at random from the set of possible salt values
defined by KDF (r may be set to a constant or a null value if so defined by
KDF).
3. The attacker B is provided with  and r.
4. B chooses arbitrary value ` and c.
5. A bit b
$   {0, 1} is chosen at random. If b = 0, attacker B is provided with
the output of KDF( , r, `, c) else B is given a random string of ` bits.
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6. B outputs a bit b0  {0, 1}. B wins if b0 = b.
In our standard model protocol construction in Chapter 5, we will use the
key derivation function of Krawczyk [Kra08] to derive the shared secrets in the
protocol principals. There we will use   as the secret value which the protocol
principals exchanged (Di e-Hellman value).
2.3.5 Pseudo Random Functions
Following we review the security definition of pseudo random function according
to Katz and Lindell [KL07].
Definition 2.3.7 (Pseudo Random Functions). Let F : {0, 1}⇤⇥{0, 1}⇤ ! {0, 1}⇤
be an e cient, length-preserving, keyed function. F is a pseudo random function
if for all PPT distinguishers J , there is a negligible function negl such that:   Pr[J F (key,·)(1k) = 1]  Pr[J frnd(·)(1k) = 1]  negl(k)   ,
where the first probability is taken over uniform choice of key 2 {0, 1}k and the
randomness of J , and the second probability is taken over uniform choice of frnd
and randomness of J , and J is not given a key key.
We will use the pseudo random function to derive the session key, in our
standard model protocol constructions in Chapter 4 and 5. In security proofs, we
use an OraclePRF which, given an input value, computes an output value either
using F or frnd. Task of the distinguisher J is to distinguish whether the output
is computed using F or frnd.
2.4 Leakage-Resilient Primitives
In this section we discuss the leakage-resilient cryptographic constructions, which
we will use for the protocol constructions in this thesis.
2.4.1 Leakage-Resilient Storage
We review the definitions of leakage-resilient storage according to Dziembowski
and Faust [DF11]. The idea behind their construction is to split the storage of
elements into two parts using a randomized encoding function. As long as leakage
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is limited from each of its two parts, no adversary can learn useful information
about an encoded element. The key observation of Dziembowski and Faust is then
to show how such encodings can be refreshed in a leakage-resilient way so that the
new parts can be re-used. To construct a continuous leakage-resilient primitive
the relevant secrets are split, used separately, and then refreshed between any
two usages.
Definition 2.4.1 (Dziembowski-Faust leakage-resilient storage scheme). For any
m,n 2 N, the storage scheme ⇤n,mZ⇤q = (Encode
n,m
Z⇤q ,Decode
n,m
Z⇤q ) e ciently stores
elements s 2 (Z⇤q)m where:
• Encoden,mZ⇤q (s) : sL
$   (Z⇤q)n\{(0n)}, then sR  (Z⇤q)n⇥m such that sL ·sR = s
and outputs (sL, sR).
• Decoden,mZ⇤q (sL, sR) : outputs sL · sR.
In the model we expect an adversary to see the results of a leakage function
applied to sL and sR. This may happen each time computation occurs.
Definition 2.4.2 ( -limited adversary). If the amount of leakage obtained by
the adversary from each of sL and sR is limited to   = ( 1, 2) bits in total
respectively, the adversary is known as a  -limited adversary.
Definition 2.4.3 (( ⇤, ✏1)-secure leakage-resilient storage scheme). We say ⇤ =
(Encode,Decode) is ( ⇤, ✏1)-secure leakage-resilient, if for any s0, s1
$  M and
any  ⇤-limited adversary C, the leakage from Encode(s0) = (s0L, s0R) and
Encode(s1) = (s1L, s1R) are statistically ✏1-close. For an adversary-chosen leakage
function f = (f1, f2), and a secret s such that Encode(s) = (sL, sR), the leakage
is denoted as
 
f1(sL), f2(sR)
 
.
Lemma 2.4.1 ( [DF11]). Suppose that m < n/20. Then ⇤n,mZ⇤q = (Encode
n,m
Z⇤q ,
Decoden,mZ⇤q ) is ( , negl(n))-secure for some negligible function negl and   =
(0.3 · n log q, 0.3 · n log q).
The encoding function can be used to design di↵erent leakage resilient schemes
with bounded leakage. The next step is to define how to refresh the encoding so
that a continuous leakage is also possible to defend against.
Definition 2.4.4 (Refreshing of Leakage-Resilient Storage [DF11]). Let (L0, R0) 
Refreshn,mZ⇤q (L,R) be a refreshing protocol that works as follows:
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• Input : (L,R) such that L 2 (Z⇤q)n and R 2 (Z⇤q)n⇥m.
• Refreshing R :
1. A
$   (Z⇤q)n\{(0n)} and B  non singular (Z⇤q)n⇥m such that A · B =
(0m).
2. M  full rank (Z⇤q)n⇥n such that L ·M = A.
3. X  M · B and R0  R +X.
• Refreshing L :
1. A˜
$   (Z⇤q)n\{(0n)} and B˜  full rank (Z⇤q)n⇥m such that A˜ · B˜ = (0m).
2. M˜  non-singular (Z⇤q)n⇥n such that M˜ ·R0 = B˜.
3. Y  A˜ · M˜ and L0  L+ Y .
• Output : (L0, R0)
Let ⇤ = (Encode,Decode) be a ( ⇤, ✏1)-secure leakage-resilient storage scheme
and Refresh be a refreshing protocol. We consider the following experiment Exp,
which runs Refresh for ` rounds and lets the adversary obtain leakage in each
round. For refreshing protocol Refresh, a  Refresh-limited adversary B, ` 2 N and
s
$  M, we denote the following experiment by Exp(Refresh,⇤)(B, s, `):
1. For a secret s, the initial encoding is generated as (s0L, s
0
R) Encode(s).
2. For j = 1 to ` run B against the jth round of the refreshing protocol.
3. Return whatever B outputs.
We require that the adversary B outputs a single bit b 2 {0, 1} upon performing
the experiment Exp using s
$   {s0, s1} 2 M. Now we define leakage-resilient
security of a refreshing protocol.
Definition 2.4.5 ((`, Refresh, ✏2)-secure Leakage-Resilient Refreshing Protocol).
For a ( ⇤, ✏1)-secure leakage-resilient storage scheme ⇤ = (Encode,Decode) with
message space M, Refresh is (`, Refresh, ✏2)-secure leakage-resilient, if for every
 Refresh-limited adversary B and any two secrets s0, s1 2 M, the statistical
distance between Exp(Refresh,⇤)(B, s0, `) and Exp(Refresh,⇤)(B, s1, `) is bounded by
✏2.
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Theorem 2.4.1 ( [DF11]). Let m/3  n, n   16 and ` 2 N. Let n,m and Z⇤q be
such that ⇤n,mZ⇤q is ( , ✏)-secure leakage-resilient storage scheme (Definition 2.4.1
and Definition 2.4.3). Then the refreshing protocol Refreshn,mZ⇤q (Definition 2.4.4)
is a (`, /2, ✏0)-secure leakage-resilient refreshing protocol for ⇤n,mZ⇤q (Definition
2.4.5) with ✏0 = 2`p(3pm✏+mp n 1).
We will use the leakage-resilient storage scheme and its refreshing protocol in
construction of the protocol in Table 5.2 in Chapter 5.
2.4.2 Adaptively Chosen Ciphertext After-the-fact Leak-
age Secure (CCLA2) Public-Key Cryptosystems
Dziembowski and Faust [DF11] constructed an adaptively chosen ciphertext
after-the-fact leakage-resilient public-key cryptosystem, which is secure against
continuous leakage. Following we review the CCLA2 security notion of Dziem-
bowski and Faust, which we will use for the security proof of the protocol in
Table 4.1 of Chapter 4.
Definition 2.4.6 (Security Against Adaptively Chosen Ciphertext After-the-fact
Leakage Attacks (CCLA2)). This is a modification of the IND-CCA2 security
notion. Let k 2 be the security parameter,   be the leakage parameter and
fi be arbitrary, e ciently computable adaptive leakage functions. Let PKE =
(KG,Enc,Dec) be a public-key encryption scheme, we define AdvCCLA2PKE (D) as the
advantage of any PPT adversary D, winning the following game:
1. (sk, pk)
$   KG(1k).
2. (m0,m1, state)  DDec(sk,·,fi)(pk)
such that |m0| = |m1|
3. b
$   {0, 1}
4. C  Enc(pk,mb)
5. b0 $   DDec 6=C(sk,·,fi)(C, state)
6. Output b0. D wins if b0 = b
Decryption Oracle
• Dec(sk, c, fi)! (sk0,m) where m
is the corresponding plaintext of
the ciphertext c and sk0 is the up-
date of the secret key sk.
• compute fi(sk) whenever
|fi(sk)|   
• Update the secret state sk to sk0
• returns (m, fi(sk)) to A
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PKE is CCLA2-secure, if AdvCCLA2PKE (D) is negligible in k.
2.4.3 After-the-fact Leakage-resilient Semantically Secure
(CPLA2) Public-Key Cryptosystems
Splitting the secret key into arbitrarily number of parts is known as the split-state
model. The leakage is allowed from the splits of the secret key independently.
The secret key is split into an arbitrary number n˜ parts such that s = (s1, . . . , sn˜).
The tuple leakage function f = (f1j, . . . , fn˜j) is an adversary chosen e ciently
computable adaptive tuple leakage function, which consists of n˜ arbitrary leakage
functions, and j indicates the jth leakage occurrence. Each leakage function fij
leaks fij(si) from each si split of the secret key individually.
Halevi and Lin [HL11] constructed a generic after-the-fact leakage-resilient
semantically secure public-key cryptosystem, which is secure against bounded
leakage in the split-state model. It can be instantiated with the DDH-based
leakage-resilient public-key cryptosystem of Naor and Segev [NS09]. Following
we review the CPLA2 security notion of Halevi and Lin in the split-state model,
which we will use for the security proof of the protocol in Table 5.1 of Chapter 5.
Definition 2.4.7 (After-the-fact Leakage-resilient Semantic Security (CPLA2)).
This is a modification of the IND-CPA security notion. Let k 2 be the
security parameter and   = ( pre, post) be a tuple of two vectors, where  pre =
( pre1 , . . . , pren˜) is the leakage bound vector before the challenge ciphertext is
issued, and  post = ( post1 , . . . , postn˜) is the leakage bound vector after the
challenge ciphertext is issued. Let f be the leakage function as described above.
Let PKE = (KG,Enc,Dec) be a public-key cryptosystem, we define AdvCPLA2PKE (D)
as the advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary D, winning
the following game:
1. (s, p)
$   KeyGen(1k).
2. (m0,m1)  DLeak(f)(p) such that |m0| = |m1|, for i = 1, . . . , n˜, Leak(f)
returns fij(si) if
X
j
|fij(si)|   prei .
3. b
$   {0, 1}.
4. C
$   Enc(pk,mb).
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5. b0  DLeak(f)(p, C) for i = 1 to i = n˜, Leak(f) returns fij(si) if
X
j
|fij(si)| 
 posti .
6. D wins if b0 = b.
PKE is CPLA2-secure, if AdvCPLA2PKE (D) is negligible in k.
Note that when we use this scheme in Chapter 5, we will consider   =
min( pre, post) for simplicity.
2.4.4 Unforgeability Against Chosen Message Leakage Se-
cure UFCMLA Signature Schemes
Katz et al. [KV09] constructed an unforgeability against chosen message leakage
attacks secure signature scheme in bounded leakage model. It contains signing and
verification operations based on NIZK proofs. Following we review the UFCMLA
security notion of Katz et al., which we will use for the security proof of the
protocol in Table 5.1 of Chapter 5.
Definition 2.4.8 (Unforgeability Against Chosen Message Leakage Attacks
(UFCMLA)). This is a modification of the UFCMA security notion. Let k 2
be the security parameter,   be the leakage parameter and fi be arbitrary
e ciently computable adaptive leakage functions. Let SIG = (KG, Sign,Vfy)
be a signature scheme, we define AdvUFCMLASIG (E) as the advantage of any PPT
adversary E , winning the following game:
1. r
$   {0, 1}⇤
2. (sk, vk)
$   KG(1k, r); st r
3. (m⇤,  ⇤) EOUFCMLA(·,·)(vk)
4. If Vfy(vk,m⇤,  ⇤) = “true” and
m⇤ is not been previously signed,
then E wins.
OUFCMLA(m, fi)
• ri
$   {0, 1}⇤
•   $   Sign(sk,m, ri)
• st st [ ri
• compute    fi(st) wheneverX
i
|fi(st)|   
• Return ( ,  ) to E
SIG is UFCMLA-secure, if AdvUFCMLASIG (E) is negligible in k.
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If we think about the split-state setting for the UFCMLA security notion,
above notion is same as the case where n˜ = 1, because the signing key sk has not
been split.
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In 1976, Di e and Hellman introduced a key exchange protocol [DH76], which
enables two parties to exchange a secret key (session key) by communicating over
a public channel.
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Users Alice and Bob agree on a group G of prime order q and on a generator
g of this group. This is done before executing the rest of the protocol, and g and
q are assumed to be public. Alice picks a random integer a
$   Zq and computes
A as follows and sends it to Bob.
A = ga
Bob picks a random integer b
$   Zq and computes B as follows and sends it to
Alice.
B = gb
Then, Alice computes
Ba = (gb)a = s 2 G
and Bob computes
Ab = (ga)b = s 2 G
Finally, both Alice and Bob end up with the same value s 2 G. An eavesdropper
who watches this communication can see A and B values, but should be unable
to determine the values of s (assuming CDH holds).
Many key exchange protocols have been created based on the Di e-Hellman
key exchange primitive [BMP00,DvOW92,Jab96]. In these key exchange protocols,
di↵erent types of keys may be used to compute session keys: long-term secret
keys are the static secrets belong to the protocol participants which are often used
to add authentication to the session key, ephemeral keys are the session specific
secrets belong to protocol participants which are used to add freshness to the
session key. There are number of known attacks against key exchange protocols:
Implicit Key Authentication. If a protocol provides a guarantee that no
party apart from the protocol participants can compute the session key, that
key exchange protocol is said to provide implicit key authentication. If a key
exchange protocol provides implicit key authentication that protocol is said to be
an authenticated key exchange protocol.
Key Confirmation. If a key exchange protocol provides a guarantee that each
party is assured that all other participants possess the session key, that key
exchange protocol is said to provide key confirmation.
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Known Key Security. The knowledge of a session key should not enable the
adversary to learn the session keys in other sessions; all session keys should not
be depended on the session keys of other sessions.
Unknown Key Share (UKS) Security. It should not happen that a party
A shares a session key with some party B, but believing that it is sharing the
session key with some one else C. That means public keys and identities of the
parties should be certified and confirmed or incorporated into protocol execution.
Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) Resistance. Knowing the long-
term secret key of a party A should not enable the adversary to impersonate
other honest parties to A.
Forward Secrecy. An adversary who knows the long-term secret keys of parties
should not be able to compute the session keys of past sessions between those
two particular parties.
3.1 Key Exchange Security Models
In order to analyze the security of key exchange protocols, a formal methodology
is needed. Therefore, key exchange security models have been created. A security
model is a formal security statement of certain security features. Generally, secu-
rity models are designed to reflect real world adversarial capabilities, addressing
the known attacks (mentioned earlier). At the same time, it is natural to design
security models with theoretical adversaries which have more capabilities than
real world adversaries, because that way it is possible to address more powerful
attacks which may exist in the future. Following is the general structure of a
security model.
• Definition of the algorithm: Inputs, outputs and abstract description
of the algorithm.
• Adversary capabilities: How the adversary can interact with the system
and which information the adversary is allowed to learn, usually in the form
of queries. As a usual practice the adversary is made as strong as possible
by giving more capabilities to the adversary.
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• Security game: The way in which the adversary perform queries.
• Security goal: The requirement for the adversary to win the security
game.
In a security model, there is a predefined list of queries that an adversary can
perform (adversary capabilities). Those queries reveal information such as session
keys, ephemeral keys, long-term secret keys etc. Even after performing the queries,
within the constraints defined in the security model, if the adversary’s advantage
of distinguishing the real session key from a random key chosen from the same
distribution is negligible, the protocol is said to be secure in the particular security
model. The session in which the adversary tries to distinguish the real session
key from a random key, is known as the target session.
The Bellare-Rogaway models (BR93 [BR93], BR95 [BR95]), the Canetti-
Krawczyk (CK) model [CK01], and the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model
[LLM07] are a few such security models, and protocol designers use them to
analyze the security of key exchange protocols. We briefly look at a few of the
earlier models such as the BR models and the CK model, and then discuss the
eCK model in detail, as it is a more recent and widely used security model.
The Bellare-Rogaway Models. The BR93 model [BR93] is the first formal
security model for key exchange protocols, in which the adversary is defined
as a probabilistic polynomial time machine that initiates and controls all the
communications between the protocol participants. Moreover, the adversary
is allowed to reveal the session keys, learn the complete internal state of the
protocol participants by corrupting the protocol participants, and overwrite the
long-term secret key of the corrupted participant with any value of her choice.
The Bellare-Rogaway models defined a notion for partner sessions. The definition
of partner sessions is used in the security definition, to restrict the adversary’s
reveal and corrupt operations to sessions that are not partners of the target
session. In the BR models security is defined on the notions of partner sessions
and the indistinguishability of session keys.
The BR93 model defines the partnership using the notion of matching con-
versations, where a conversation is defined to be the sequence of messages sent
and received by a particular protocol instance (session) of a protocol participant.
In the BR95 model, the partnership is defined using the notion of a partner
function, which uses the transcript containing the record of all messages sent and
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received by a particular protocol instance (session) of a protocol participant, to
determine the partner sessions. However, such partner definitions can easily go
wrong [CBHM04].
Canetti-Krawczyk Model. In the CK model, the adversary is allowed to ini-
tiate and control all the communications between the protocol participants, reveal
the session keys, learn the complete internal state of the protocol participants
by corrupting the protocol participants and overwrite the long-term secret key
of the corrupted participant with any value of her choice, as in the BR models,
and additionally reveal the internal state of the protocol participants (but not
the long-term secret keys). The partner sessions are defined using the notion
of matching session identifiers (SIDs) and partner identifiers (PIDs). There is
no formal definition of how SIDs should be defined and the values of SIDs are
not specified in the CK model. It is assumed that the SIDs are known by the
protocol participants before the protocol begins. Such an assumption may not be
practical, because it requires some form of communication between the protocol
participants before the protocol begins. The definition of partner sessions is used
in the security definition, to restrict the adversary’s session key reveal, session
state reveal and corrupt operations to sessions that are not partners of the target
session. In the CK model security is defined on the notions of partner sessions and
the indistinguishability of session keys, which is similar to the security definition
of the BR models.
In the BR models and the CK model, the adversary is not allowed to learn the
long-term secret key of the owner of the target session, before it expires. Therefore,
those models are not capable of addressing the key compromise impersonation
attacks. Moreover, the BR models and the CK model not allow the adversary
to reveal the session states or ephemeral keys of the target session or its partner
session. Therefore, those models are not capable of addressing the ephemeral key
leakage attacks. We will discuss the technical details of key exchange security
models in detail, in section 3.1.1. We intentionally choose the eCK model for
detailed discussion, because we use the eCK model as the foundation to build-up
our leakage security models for key exchange protocols.
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3.1.1 Extended Canetti-Krawczyk Model (eCK)
Parties and Long-term Keys
Let U = {U1, . . . , UNP } be a set of NP parties. Each party Ui where i 2 [1, NP ]
has a pair of long-term public and secret keys, (pkUi , skUi). Each party Ui owns
at most NS number of protocol sessions.
Sessions
Each party may run multiple instances of the protocol concurrently or sequentially;
we use the term principal to refer a party involved in a protocol instance, and
the term session to identify a protocol instance at a principal. The notation
⇧sU,V represents the s
th session at the owner principal U , with intended partner
principal V . The principal which sends the first protocol message of a session is
the initiator of the session, and the principal which responds to the first protocol
message is the responder of the session. A session ⇧sU,V enters an accepted state
when it computes a session key. Note that a session may terminate without
ever entering into the accepted state. The information of whether a session has
terminated with or without acceptance is public.
Partnering
Legitimate execution of a key exchange protocol between two principals U and
V makes two partnering sessions owned by U and V respectively. Two sessions
⇧sU,V and ⇧
s0
U 0,V 0 are said to be partners if all of the following hold:
1. both ⇧sU,V and ⇧
s0
U 0,V 0 have computed session keys;
2. messages sent from ⇧sU,V and messages received by ⇧
s0
U 0,V 0 are identical;
3. messages sent from ⇧s
0
U 0,V 0 and messages received by ⇧
s
U,V are identical;
4. U 0 = V and V 0 = U ;
5. Exactly one of U and V is the initiator and the other is the responder.
The protocol is said to be correct if two partner sessions compute identical session
keys.
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Adversarial Powers
The adversary A is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm in the security
parameter k, that has the control over the whole network. A interacts with set
of sessions which represent protocol instances. A can adaptively ask following
queries.
• Send (U, V, s,m) query- This query allows A to run the protocol. It sends
the message m to the session
Qs
U,V as coming from the session
Qs0
V,U .
Qs
U,V
will return to A the next message according to the protocol conversation so
far or decision on whether to accept or reject the session. A can also use this
query to initiate a new protocol instance with blank m. This query captures
capabilities of active adversary, who can initiate sessions and modify or
delay protocol messages.
• Session-Key reveal (U, V, s) query- If a session
Qs
U,V has accepted and
holds a session key, A gets the session key of QsU,V . A session can only
accept a session key once. This query captures the known key attacks.
• Ephemeral-Key reveal (U, V, s) query- Gives all the ephemeral keys (per
session randomness) of the session
Qs
U,V to A.
• Corrupt (U) query- A gets all the long-term secrets of the principal U . But
this query does not reveal any session keys to A. This query captures the
key compromise impersonation (KCI) attacks, unknown key share (UKS)
attacks and forward secrecy.
• Test (U, s) query- Once a session
Qs
U,V has accepted and holds a session
key, A can attempt to distinguish it from a random key. When A asks the
Test query, the session
Qs
U,V first chooses a random bit b 2 {0, 1} and if
b = 1, the actual session key is returned to A, otherwise a random session
key is chosen uniformly at random from the same session key distribution,
and is returned to A. This query is only allowed to be asked once.
Freshness
A session
Qs
U,V is said to be fresh if and only if all of the following hold:
1. The session
Qs
U,V and its partner (if it exists),
Qs0
V,U have not been asked
the Session- Key reveal query.
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2. If partner
Qs0
V,U exists none of the following combinations have been asked:
(a) Corrupt(U) and Ephemeral-Key reveal(U, V, s)
(b) Corrupt(V ) and Ephemeral-Key reveal(V, U, s0)
3. If partner
Qs0
V,U does not exist none of the following combinations have been
asked
(a) Corrupt(V )
(b) Corrupt(U) and Ephemeral-Key reveal(U, V, s)
Security Game
• Stage 0: The challenger generates the keys by using the security parameter
k.
• Stage 1: A is executed and may ask any of Send, Session-Key reveal,
Ephemeral-Key reveal and Corrupt queries to any session at will.
• Stage 2: At some point A chooses a fresh session and asks the Test query.
• Stage 3: A may continue asking Send, Session-Key reveal, Ephemeral-
Key reveal and Corrupt queries. The only condition is that A cannot
violate the freshness of the test session.
• Stage 4: At some point A outputs the bit b0 2 {0, 1} which is its guess of
the value b on the test session. A wins if b0 = b.
Definition of Security
Let SuccA be the event that the adversary A wins the eCK game.
Definition 3.1.1. A protocol (⇡) is said to be secure in the eCK model if there
is no PPT adversary A who can win the eCK game with non-negligible advantage
in the security parameter k. The advantage of an adversary A is defined as
AdveCK⇡ (A) = |2Pr(SuccA)  1| .
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The essential di↵erence between the eCK [LLM07] and the CK model is that
the eCK model substitutes the adversarial operation of revealing the complete
internal state of the protocol participants with a new operation to reveal the
ephemeral secret key, which reveals the randomness used in the specified session.
The important point to note is that the ephemeral key does not include the
session state that has been computed using the long-term secret of the protocol
participant. This is not the case in the CK model, in which the adversary is
allowed access to all the inputs (including the randomness, but excluding the
long-term secret itself) and the results of all the computations done as part of
a session. In the CK model, the adversary is not allowed to reveal the session
state of the target session or its partner session, whereas in the eCK model, the
adversary is allowed to reveal both of the ephemeral keys of the target session,
as long as the owner and the partner principals to the target session are not
corrupted. Thus, the eCK model can address the ephemeral key reveal attacks.
In the CK model, after the target session has expired, the adversary is allowed
to learn the long-term secret keys of the protocol participants of the target session,
regardless of whether the adversary actively interfered with the target session.
The eCK model only allows the adversary to learn the long-term secret keys
of both protocol participants of the target session when the adversary has not
actively interfered with the target session. Therefore, the CK model addresses
the perfect forward secrecy, while the eCK model only addresses the weak perfect
forward secrecy.
3.1.2 Leakage Security Models for Key Exchange Proto-
cols: Moriyama-Okamoto Model
Moriyama and Okamoto have presented a suitable security model to capture
leakage, and a proven secure protocol in that model [MO11]. The security
model introduced by Moriyama and Okamoto is based on the eCK model. The
Moriyama-Okamoto model allows the adversary to obtain leakage of a long-term
secret key sk, of a protocol principal U , by issuing adaptively-chosen arbitrary
leakage functions fi and specifying the identity of the protocol principal U . Hence,
in addition to the adversarial powers in the eCK, model Moriyama-Okamoto
model provides:
• StaticKeyLeakage(f, U) query: From this query the adversary obtains
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fi(sk) where sk denotes the long-term secret key of the principal U .
Further, it is important to study the constraints in the Moriyama-Okamoto
model. We can identify two main limitations in Moriyama-Okamoto model.
1. The adversary is allowed to obtain leakage from long-term secrets of protocol
participants; this leakage is bounded by some parameter  .
2. The model does not allow the adversary to obtain leakage after the test
session is activated.
Since the Moriyama-Okamoto model is restricted to the bounded leakage, it
can only address the side-channel attacks such as cold boot attacks (to some
extent), which happen due to the leakage of bounded amount of information from
the secret memory. The Moriyama-Okamoto model allows the adversary to reveal
either the long-term secret key or the ephemeral secret key of the target session
(same as in the eCK model). Additionally, the the Moriyama-Okamoto model
allows bounded amount of leakage of the long-term secret key with the ephemeral
secret key reveal from the target session. Thus the Moriyama-Okamoto model
addresses the cold boot attacks to some extent by addressing following situations:
the attacker reveals either (i) the long-term secret key, (ii) the ephemeral secret
key, or (iii) the ephemeral secret key and part of the long-term secret key of the
target session.
Di↵erently, side-channel attacks which happen due to the continuous leakage of
secret keys, such as timing attacks or power analysis attacks can not be modelled
using the Moriyama-Okamoto model. Because the Moriyama-Okamoto model
does not address continuous leakage of the long-term secret keys, which happens
whenever computations use the long-term secret keys. Further, restricting the
leakage to occur only before the target session is activated is not a natural
restriction. Therefore, although the Moriyama-Okamoto model addresses side-
channel attacks for some extent, there is some gap between the Moriyama-Okamoto
model and real world side-channel attacks.
Those two limitations are considered when defining the freshness of a session
in the Moriyam-Okamoto model.
Moriyama-Okamoto Freshness
A session
Qs
U,V is  -leakage fresh if the following conditions hold:
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•
Qs
U,V is a fresh session in the sense of the eCK model.
• Before the adversary activates the session
Qs
U,V , the total amount of leakage
that the adversary obtains from each partner principal of the session
Qs
U,V :
U and V , is bounded by the leakage parameter  .
• After the session
Qs
U,V is activated, no leakage is allowed from the partner
principals of the session
Qs
U,V .
Apart from the freshness condition, partnering and the security game are the
same as in the eCK model.
3.2 Key Exchange Protocols
In this section we look at a few well-known key exchange protocols. All examples
we consider here are two-party, two message-pass key exchange protocols, and all
of them are based on the Di e-Hellman key exchange protocol.
3.2.1 MQV Protocol
The MQV protocol [LMQ+98], shown in Table 3.1, is a key exchange protocol
based on the Di e-Hellman scheme and it is considered as a highly e cient
protocol. Following we describe the message flow of MQV protocol. In this
protocol, wA and rA are the long-term secret key and the ephemeral secret key
(respectively) of party A, which WA and RA are the corresponding public keys
of A. f denotes the bit length of n, the prime order of the base point P of a
finite elliptic curve, i.e., f = blog2 nc + 1. If Q is a finite elliptic curve point,
then Q¯ is defined as follows: Let xQ be the x-coordinate of Q, and let x¯Q be the
integer obtained from the binary representation of xQ. Then Q¯ is defined to be
the integer (x¯Q mod 2df/2e + 2df/2e).
The MQV protocol works on elliptic curve group. It is also possible to modify
this to be working in an arbitrary finite group. The MQV protocol has not been
formally proved in any security model.
3.2.2 HMQV Protocol
Krawczyk [Kra05] analyzed the MQV protocol and stated that the MQV fails
to satisfy some of the most important security properties such as resistance
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A B
wA
$   {0, 1}n wB $   {0, 1}n
WA  wAP WB  wBP
rA
$   {0, 1}n rB, $   {0, 1}n
RA  rAP RA  ! RB  rBP
RB   
sA  (rA + R¯AwA) (mod n) sB  (rB + R¯BwB) (mod n)
K  hsA(RB + R¯BWB) K  hsB(RA + R¯AWA)
K is the session key
Table 3.1: MQV protocol
to known-key attacks, resistance to basic impersonation attacks, resistance to
unknown key share (UKS) attacks, resistance to key compromise impersonation
(KCI) attacks and fails to provide perfect forward security. Then he created
another protocol which is known as “hashed-MQV” (HMQV). He claimed that the
HMQV is a hashed variant of the MQV with improved security while preserving
the performance of the MQV unchanged. The design and proof of HMQV is on
challenge-response signature schemes, which have the property that both signer
and challenger can compute the same signature.
The di↵erence of the HMQV over the MQV comes in the boxed line of the
MQV protocol shown in Table 3.1. In the MQV, the parties compute R¯A = (x¯RA
mod 2df/2e + 2df/2e) and R¯B = (x¯RB mod 2
df/2e + 2df/2e) whereas in the HMQV
they compute R¯A = H(RA, B) and R¯B = H(RB, A) where H is a hash function
modeled as a random oracle and A,B are identities of the intended partners. The
HMQV protocol has been formally proven in a variant of the CK model named as
the CK-HMQV model. We note that the proof for HMQV protocol is in random
oracle model.
3.2.3 NAXOS Protocol
The NAXOS protocol [LLM07] was originally published with the eCK model, and
it is proven secure in the eCK model. Table 3.2 shows the NAXOS protocol. Let
G be a group of prime order with generator g. Here a and A¯ are the long-term
secret and public keys of A, while x and X are the ephemeral secret and public
keys of A. The important feature we can see is that the long-term secret key and
the ephemeral secret key are combined using a hash function H1. The trick of
combining the long-term secret key and the ephemeral secret key is known as
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“NAXOS trick”. In this protocol both hash functions H1 and H are modeled as
random oracles.
A B
a
$   Zq b $   Zq
A¯ ga B¯  gb
x
$   Zq y $   Zq
x¯ H1(x, a) y¯  H1(y, b)
X = gx¯
X ! Y = gy¯
Y  
 = H(Y a, B¯H1(x,a), Y H1(x,a), A,B)  = H(A¯H1(y,b), Xb, XH1(y,b), A,B)
 is the session key
Table 3.2: NAXOS protocol
3.2.4 CMQV Protocol
Using the MQV, the HMQV and the NAXOS protocols Fujioka et al. [FSU09]
created a new key exchange protocol called “Combined MQV” (CMQV). Table
3.3 shows the CMQV protocol. Let G be a group of prime order with generator g.
Here a and A¯ are the long-term secret and public keys of A, while x and X are
the ephemeral secret and public keys of A. The main advantages of the CMQV
protocol are, better e ciency than the NAXOS protocol and proven-security in
the eCK model. The CMQV protocol uses the NAXOS trick to achieve the eCK
security. As for the NAXOS protocol, the CMQV security proof also uses the
random oracle assumption, because hash functions H1, H2 and H are modeled as
random oracles.
3.3 eCK-Secure Key Exchange without NAXOS
Trick: Protocol P1
The motivation of LaMacchia et al. [LLM07] in designing the eCK model was
that an adversary should have to compromise both the long-term and ephemeral
secret keys of a party in order to recover the session key.
Recently, some researchers worked on constructing eCK-secure key exchange
protocols without NAXOS trick [MO09,Yan13]. The motivation for such research
can be explained as follows: The exponent of the ephemeral public key can be
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A B
a
$   Zq b $   Zq
A¯ ga B¯  gb
x
$   Zq y $   Zq
x¯ = H1(x, a) y¯ = H1(y, b)
X = gx¯ Y = gy¯
(B,A,X)     !
(A,B,X,Y )       
E = H2(Y,A,B) D = H2(X,A,B)
  = (Y B¯E)x¯+Da   = (XA¯D)y¯+Eb
 = H( , X, Y, A,B)  = H( , X, Y, A,B)
 is the session key
Table 3.3: Two-pass CMQV protocol
leaked to the adversary at some point. But when we consider the eCK model, it
does not address the leakage of the exponent of the ephemeral public key in a
NAXOS-type protocol. Thus, it seems that there is an unnatural and indirect
assumption of a leakage-free exponentiation computation or leakage-free random
source, in the eCK-security proof of the NAXOS-type key exchange protocols.
Therefore, eliminating the NAXOS trick and still preserving the eCK security
would be more realistic.
3.3.1 Construction of Protocol P1
Influenced by the above motivation, we aim to construct a new eCK-secure key
exchange protocol which does not use the NAXOS trick, but combines long-term
secret keys and ephemeral secret keys to compute the session key, in a way that
guarantees eCK security of the protocol. Thus, we construct the key exchange
protocol P1 shown in Table 3.4, which is a Di e-Hellman-type key agreement
protocol. Let k be the security parameter and group G be generated using a
group generation algorithm which takes k as an input, where G be a group of
prime order q with generator g. Here a and A are the long-term secret and public
keys of Alice, while x and X are the ephemeral secret and public keys of Alice.
After exchanging the public values both principals compute a Di e-Hellman-type
shared secret, and then compute the session key using a random oracle H. We
use the random oracle because otherwise it is not possible to perfectly simulate
the interaction between the adversary and the protocol, in a situation where the
simulator does not know a long-term secret key of a protocol principal. Since the
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P1 protocol does not have a NAXOS computation, it does not contain a exponent
value, for which the leakage is not addressed in the eCK model. We will use the
P1 protocol as a building block for a leakage-resilient key exchange protocol in
chapter 5.
Alice (Initiator) Bob (Responder)
a
$   Z⇤q, A ga b $   Z⇤q, B  gb
x
$   Z⇤q, X  gx Alice,X    ! y $   Z⇤q, Y  gy
Bob,Y    
Z1  Ba, Z2  Bx Z 01  Ab, Z 02  Xb
Z3  Y a, Z4  Y x Z 03  Ay, Z 04  Xy
K  H(Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, Alice,X,Bob, Y ) K  H(Z 01, Z 02, Z 03, Z 04, Alice,X,Bob, Y )
K is the session key
Table 3.4: Concrete construction of Protocol P1
In order to compute the session key, the protocol P1 combines four components
(Z1  Ba, Z3  Y a, Z4  Y x, Z2  Bx) using the random oracle function H.
These four components cannot be recovered by the attacker without both the
ephemeral and long-term secret keys of at least one protocol principal, which
allows a proof of the eCK security.
3.3.2 Security Analysis of the Protocol P1
Theorem 3.3.1. If H is modeled as a random oracle and G is a group of prime
order q and generator g, where the gap Di e-Hellman (GDH) assumption holds,
then the protocol P1 is secure in the eCK model.
Let U = {U1, . . . , UNP } be a set of NP parties. Each party Ui owns at most
NS number of protocol sessions. Let A be any PPT adversary in the security
parameter k, against the protocol P1. Then, B is an e cient algorithm which
can be constructed using the adversary A, against the GDH problem such that
the advantage of A against the eCK-security of the protocol P1, AdveCKP1 is:
AdveCKP1 (A)  max
⇣
N2PN
2
S
 
PrGDHg,q (B)
 
, N2P
 
PrGDHg,q (B)
 
, N2PNS
 
PrGDHg,q (B)
 
,
N2PNS
 
PrGDHg,q (B)
 
, N2PNS
 
PrGDHg,q (B)
 
, N2P
 
PrGDHg,q (B)
 ⌘
.
(in 6 di↵erent cases in the proof B denotes di↵erent simulations)
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Proof. Let A denote the event that A wins the eCK challenge. Let H denote
the event that A queries the random oracle H with (CDH(A⇤, B⇤),CDH(B⇤, X⇤),
CDH(A⇤, Y ⇤),CDH(X⇤, Y ⇤), initiator, X, responder, Y ), where A⇤, B⇤ are the
long-term public-keys of the two partners to the test session, and X⇤, Y ⇤ are
their ephemeral public keys for this session. Note that when A = ga, B =
gb,CDH(A,B) = gab; also initiator is the initiator of the session and responder
is the responder of the session.
Pr(A)  Pr(A ^H) + Pr(A ^ H¯) .
Without the event H occurring, the session key given as the answer to the
Test query is random-looking to the adversary, and therefore Pr(A|H¯) = 12 .
Pr(A ^ H¯) = Pr(A|H¯) Pr(H¯), and therefore Pr(A ^ H¯)  12 . Hence,
Pr(A)  1
2
+ Pr(A ^H),
that is Pr(A ^H) = AdveCKP1 (A). Henceforth, the event (A ^H) is denoted as
A⇤.
Note 1. Let B be an algorithm against a GDH challenger. B receives L =
g`,W = gw as the GDH challenge and B has access to a DDH oracle, which
outputs 1 if the input is a tuple of (g↵, g , g↵ ). ⌦ : G ⇥ G ! G is a random
function known only to B, such that ⌦( ,⇥) = ⌦(⇥, ) for all  ,⇥ 2 G. B
will use ⌦( ,⇥) as CDH( ,⇥) in situations where B does not know logg   and
logg ⇥. Except with negligible probability, A will not recognize that ⌦( ,⇥) is
being used as CDH( ,⇥).
We construct the algorithm B using A as a sub-routine. B receives L =
g`,W = gw as the GDH challenge. We consider the following mutually exclusive
events, under two main cases:
1. A partner to the test session exists: the adversary is allowed to corrupt both
principals or reveal ephemeral keys from both sessions of the test session.
(a) Adversary corrupts both the owner and partner principals to the test
session - Event E1a
(b) Adversary corrupts neither owner or nor partner principal to the test
session - Event E1b
3.3. eCK-Secure Key Exchange without NAXOS Trick: Protocol P1 45
(c) Adversary corrupts the owner to the test session, but does not corrupt
the partner to the test session - Event E1c
(d) Adversary corrupts the partner to the test session, but does not corrupt
the owner to the test session - Event E1d
2. A partner to the test session does not exist: the adversary is not allowed to
corrupt the intended partner principal to the test session.
(a) Adversary corrupts the owner to the test session - Event E2a
(b) Adversary does not corrupt the owner to the test session - Event E2b
In any other situation the test session is no longer fresh. If event A⇤ happens
with non-negligible probability at least one of the following event should happen
with non-negligible probability.
[(E1a ^A⇤), (E1b ^A⇤), (E1c ^A⇤), (E1d ^A⇤), (E2a ^A⇤), (E2b ^A⇤)]
Hence,
AdveCKP1  max
⇣
Pr(E1a ^A⇤),Pr(E1b ^A⇤),Pr(E1c ^A⇤),
Pr(E1d ^A⇤),Pr(E2a ^A⇤),Pr(E2b ^A⇤)
⌘
.
Adversary corrupts both the owner and partner principals
to the test session - Event E1a
Event (E1a ^A⇤) : setup.
B establishes NP number of honest parties to which B assigns long-term se-
cret/public key pairs. For each honest party B maintains at most NS number of
sessions. B chooses two distinct random principals U⇤, V ⇤ $   {U1, . . . , UNP } and
two random numbers s⇤, t⇤ $   {1, . . . , NS}. B guesses the session ⇧s⇤U⇤,V ⇤ as the
target session and the session ⇧t
⇤
V ⇤,U⇤ as the partner to the target session. For
the rest of this event consider A as the long-term public key of U⇤ and B as the
long-term public key of V ⇤.
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Event (E1a ^A⇤) : simulation.
• Send: B uses X = L = g` as the ephemeral public key of ⇧s⇤U⇤,V ⇤ and
Y = W = gw as the ephemeral public key of ⇧t
⇤
V ⇤,U⇤ . Note that B does not
possess the ephemeral secret keys of sessions ⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤ and ⇧
t⇤
V ⇤,U⇤ .
• Corrupt: B answers all Corrupt queries faithfully.
• EphemeralKeyReveal: If EphemeralKeyReveal query to the session ⇧s⇤U⇤,V ⇤
or ⇧t
⇤
V ⇤,U⇤ is asked, B aborts the simulation. Otherwise B answers all
EphemeralKeyReveal queries faithfully.
• SessionKeyReveal: B answers all SessionKeyReveal queries faithfully.
• H(pos1, pos2, pos3, pos4, initiator, I, responder, J): B simulates the random
oracle H in the usual way. If A asks a H query such that pos4 = CDH(L,W ),
B aborts the game and answers the GDH challenge (B can find whether
pos4 = CDH(L,W ) or not by using the DDH oracle).
• Test: If the Test query is not asked to ⇧s⇤U⇤,V ⇤ with partner ⇧t
⇤
V ⇤,U⇤ , B aborts
the simulation. Otherwise, B obtains K  H(CDH(A,B),CDH(B,L),
CDH(A,W ),⌦(L,W ), U⇤, L, V ⇤,W ) (considering U⇤ is the initiator, oth-
erwise exchange the positions of (CDH(B,L), CDH(A,W )), (U⇤, V ⇤) and
(L,W ) respectively), and uses K as the real session key.
Event (E1a ^A⇤) : analysis.
We explained above that it is possible to perfectly simulate the answers to all
the adversarial queries. The probability that A selects the sessions ⇧s⇤U⇤,V ⇤ and
⇧t
⇤
V ⇤,U⇤ as the test session and its partner is at least
1
N2PN
2
S
, and the probability of
event (E1a ^A⇤) is non-negligible. The simulation of the view of eCK challenger
to the adversary A is perfect except with negligible probability. According
to the event A⇤, A queries the random oracle H with (CDH(A,B),CDH(B,L),
CDH(A,W ),CDH(L,W ), U⇤, L, V ⇤,W ). Hence, B can answer the GDH challenge
with probability,
PrGDHg,q (B)  
Pr (E1a ^A⇤)
N2PN
2
S
.
Thus,
Pr (E1a ^A⇤)  N2PN2S
⇣
PrGDHg,q (B)
⌘
. (3.1)
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Adversary corrupts neither owner or nor partner principal
to the test session - Event E1b
Event (E1b ^A⇤) : setup.
B establishes NP number of honest parties. For each honest party B maintains
at most NS number of sessions. B chooses two distinct random principals
U⇤, V ⇤ $   {U1, . . . , UNP }. B sets A = L = g` as the long-term public key of U⇤
and B = W = gw as the long-term public key of V ⇤. For the rest of the parties
B sets long-term secret/public key pairs according to the protocol specification.
Note that B does not possess the long-term secret keys of U⇤ and V ⇤.
Event (E1b ^A⇤) : simulation.
• Send: On behalf of honest protocol principals B selects ephemeral se-
cret/public key pairs according to the protocol specification.
• Corrupt: If Corrupt query to U⇤ or V ⇤ is asked, B aborts the simulation.
Otherwise B answers all Corrupt queries faithfully.
• EphemeralKeyReveal: B answers all EphemeralKeyReveal queries faith-
fully.
• SessionKeyReveal: B answers all SessionKeyReveal queries as follows:
1. If A asks a SessionKeyReveal query to a session where both U⇤ and
V ⇤ are involved (⇧·U⇤,V ⇤ or ⇧
·
V ⇤,U⇤), B uses the function ⌦ to compute
a value to replace CDH(L,W ) as ⌦(L,W ).
2. If A asks a SessionKeyReveal query to a session which is owned by
principal U⇤ (or V ⇤) and does not have a partner (where A sends E
having come from the partner and B does not possess the secret key
corresponding to E), B uses the function ⌦ to compute a value to
replace CDH(L,E) (or CDH(W,E)) as ⌦(L,E) (or ⌦(W,E)).
3. For any other SessionKeyReveal query B can easily compute the four
corresponding Di e-Hellman exponentiations, because B knows the
long-term secret keys of other principals and ephemeral secret keys
of partnered sessions. Then B queries the random oracle H with the
corresponding values and answers the SessionKeyReveal query.
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Since B uses the function ⌦ to compute values to replace Di e-Hellman
exponentiations in places where it does not possess both long-term and
ephemeral secret keys, B can maintain consistency when querying the
random oracle H.
• H(pos1, pos2, pos3, pos4, initiator, I, responder, J):
1. If initiator, responder /2 {U⇤, V ⇤}, B simulates the random oracle H
in the usual way.
2. If initiator = U⇤, B checks the random oracle for a previously asked
query, matching with the current one. If a match is found, B answers
with the corresponding random-oracle value. Otherwise:
– If B found all the positions except position 3 of a previously asked
random oracle query respectively matching with the positions of
the current random oracle query, B queries the DDH oracle with
(L, J, pos3). If the output is 1 and position 3 of the previously
asked random oracle query equals to ⌦(L, J), B answers with the
corresponding random-oracle value in the table. Else B answers
with a random value and stores the query and the answer in the
random oracle table.
– Else, B answers with a random value and stores the query and
the answer in the random oracle table.
Similarly when initiator = V ⇤ (but with W replacing L).
3. If responder = V ⇤, B checks the random oracle for a previously asked
query, matching with the current one. If a match is found, B answers
with the corresponding random-oracle value. Otherwise:
– If B found all the positions except position 2 of a previously asked
random oracle query respectively matching with the positions of
the current random oracle query, B queries the DDH oracle with
(W, I, pos2). If the output is 1 and position 2 of the previously
asked random oracle query equals to ⌦(W, I), B answers with the
corresponding random-oracle value in the table. Else B answers
with a random value and stores the query and the answer in the
random oracle table.
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– Else, B answers with a random value and stores the query and
the answer in the random oracle table.
Similarly when responder = U⇤ (but with L replacing W ).
4. If initiator 2 {U⇤, V ⇤} and responder 2 {U⇤, V ⇤} and A asks a H
query such that pos1 = CDH(L,W ), B aborts the game and answers
the GDH challenge (B can find whether pos1 = CDH(L,W ) or not by
using the DDH oracle).
• Test: If the Test query is not asked to a session where both U⇤ and V ⇤
are involved (⇧·U⇤,V ⇤ or ⇧
·
V ⇤,U⇤), B aborts the simulation. Otherwise, B
obtains K  H(⌦(L,W ),CDH(W,X),CDH(L, Y ),CDH(X, Y ), U⇤, X, V ⇤,
Y ) (considering U⇤ is the initiator, otherwise exchange the positions of
(CDH(W,X), CDH(L, Y )), (U⇤, V ⇤) and (X, Y ) respectively), and uses K
as the real session key.
Event (E1b ^A⇤) : analysis.
We explained above that it is possible to perfectly simulate the answers to
all the adversarial queries. The probability that A selects a session where both
U⇤ and V ⇤ are involved (⇧·U⇤,V ⇤ or ⇧
·
V ⇤,U⇤) as the test session is at least
1
N2P
, and
the probability of event (E1b ^A⇤) is non-negligible. According to the event
A⇤, A queries the random oracle H with (CDH(L,W ),CDH(W,X),CDH(L, Y ),
CDH(X, Y ), U⇤, X, V ⇤, Y ). Hence, B can answer the GDH challenge with the
probability,
PrGDHg,q (B)  
Pr (E1b ^A⇤)
N2P
.
Thus,
Pr (E1b ^A⇤)  N2P
⇣
PrGDHg,q (B)
⌘
. (3.2)
Adversary corrupts the owner to the test session, but does
not corrupt the partner to the test session - Event E1c
Event (E1c ^A⇤) : setup.
B establishes NP number of honest parties. For each honest party B maintains
at most NS number of sessions. B chooses two distinct random principals
U⇤, V ⇤ $   {U1, . . . , UNP }. B sets B = W = gw as the long-term public key of V ⇤.
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For the rest of the parties B sets long-term secret/public key pairs according to
the protocol specification. Note that B does not possess the long-term secret keys
of V ⇤. B chooses a random number s⇤ $   {1, . . . , NS} and guesses the session
⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤ as the target session.
Event (E1c ^A⇤) : simulation.
In the following description we assume that U⇤ is the initiator of the target
session. The same analysis can also be applied to the case where U⇤ is the
responder by adjusting the description as follows: In any place where we consider
the random oracle query H(CDH(A,B),⌦(W,L),CDH(A, Y ),CDH(X, Y ), U⇤, L,
V ⇤, Y ), exchange the positions of (⌦(W,L), CDH(A, Y )), (U⇤, V ⇤) and (X, Y )
respectively. Particularly, this change is relevant in the simulation of the Test
query and in the simulation of point 4 of the H query (consider pos3 instead of
pos2).
• Send: B uses X = L = g` as the ephemeral public key of ⇧s⇤U⇤,V ⇤ . Note that
B does not possess the ephemeral secret key of session ⇧s⇤U⇤,V ⇤ .
• Corrupt: If Corrupt query to V ⇤ is asked, B aborts the simulation. Other-
wise B answers all Corrupt queries faithfully.
• EphemeralKeyReveal: If EphemeralKeyReveal query to ⇧s⇤U⇤,V ⇤ is asked,
B aborts the simulation. Otherwise B answers all EphemeralKeyReveal
queries faithfully.
• SessionKeyReveal: B answers all SessionKeyReveal queries as follows:
1. If A asks a SessionKeyReveal query to a session which is owned by
principal V ⇤ and does not have a partner (whereA sends E having come
from the partner and B does not possess the secret key corresponding
to E), B uses the function ⌦ to compute a value to replace CDH(W,E)
as ⌦(W,E).
2. For any other SessionKeyReveal query B can easily compute the four
corresponding Di e-Hellman exponentiations, because B knows the
long-term secret keys of other principals and ephemeral secret keys
of partnered sessions. Then B queries the random oracle H with the
corresponding values and answers the SessionKeyReveal query.
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Since B uses the function ⌦ to compute values to replace Di e-Hellman
exponentiations in places where it does not possess both long-term and
ephemeral secret keys, B can maintain consistency when querying the
random oracle H.
• H(pos1, pos2, pos3, pos4, initiator, I, responder, J):
1. If initiator, responder /2 {V ⇤}, B simulates the random oracle H in the
usual way.
2. If initiator = V ⇤, B checks the random oracle for a previously asked
query, matching with the current one. If a match is found, B answers
with the corresponding random-oracle value. Otherwise:
– If B found all the positions except position 3 of a previously asked
random oracle query respectively matching with the positions of
the current random oracle query, B queries the DDH oracle with
(W,J, pos3). If the output is 1 and position 3 of the previously
asked random oracle query equals to ⌦(W,J), B answers with the
corresponding random-oracle value in the table. Else B answers
with a random value and stores the query and the answer in the
random oracle table.
– Else, B answers with a random value and stores the query and
the answer in the random oracle table.
3. If responder = V ⇤, B checks the random oracle for a previously asked
query, matching with the current one. If a is match found, B answers
with the corresponding random-oracle value. Otherwise:
– If B found all the positions except position 2 of a previously asked
random oracle query respectively matching with the positions of
the current random oracle query, B queries the DDH oracle with
(W, I, pos2). If the output is 1 and position 2 of the previously
asked random oracle query equals to ⌦(W, I), B answers with the
corresponding random-oracle value in the table. Else B answers
with a random value and stores the query and the answer in the
random oracle table.
– Else, B answers with a random value and stores the query and
the answer in the random oracle table.
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4. If A asks a H query such that pos2 = CDH(W,L), B aborts the game
and answers the GDH challenge (B can find whether pos2 = CDH(W,L)
or not by using the DDH oracle).
• Test: If the Test query is not asked to ⇧s⇤U⇤,V ⇤ , B aborts the simulation. Oth-
erwise, B obtains K  H(CDH(A,W ),⌦(W,L),CDH(L, Y ),CDH(X, Y ),
U⇤, L, V ⇤, Y ), and uses K as the real session key.
Event (E1c ^A⇤) : analysis.
We explained above that it is possible to perfectly simulate the answers to
all the adversarial queries. The probability that A selects the session ⇧s⇤U⇤,V ⇤
as the test session is at least 1
N2PNS
, and the probability of event (E1c ^A⇤) is
non-negligible. According to the event A⇤, A queries the random oracle H with
(CDH(A,W ),CDH(W,L),CDH(A, Y ),CDH(L, Y ), U⇤, L, V ⇤, Y ). Hence, B can
answer the GDH challenge with the probability,
PrGDHg,q (B)  
Pr (E1c ^A⇤)
N2PNS
.
Thus,
Pr (E1c ^A⇤)  N2PNS
⇣
PrGDHg,q (B)
⌘
. (3.3)
Adversary corrupts the partner to the test session, but
does not corrupt the owner to the test session - Event E1d
Event (E1d ^A⇤) : setup.
B establishes NP number of honest parties. For each honest party B maintains
at most NS number of sessions. B chooses two distinct random principals
U⇤, V ⇤ $   {U1, . . . , UNP }. B sets A = W = gw as the long-term public key of U⇤.
For the rest of the parties B sets long-term secret/public key pairs according to
the protocol specification. Note that B does not possess the long-term secret keys
of U⇤. B chooses a random number t⇤ $   {1, . . . , NS} and guesses the session
⇧t
⇤
V ⇤,U⇤ as the partner session to the target session.
Event (E1d ^A⇤) : simulation.
In the following description we assume that U⇤ is the initiator of the target ses-
sion. The same analysis also be applied to the case where U⇤ is the responder by
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adjusting the description as follows: In any place where we consider the random
oracle query H(CDH(W,B),CDH(B,X),⌦(W,L),CDH(X,L), U⇤, X, V ⇤, L), ex-
change the positions of (CDH(B,X), ⌦(A, Y )), (U⇤, V ⇤) and (X, Y ) respectively.
Particularly, this change is relevant in the simulation of the Test query and in
the simulation of the point 4 of the H query checks for pos2 = CDH(W,L).
• Send: B uses Y = L = g` as the ephemeral public key of ⇧t⇤V ⇤,U⇤ . Note that
B does not posses the ephemeral secret key of session ⇧t⇤V ⇤,U⇤ .
• Corrupt: If Corrupt query to U⇤ is asked, B aborts the simulation. Other-
wise B answers all Corrupt queries faithfully.
• EphemeralKeyReveal: If EphemeralKeyReveal query to partner to ⇧t⇤V ⇤,U⇤
is asked, B aborts the simulation. Otherwise answers all EphemeralKeyReveal
queries faithfully.
• SessionKeyReveal: B answers all SessionKeyReveal queries as follows:
1. If A asks a SessionKeyReveal query to a session which is owned by
principal U⇤ and does not have a partner (whereA sends E having come
from the partner and B does not possess the secret key corresponding
to E), B uses the function ⌦ to compute a value to replace CDH(W,E)
as ⌦(W,E).
2. For any other SessionKeyReveal query B can easily compute the four
corresponding Di e-Hellman exponentiations, because B knows the
long-term secret keys of other principals and ephemeral secret keys
of partnered sessions. Then B queries the random oracle H with the
corresponding values and answers the SessionKeyReveal query.
Since B uses the function ⌦ to compute values to replace Di e-Hellman
exponentiations in places where it does not possess both long-term and
ephemeral secret keys, B can maintain consistency when querying the
random oracle H.
• H(pos1, pos2, pos3, pos4, initiator, I, responder, J):
1. If initiator, responder /2 {U⇤}, B simulates the random oracle H in the
usual way.
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2. If initiator = U⇤, B checks the random oracle for a previously asked
query, matching with the current one. If a match is found, B answers
with the corresponding random-oracle value. Otherwise:
– If B found all the positions except position 3 of a previously asked
random oracle query respectively matching with the positions of
the current random oracle query, B queries the DDH oracle with
(W,J, pos3). If the output is 1 and position 3 of the previously
asked random oracle query equals to ⌦(W,J),B answers with the
corresponding random-oracle value in the table. Else B answers
with a random value and stores the query and the answer in the
random oracle table.
– Else, B answers with a random value and stores the query and
the answer in the random oracle table.
3. If responder = U⇤, B checks the random oracle for a previously asked
query, matching with the current one. If a match is found, B answers
with the corresponding random-oracle value. Otherwise:
– If B found all the positions except position 2 of a previously asked
random oracle query respectively matching with the positions of
the current random oracle query, B queries the DDH oracle with
(W, I, pos2). If the output is 1 and position 2 of the previously
asked random oracle query equals to ⌦(W, I), B answers with the
corresponding random-oracle value in the table. Else B answers
with a random value and stores the query and the answer in the
random oracle table.
– Else, B answers with a random value and stores the query and
the answer in the random oracle table.
4. If A asks a H query such that pos3 = CDH(W,L), B aborts the game
and answers the GDH challenge (B can find whether pos3 = CDH(W,L)
or not by using the DDH oracle.)
• Test: If the Test query is not asked to the partner of ⇧t⇤V ⇤,U⇤ , B aborts
the simulation. Otherwise, B obtains K  H(CDH(W,B),CDH(B,X),
⌦(W,L),CDH(X,L), U⇤, X, V ⇤, L), and uses K as the real session key.
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Event (E1d ^A⇤) : analysis.
We explained above that it is possible to perfectly simulate the answers to
all the adversarial queries. The probability that A selects the partner to the
session ⇧t
⇤
V ⇤,U⇤ as the test session is at least
1
N2PNS
, and the probability of event
(E1d ^A⇤) is non-negligible. According to the event A⇤, A queries the random
oracle H with (CDH(W,B),CDH(B,X),CDH(W,L),CDH(X, Y ), U⇤, X, V ⇤, L).
Hence, B can answer the GDH challenge with the probability,
PrGDHg,q (B)  
Pr (E1d ^A⇤)
N2PNS
.
Thus,
Pr (E1d ^A⇤)  N2PNS
⇣
PrGDHg,q (B)
⌘
. (3.4)
Adversary corrupts the owner to the test session - Event
E2a
Event (E2a ^A⇤) : setup.
B establishes NP number of honest parties. For each honest party B maintains
at most NS number of sessions. B chooses two distinct random principals
U⇤, V ⇤ $   {U1, . . . , UNP }. B sets B = W = gw as the long-term public key of V ⇤.
For the rest of the parties B sets long-term secret/public key pairs according to
the protocol specification. Note that B does not possess the long-term secret keys
of V ⇤. B chooses a random number s⇤ $   {1, . . . , NS} and guesses the session
⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤ as the target session.
Event (E2a ^A⇤) : simulation.
B uses X = L = g` as the ephemeral public key of ⇧s⇤U⇤,V ⇤ . Note that B does not
posses the ephemeral secret key of session ⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤ . This simulation is same as the
simulation of Event E1c ^A⇤.
Event (E2a ^A⇤) : analysis.
We explained above that it is possible to perfectly simulate the answers to all
the adversarial queries. The probability that A selects the session ⇧s⇤U⇤,V ⇤ as
the test session is at least 1
N2PNS
, and the probability of event (E2a ^A⇤) is
non-negligible. According to the event A⇤, A queries the random oracle H with
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(CDH(A,W ),CDH(W,L),CDH(A, Y ),CDH(L, Y ), U⇤, L, V ⇤, Y ). Hence, B can
answer the GDH challenge with the probability,
PrGDHg,q (B)  
Pr (E2a ^A⇤)
N2PNS
.
Thus,
Pr (E2a ^A⇤)  N2PNS
⇣
PrGDHg,q (B)
⌘
. (3.5)
Adversary does not corrupt the owner to the test session
- Event E2b
Event (E2b ^A⇤) : setup.
B establishes NP number of honest parties. For each honest party B maintains
at most NS number of sessions. B chooses two distinct random principals
U⇤, V ⇤ $   {U1, . . . , UNP }. B sets A = L = g` as the long-term public key of U⇤
and B = W = gw as the long-term public key of V ⇤. For the rest of the parties
B sets long-term secret/public key pairs according to the protocol specification.
Note that B does not possess the long-term secret keys of U⇤ and V ⇤.
Event (E2b ^A⇤) : simulation.
This simulation is same as the simulation of Event E1b ^A⇤.
Event (E2b ^A⇤) : analysis.
We explained above that it is possible to perfectly simulate the answers to all
the adversarial queries. The probability that A selects an oracle where both
U⇤ and V ⇤ involve (⇧·U⇤,V ⇤ or ⇧
·
V ⇤,U⇤) as the test session is at least
1
N2P
, and
the probability of event (E1b ^A⇤) is non-negligible. According to the event
A⇤, A queries the random oracle H with (CDH(L,W ),CDH(W,X),CDH(L, Y ),
CDH(X, Y ), U⇤, X, V ⇤, Y ). Hence, B can answer the GDH challenge with the
probability,
PrGDHg,q (B)  
Pr (E2b ^A⇤)
N2P
.
Thus,
Pr (E2b ^A⇤)  N2P
⇣
PrGDHg,q (B)
⌘
. (3.6)
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We know that,
AdveCKP1  max
⇣
Pr(E1a ^A⇤),Pr(E1b ^A⇤),Pr(E1c ^A⇤),
Pr(E1d ^A⇤),Pr(E2a ^A⇤),Pr(E2b ^A⇤)
⌘
.
Therefore we get that,
AdveCKP1  max
⇣
N2PN
2
S
 
PrGDHg,q (B)
 
, N2P
 
PrGDHg,q (B)
 
, N2PNS
 
PrGDHg,q (B)
 
,
N2PNS
 
PrGDHg,q (B)
 
, N2PNS
 
PrGDHg,q (B)
 
, N2P
 
PrGDHg,q (B)
⌘
.
3.4 Comparison of Key Exchange Protocols
Table 3.5 summarizes the most significant properties of the protocols in this
chapter. We can see the HMQV, the NAXOS, the CMQV and the P1 protocols
have been proven using the random oracle assumption.
Property MQV HMQV NAXOS CMQV P1
Security Proof 7 CK eCK eCK eCK
Random Oracle 7 4 4 4 4
NAXOS Trick 7 7 4 4 7
Di e-Hellman Based 4 4 4 4 4
KCI security 7 4 4 4 4
UKS security 7 4 4 4 4
Known key security 7 4 4 4 4
Forward Secrecy (FS) 7 weak FS weak FS weak FS weak FS
Table 3.5: Comparison of key exchange protocols
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A number of security models for two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE)
protocols have been developed over time. We discussed a few such security
models in chapter 3. The main purpose of those security models is to provide
a framework to analyze the security of key exchange protocols against a strong
adversary, who is capable of learning certain secrets of the protocol principals. In
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this chapter, we advance the modelling of AKE protocols by considering more
granular, continuous leakage of long-term secrets of protocol participants: the
adversary can adaptively request arbitrary leakage of long-term secrets even
after the test session is activated (after-the-fact), with limits on the amount of
leakage per query but no bounds on the total leakage. Di↵erently, in the bounded
leakage model, the total amount of leakage is bounded. We present a security
model supporting continuous leakage even when the adversary learns certain
ephemeral secrets or session keys (restricted eCK model). Moreover we give a
generic construction of a two-pass leakage-resilient key exchange protocol that
is secure in the model. The generic protocol can be instantiated with certain
available public-key encryption schemes in the literature.
The generic protocol construction presented in our initial publication of this
work [ABS14] was later found by Toorani [Too15] to be vulnerable to ephemeral
key reveal attacks against an active adversary (legitimate partner does not exist
for the target session): the adversary who picks the ephemeral secret key as the
partner session to the target session, can trivially compute the session key of
the target session, by revealing the ephemeral secret key of the target session
from the owner of the target session. As a result, in this chapter, we revise the
initial security model by restricting the active adversary to reveal the ephemeral
secret key of the target session from the owner of the target session. Thus, in the
revised security model, it is possible to prove the security of the generic protocol
construction. Even after revising the initial model by enforcing this additional
restriction, this model still allows the adversary to learn long-term, ephemeral
secret keys of the target session, which is a more powerful adversarial capability
than in many of the previous security models such as the Bellare–Rogaway [BR93]
models and the Canetti–Krawczyk [CK01] model. In Chapter 5, we present
a stronger security model and a proven secure generic protocol construction,
overcoming the limitations we enforce in this chapter.
4.1 Introduction
Earlier key exchange security models, such as the Bellare–Rogaway [BR93],
Canetti–Krawczyk [CK01], and extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) [LLM07]
models, aim to capture security against an adversary who can fully compromise
some, but not all secret keys. For example, in the eCK model, a session key
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should be secure even if the adversary has compromised either the long-term or
ephemeral key at the client, and either the long-term or ephemeral key at the
server, but not all of the values at one party. This is not a very granular form of
leakage, and thus is not fully suitable for modelling side-channel attacks.
This motivates the development of leakage-resilient key exchange security
models and protocols. Moriyama and Okamoto [MO11] created key exchange
security models to analyze security of leakage-resilient key exchange protocols,
using a variant of the eCK model. There are two central limitations in the
Moriyama–Okamoto model as we pointed out in section 3.1.2. First, the total
amount of leakage allowed in the Moriyama–Okamoto model is bounded. Second,
the adversary cannot obtain any leakage information after the “test” session is
activated. The former restriction is troublesome because, in practice, ongoing
executions of a protocol may reveal a small amount of leakage each time, and
we would like to provide security against this “continuous” leakage. The latter
restriction is problematic because we would like to provide security of one session,
even if some leakage happens in subsequent sessions.
The above limitations thus somewhat restrict the adversary in the Moriyama–
Okamoto model. In this chapter, we aim to remove these two restrictions. We
will present a model and a protocol that allow the adversary to adaptively obtain
an unbounded amount of total continuous leakage, albeit with the restriction that
the amount of leakage obtained in each leakage request is limited; this addresses
the first restriction of previous models. Secondly, we allow the adversary to obtain
leakage after the test session is activated, addressing the second restriction of
the Moriyama–Okamoto model. The model we present in this chapter enforces
restrictions on the freshness condition, in addition to the eCK-style freshness
condition defined in the Moriyama–Okamoto model. We explain the additional
restrictions on the freshness condition further in this chapter.
4.2 Continuous After-the-fact Leakage (CAFL)
Model
In this section we introduce the continuous after-the-fact leakage model, (CAFL
model), for key exchange. In the CAFL model, the adversary is allowed to
adaptively obtain partial leakage on the long-term secret keys even after the test
session is activated, as well as reveal session keys, long-term keys, and ephemeral
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keys.
4.2.1 Modelling Leakage
In this key exchange security model we consider continuous leakage of the long-term
secret keys of protocol principals, because long-term secret keys are not one-time
secrets, but they last for multiple protocol sessions. Leakage of long-term secret
key from one session a↵ects the security of another session which uses the same
long-term secret key. Considering side-channel attacks which can be mounted
against key exchange protocols, the most realistic way to obtain the leakage
information of long-term secret keys is from the protocol computations which
use long-term secret keys. Hence, following the premise “only computation leaks
information” [MR04], we have modeled the leakage to occur where computation
takes place using secret keys. By issuing a Send query, the adversary will
get a protocol message which is computed according to the normal protocol
computations. Therefore, the instance of a Send query would be the appropriate
instance to address the leakage which occurs due to a computation which uses a
long-term secret key. Thus, sending an adversary-chosen leakage function, f , with
the Send query would reflect the premise “only computation leaks information”.
We assume also that the leakage function f is an e ciently computable, adaptive
leakage function.
Further, we assume that the amount of leakage of a secret key is bounded
by a leakage parameter  , per computation. The adversary is allowed to obtain
leakage from many computations continuously. Hence, the overall leakage amount
is unbounded.
4.2.2 Adversarial Powers
The adversary (a probabilistic algorithm) controls all interaction and communi-
cation between parties. In particular, the adversary initiates sessions at parties
and delivers protocol messages; it can create, change, delete, or reorder messages.
The adversary can also compromise certain short-term and long-term secrets.
Notably, whenever the party performs an operation using its long-term key, the
adversary obtains some leakage information about the long-term key.
The following query allows the adversary A to run the protocol, modelling
normal communication.
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• Send(U, V, s,m, f) query: The session ⇧sU,V , computes the next protocol
message according to the protocol specification on receipt of m, and sends
it to the adversary A, along with the leakage f(skU) as described in Sec-
tion 4.2.1. A can also use this query to activate a new protocol instance as
an initiator with blank m.
The following queries allow the adversary A to compromise certain session
specific ephemeral secrets and long-term secrets from the protocol principals.
• SessionKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: A is given the session key of the session
⇧sU,V , if the session ⇧
s
U,V is in the accepted state.
• EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: A is given the ephemeral keys of the
session ⇧sU,V .
• Corrupt(U) query: A is given the long-term secrets of the principal U .
This query does not reveal any session keys or ephemeral keys to A.
Remark 4.2.1 (Corrupt query vs Leakage queries). By issuing a Corrupt query,
the adversary gets the party’s entire long-term secret key. Separately, by issuing
leakage queries (using leakage function f embedded with the Send query) the
adversary gets  -bounded amount of leakage information about the long-term
secret key. It may seem paradoxical to consider Corrupt and Leakage queries at
the same time. But there are good reasons to consider both.
• A non-leakage version of CAFL model (Send query without f) addresses
KCI attacks, because the adversary is allowed to corrupt the owner of the
test session before the activation of the test session. In the CAFL model, we
allow the adversary to obtain leakage from the partner of the test session, in
addition to allowing the adversary to corrupt the owner of the test session.
• A non-leakage version of CAFL model (Send query without f) addresses
partial weak forward secrecy, because the adversary is allowed to corrupt
either of the protocol principals, but not both, after the test session is
activated. In the CAFL model, we allow the adversary to obtain leakage
from the uncorrupted principal, in addition to allowing the adversary to
corrupt one of the protocol principals.
Hence, the CAFL model allows the adversary to obtain more information
than a non-leakage version of CAFL model.
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4.2.3 Defining Security
In this section we give formal definitions for partner sessions, freshness of a session
and security in the CAFL model.
Definition 4.2.1 (Partner sessions in CAFL model). As in the eCK model, two
sessions ⇧sU,V and ⇧
s0
U 0,V 0 are said to be partners if:
1. ⇧sU,V and ⇧
s0
U 0,V 0 have computed session keys and
2. Sent messages from ⇧sU,V = Received messages to ⇧
s0
U 0,V 0 and
3. Sent messages from ⇧s
0
U 0,V 0 = Received messages to ⇧
s
U,V and
4. U 0 = V and V 0 = U and
5. If U is the initiator then V is the responder, or vice versa.
A protocol is said to be correct if two partner sessions compute identical
session keys in the presence of a passive adversary.
Once the session ⇧sU,V has accepted a session key, the adversary A attempts to
distinguish it from a random session key, by asking the following query. The Test
query is used to formalize the notion of the semantic security of a key exchange
protocol.
• Test(U, V, s) query: When A asks the Test query, the session ⇧sU,V first
chooses a random bit b {0, 1} and if b = 1 then the actual session key is
returned to A, otherwise a random string chosen from the same session key
space is returned to A. This query is only allowed to be asked once across
all sessions.
We now define what it means for a session to be   CAFL-fresh in the CAFL
model.
Definition 4.2.2 (   CAFL-freshness). Let   be the leakage bound per occur-
rence. A session ⇧sU,V is said to be    CAFL-fresh if and only if:
1. The session ⇧sU,V or its partner, ⇧
s0
V,U (if it exists) has not been asked a
SessionKeyReveal.
2. If the partner ⇧s
0
V,U exists, none of the following combinations have been
asked:
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(a) Corrupt(U) and Corrupt(V ).
(b) Corrupt(U) and EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s).
(c) Corrupt(V ) and EphemeralKeyReveal(V, U, s0).
(d) EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s) and EphemeralKeyReveal(V, U, s0).
3. If the partner ⇧s
0
V,U does not exist, none of the following combinations have
been asked:
(a) Corrupt(V ).
(b) EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s).
4. For each Send(U, ·, ·, ·, f) query, the output of f is at most   bits.
5. For each Send(V, ·, ·, ·, f) query, the output of f is at most   bits.
Limitations of     CAFL-freshness. When the adversary asks Corrupt
and EphemeralKeyReveal queries, there are two Corrupt–EphemeralKeyReveal
query combinations which trivially expose the session key of a session, in a
scenario that a partner to that particular session exists.
1. Corrupt(U) and EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s).
2. Corrupt(V ) and EphemeralKeyReveal(V, U, s0).
As in the other models we have compared with [LLM07,MO11] we do not allow
above combinations in the freshness condition, as they trivially expose the session
key of sessions ⇧sU,V and ⇧
s0
V,U . Di↵erently, in the other models we have compared
with, there are four Corrupt–EphemeralKeyReveal query combinations which
do not trivially expose the session key a session, in a scenario that a partner to
that particular session exists.
1. Corrupt(U) and Corrupt(V ).
2. Corrupt(U) and EphemeralKeyReveal(V, U, s).
3. Corrupt(V ) and EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s0).
4. EphemeralKeyReveal(V, U, s) and EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s0).
66 Chapter 4. Continuous After-the-fact Leakage in Restricted-eCK Model
All the models we consider [LLM07,MO11] allow above combinations in the fresh-
ness condition, whereas our CAFL model does not allow the query combinations
1 and 4 in the freshness condition.
When the adversary asks EphemeralKeyReveal and Corrupt queries, there
are two query combinations which trivially expose the session key of a session, in
a scenario that a partner to that particular session does not exist.
1. Corrupt(V ).
2. Corrupt(U) and EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s).
As in the other models we have compared with [LLM07,MO11] we do not allow
above combinations in the freshness condition, as they trivially expose the session
key of sessions ⇧sU,V and ⇧
s0
V,U . Weakening that condition, our model does not
allow following two query combinations in the freshness condition, when a partner
to the test session does not exist.
1. Corrupt(V ).
2. EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s). (instead of EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s)
and Corrupt(U) as in other models)
Thus, the freshness of a non-leakage variant of the CAFL model (without
conditions 4 and 5) is weaker than the eCK-freshness definition, because of the
restriction enforced in the conditions (2)-a and (2)-d. Di↵erently, the    CAFL-
freshness allows partial leakage of the long-term secret key of a protocol principal,
even when the partner principal is corrupted or EphemeralKeyReveal query is
asked to the partner session. In some sense that is stronger than the eCK-freshness
definition, because according to the eCK-freshness, once EphemeralKeyReveal
query have been asked to a session, revealing the long-term secret key of the
partner is not allowed. Hence, although the freshness of a non-leakage variant
of the CAFL model is weaker than the eCK-freshness in some sense,    CAFL-
freshness achieved an improvement over eCK-freshness by means of partial leakage
of long-term secrets.
We justify why we introduce additional restrictions (restriction enforced in the
conditions (2)-a and (2)-d) to the freshness condition of the CAFL model, more
than in the freshness condition of the eCK model as follows: At this stage our aim
is to construct a simple leakage-resilient two-pass key exchange protocol, using a
leakage-resilient public-key encryption scheme, in which each of the principals
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randomly chooses its ephemeral secret key, encrypts it with the public key of
the intended partner principal, and sends the encrypted message to the intended
partner principal. Defining eCK-style freshness makes it impossible to prove the
security of our simple two-pass key exchange protocol, because corrupting both
principals to the target session or revealing the ephemeral key from both sessions
to the target session will trivially expose the session key. Therefore, we enforce
additional restrictions to the   CAFL-freshness condition, but allow the partial
leakage of long-term secret keys, as our aim is to model the side-channel attacks.
We will define a stronger eCK-style freshness condition for a leakage security
model in chapter 5 and then construct a stronger leakage-resilient key exchange
protocol.
Security of a key exchange protocol in the CAFL model is defined using
the following security game, which is played by a probabilistic polynomial time
adversary A against the protocol challenger.
• Stage 0: The challenger generates the keys by using the security parameter
k.
• Stage 1: Amay ask any of Send, SessionKeyReveal, EphemeralKeyReveal
and Corrupt queries to any session at will.
• Stage 2: A chooses a    CAFL-fresh session and asks a Test query.
• Stage 3: A may continue asking Send, SessionKeyReveal, Corrupt and
EphemeralKeyReveal queries. A may not ask a query that violates the
   CAFL-freshness of the test session.
• Stage 4: Eventually, A outputs the bit b0 2 {0, 1} which is its guess of the
value b on the test session. A wins if b0 = b.
SuccA is the event that A wins the above security game. The definition of security
follows.
Definition 4.2.3 (    CAFL-security). A protocol ⇡ is said to be     CAFL-
secure if there is no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A that can win the
above game with non-negligible advantage. The advantage of an adversary A is
defined as Adv  CAFL⇡ (A) = |2Pr(SuccA)  1|.
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4.2.4 Practical Interpretation of Security of CAFL Model
We review the relationship between the CAFL model and real world attack
scenarios.
• Active adversarial capabilities: Send queries address the powers of an
active adversary who can control the message flow over the network. In
the previous security models, this property is addressed by introducing the
send query.
• Side-channel attacks: Leakage functions are embedded with the Send
query. Thus, assuming that the leakage happens when computations take
place in principals, a wide variety of side-channel attacks such as timing
attacks, EM emission based attacks, power analysis attacks, which are based
on continuous leakage of long-term secrets are addressed. This property is
not addressed in the earlier security models such as the BR models, the CK
model, the eCK model and the Moriyama-Okamoto model.
• Cold boot attacks: The CAFL model allows the adversary to reveal
either the long-term secret key (Corrupt query) or the ephemeral secret
key (EphemeralKeyReveal query) of the target session (same as in the eCK
model and the Moriyama-Okamoto model). Thus these queries address the
cold boot attacks to some extent, where the cold boot attacks reveal either
(i) the long-term secret key or (ii) the ephemeral secret key of the target
session. Note that the Moriyama-Okamoto model addresses the cold boot
attacks by additionally covering the situation, where the attacker reveals
(iii) the ephemeral secret key and part of the long-term secret key of the
target session. Thus, the Moriyama-Okamoto model is more suitable to
model cold boot attacks.
• Malware attacks: EphemeralKeyReveal queries cover the malware at-
tacks which steal stored ephemeral keys, given that the long-term keys may
be securely stored separately from the ephemeral keys in places such as
smart cards or hardware security modules. Separately, Corrupt queries
address malware attacks which steal the long-term secret keys of protocol
principals. In the previous security models, this property is addressed
by introducing the ephemeral-key reveal, session-state reveal and corrupt
queries.
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• Weak random number generators: Due to weak random number gener-
ators, the adversary may correctly determine the produced random number.
EphemeralKeyReveal query addresses situations where the adversary can
get the ephemeral secrets. In the previous security models, this property is
addressed by introducing the ephemeral-key reveal query or the session-state
reveal query.
• Known key attacks: SessionKeyReveal query covers the attacks which
can be mounted by knowing past session keys. In the previous security
models, this property is addressed by introducing the session key reveal
query.
• Key compromise impersonation attacks:    CAFL-freshness allows
the adversary to corrupt the owner of the test session before the activation
of the test session. Hence, the CAFL model security protects against the key
compromise impersonation attacks. In the eCK model and the Moriyama-
Okamoto model, this property is addressed by introducing the long-term
key reveal query to the owner of the target session, before the session is
completed. Earlier models such as the BR models and the CK model do not
allow the adversary to reveal the long-term secret key of the owner of the
target session before it is expired, and hence do not address this property.
• Partial weak forward secrecy:   CAFL-freshness allows the adversary
to corrupt either of the protocol principals, after the test session is activated.
Hence, the CAFL model addresses partial weak forward secrecy. The eCK
model and the Moriyama-Okamoto model allow the adversary to reveal the
long-term secret keys of both protocol principals of the target session after
the target session is activated, as long as the adversary is passive. Hence
they address weak forward secrecy. The CK model allows the adversary to
reveal the long-term secret keys of both protocol principals of the target
session, after the session is expired but regardless of whether the adversary is
passive or active. Therefore, the CK model address perfect forward secrecy.
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4.3 Constructing CAFL-secure Key Exchange Pro-
tocols
We investigate how to construct CAFL-secure key exchange protocols. Table
4.1 shows the generic construction of protocol ⇡1, which is CAFL-secure. The
protocol ⇡1 is a key agreement protocol, in which each of the principals randomly
chooses its ephemeral secret key, encrypts it with the public key of the intended
partner principal, and sends the encrypted message to the intended partner
principal. After exchanging the ephemeral secrets both principals compute the
session key with ephemeral secrets, identities of the two principals and the protocol
message sequence, using a pseudo random function. Updating the secret keys of
protocol principals is an essential ingredient in achieving CAFL security. For this
generic protocol construction, the underlying public-key encryption scheme is
chosen to be a continuous leakage-resilient public-key encryption scheme, which
updates the secret key after each decryption operation. We use this public-key
encryption scheme to achieve the continuous leakage resiliency of the key exchange
protocol.
4.3.1 Protocol Construction
KG, Enc and Dec are the key generation, encryption and decryption algorithms
of the underlying adaptively chosen ciphertext after-the-fact leakage (CCLA2)
secure public-key cryptosystem PKE (Section 2.4.2). PRF is a pseudo random
function (Section 2.3.5) which generates the session key of length k.
A (Initiator) B (Responder)
Initial Setup
skA, pkA  KG(1k) skB, pkB  KG(1k)
Protocol Execution
rA  {0, 1}k rB  {0, 1}k
CA  Enc(pkB, rA) A,CA   ! (sk0B, rA) Dec(skB, CA)
skB  sk0B
(sk0A, rB) Dec(skA, CB) B,CB     CB  Enc(pkA, rB)
skA  sk0A
K  PRF(rA, A||CA||B||CB) K  PRF(rA, A||CA||B||CB)
 PRF(rB, A||CA||B||CB)  PRF(rB, A||CA||B||CB)
K is the session key
Table 4.1: Generic CAFL-secure protocol construction: Protocol ⇡1
The generic protocol construction presented in our initial publication of this
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work [ABS14], is vulnerable against active adversary. Following we explain the
reason: In that protocol construction, the inputs to the key derivation function
KDF contain the two ephemeral values, rA and rB, and the identities of the
initiator and the responder, A and B, respectively: KDF(rA||rB,?, k, A||B).
Assume that the target session is in A, if the adversary corrupts A, decrypts the
protocol message from CB, then re-encrypt the corresponding plaintext again
using pkA, that makes a di↵erent plaintext C 0B, due to probabilistic encryption.
Then if the adversary sends C 0B to A, instead of CB, and executes the rest of the
protocol, it results that A’s session and B’s session are not matching, because the
message CB computed by B is di↵erent from the message C 0B received by A, but
compute the same session key. Thus, the adversary can issue SessionKeyReveal
query to the session at B and thus trivially learn the session key of the target
session. Cremers [Cre11] showed that such attacks can be avoided by using the
session identifier in the key derivation step together with other shared secrets.
In this thesis we re-design the protocol accordingly to ensure that mismatching
sessions do not compute same session keys. Thus, the session key is derived using a
pseudo random function (two calls to the PRF) asK  PRF(rA, A||CA||B||CB) 
PRF(rB, A||CA||B||CB), such that it contains the session identifier A||CA||B||CB
as an input to the pseudo random function.
Here we use a multiple-call pseudo random function PRF, instead of a key
derivation function KDF, to ensure that the adversary chosen rA xor rB, can be
used in the session key derivation, when the presence of an active adversary. Since
the input   = rA||rB to the KDF should be uniformly random in the security
definition of the KDF, using adversary chosen rA xor rB in the   of KDF input
is not allowed.
4.3.2 Security Proof of the Protocol ⇡1 in the CAFLModel
Theorem 4.3.1. The protocol ⇡1 is    CAFL-secure, whenever the underlying
public-key cryptosystem PKE is CCLA2-secure and PRF is a pseudo random
function.
Let U = {U1, . . . , UNP } be a set of NP parties. Each party Ui owns at most
Ns number of protocol sessions. Let A be any PPT adversary against the key
exchange protocol ⇡1. Then the advantage of A against the CAFL-security of
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the protocol ⇡1, Adv  CAFL⇡1 is:
Adv  CAFL⇡1 (A)  N2PN2s
 
AdvCCLA2PKE (D) + AdvPRF(B)
 
.
where B,D are e cient algorithms constructed using the adversary A, against
the underlying pseudo random function, PRF, and the public-key cryptosystem,
PKE, respectively.
In order to formally prove the CAFL-security of the protocol ⇡1 we use the
game hopping technique [BR06,KR01,Sho04]; define a sequence of games and
relate the adversary’s advantage of distinguishing each game from the previous
game to the advantage of breaking one of the underlying cryptographic primitive.
The proof structure is similar to Boyd et al. [BCNP09].
Proof. Assume that the adversary A can win the challenge against the protocol
⇡1 challenger with advantage Adv  CAFL⇡1 (A). We split the proof into two cases:
partner to the test session exists and partner to the test session does not exist.
Case 1: Partner to the test session exists
In this case we consider three sub cases as follows:
1. Adversary corrupts the owner of the test session, but does not corrupt the
peer.
2. Adversary corrupts the peer of the test session, but does not corrupt the
owner.
3. Adversary corrupts neither the owner nor the partner of the test session
Case 1.1: Adversary corrupts the owner of the test session, but does
not corrupt the peer
In this case we consider the situation that A corrupts the owner of the test session
but not the partner.
Game 1. This game is the original game. When the Test query is asked, the
Game 1 challenger chooses a random bit b
$   {0, 1}. If b = 1, the real session key
is given to A, otherwise a random value chosen from the same session key space
is given.
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Game 2. Same as Game 1 with the following exception: before A begins, two
distinct random principals U⇤, V ⇤  {U1, . . . , UNP } are chosen and two random
numbers s⇤, t⇤  {1, . . . , Ns} are chosen, where NP is the number of protocol
principals and Ns is the number of sessions on a principal. The session ⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤ is
chosen as the target session and the session ⇧t
⇤
V ⇤,U⇤ is chosen as the partner to
the target session. If the test session is not the session ⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤ or the partner to
the session is not ⇧t
⇤
V ⇤,U⇤ , the Game 2 challenger aborts the game.
Game 3. Same as Game 2 with the following exception: the Game 3 challenger
chooses a random value r0 $   {0, 1}k.
• If the test session is on the initiator, the challenger computes the session key
in the test session K  PRF(r0, U⇤||CU⇤ ||V ⇤||CV ⇤) PRF(rV ⇤ , U⇤||CU⇤ ||V ⇤
||CV ⇤).
• If the test session is on the responder, the challenger computes the session key
in the test session K  PRF(rV ⇤ , V ⇤||CV ⇤ ||U⇤||CU⇤) PRF(r0, V ⇤||CV ⇤ ||U⇤
||CU⇤).
The session key is computed in the same way in the partner to the test session.
Game 4. Same as Game 3 with the following exception: In the Test query, in
the target session, the Game 4 challenger randomly chooses K
$   {0, 1}k and
sends it to the adversary A as the answer to the Test query. In sessions at V ⇤
which has the same incoming message to V ⇤ as in the target session, the session
key is randomly chosen as K
$   {0, 1}k.
Di↵erences between games. In this section the adversary’s advantage of
distinguishing each game from the previous game is investigated. AdvGame x(A)
denotes the advantage of the adversary A of winning Game x.
Game 1 is the original game. Hence,
AdvGame 1(A) = Adv  CAFL⇡1,Case 1.1(A). (4.1)
Game 1 and Game 2. The probability of Game 2 to be halted due to incorrect
choice of the test session is 1  1
N2PN
2
s
. Unless the incorrect choice happens, Game
2 is identical to Game 1. Hence,
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AdvGame 2(A) = 1
NP
2N2s
AdvGame 1(A). (4.2)
Game 2 and Game 3. We introduce an algorithm D which is constructed
using the adversary A. If A can distinguish the di↵erence between Game 2 and
Game 3, then D can be used against the CCLA2 challenger of the underlying
public-key cryptosystem, PKE. The algorithm D uses the public key of the
CCLA2 challenger as the public key of the protocol principal V ⇤ and generates
public/secret key pairs for all other protocol principals. D runs a copy of A
and interacts with A, such that A is interacting with either Game 2 or Game
3. D picks two random strings, r00, r01  {0, 1}k and passes them to the CCLA2
challenger. From the CCLA2 challenger, D receives a challenge ciphertext C such
that C  Enc(pkV ⇤ , r0) where r0 = r00 or r0 = r01. The following describes D’s
procedure of answering queries.
• Send(U, V, s,m, f) query:
– U = U⇤, V = V ⇤, s = s⇤:
∗ If U⇤ is the initiator, D sends the ciphertext C to A as the first
message of the test session. Upon receiving the second proto-
col message computes the session key K  PRF(r01, U⇤||CU⇤ ||V ⇤
||CV ⇤)  PRF(rV ⇤ , U⇤||CU⇤ ||V ⇤||CV ⇤).
∗ If U⇤ is the responder, upon receiving the first protocol message
sends C to A, and computes the session key K  PRF(r01, V ⇤
||CV ⇤ ||U⇤||CU⇤)  PRF(rV ⇤ , V ⇤||CV ⇤ ||U⇤||CU⇤).
– U = U⇤, V = V ⇤, s 6= s⇤: Executes the protocol normally.
– U = U⇤, V 6= V ⇤: Executes the protocol normally.
– U = V ⇤:
∗ If this is the initiator and it is the first message, then executes the
protocol normally.
∗ If this is the initiator and the second protocol message, or the
responder:
· If C has come as the incoming message uses r01 as the decryp-
tion of the incoming message. To obtain the corresponding
leakage, D first encrypts r01 using pkV ⇤ , gets that ciphertext
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and access the leakage oracle of CCLA2 challenger with the
ciphertext of r01.
· Else uses the decryption oracle to decrypt incoming messages.
– U, V 6= U⇤ or V ⇤: Executes the protocol normally.
For all other leakage queries f(skV ⇤), D obtains the leakage accessing
the leakage oracle of the CCLA2 challenger, whereas for all the other
leakage queries, D can compute the leakage by its own, because D
knows all other secret keys.
• SessionKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: SessionKeyReveal query is not allowed
to the target session or the partner of the target session. D can compute
all the session keys by executing the protocol.
– For sessions involving the principal V ⇤, and the incoming message to
V ⇤ is the same message which has come to V ⇤ in the target session,
uses r01 as the decryption.
– For other sessions involving the principal V ⇤, D can decrypt the
incoming messages to V ⇤ by using the decryption oracle.
– Otherwise, D can decrypt all the other incoming messages to protocol
principals by its own.
Then compute the session key using the PRF.
• EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: For all EphemeralKeyReveal queries
allowed in the freshness condition, D can answer correctly, because D has
the ephemeral keys.
• Corrupt(U) query: Except for V ⇤, algorithm D can answer all other
Corrupt queries. In this case we consider the situation in which the adver-
sary is not allowed to corrupt the partner principal of the target session, so
in fact, D can answer all legitimate Corrupt queries.
• Test(U, V, s) query: Answers with the K which is computed at the Send
query when U = U⇤, V = V ⇤, s = s⇤.
If r01 is the decryption of C in the target session, the simulation constructed
by D is identical to Game 2 whereas if r00 is the decryption of C, the simulation
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constructed by D is identical to Game 3. If A can distinguish the di↵erence
between Game 2 and Game 3, then D can distinguish whether C  Enc(pkV ⇤ , r00)
or C  Enc(pkV ⇤ , r01).
The algorithm D plays the CCLA2 game against the public-key cryptosystem
PKE according to the Definition 2.4.6 since D does not ask the decryption of the
challenge ciphertext C. Hence,
|AdvGame 2(A)  AdvGame 3(A)|  AdvCCLA2PKE (D). (4.3)
Game 3 and Game 4. If A can distinguish the di↵erence between Game 3
and Game 4, then A can be used as a subroutine of an algorithm B, which is
used to distinguish whether the session key value K is computed using the real
PRF with a hidden key, or using a random function. The adversary A is given a
K, such that it is computed using the PRF or randomly chosen from the session
key space. The following describes B’s procedure of answering queries.
• Send(U, V, s,m, f) query:
– U = U⇤, V = V ⇤, s = s⇤:
∗ If U⇤ is the initiator, upon receiving the second protocol message
computes the session key K  OraclePRF(U⇤||CU⇤ ||V ⇤||CV ⇤)  
PRF(rV ⇤ , U⇤||CU⇤ ||V ⇤||CV ⇤).
∗ If U⇤ is the responder, upon receiving the first protocol message
computes the session key K  OraclePRF(U⇤||CU⇤ ||V ⇤||CV ⇤)  
PRF(rV ⇤ , U⇤||CU⇤ ||V ⇤||CV ⇤).
– U = U⇤, V = V ⇤, s 6= s⇤: Executes the protocol normally.
– U = U⇤, V 6= V ⇤: Executes the protocol normally.
– U = V ⇤:
∗ If this is the initiator and it is the first message, then executes the
protocol normally.
∗ If this is the initiator and the second protocol message, or the
responder:
· If the same message that came to V ⇤ in the test session has
come as the incoming message, computes the session key using
the OraclePRF.
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· Otherwise, executes the protocol normally.
– U, V 6= U⇤ or V ⇤: Executes the protocol normally.
For all leakage queries, B can compute the leakage by its own, because
B knows all the secret keys.
• SessionKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: SessionKeyReveal query is not allowed
to the target session or its partner. B can compute all the session keys by
executing the protocol.
– For sessions involving the principal V ⇤, and the incoming message to
V ⇤ is the same message which has come to V ⇤ in the target session, B
uses OraclePRF to compute the session key.
– For all other sessions, B computes the session key by using the PRF.
• EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: B can answer all EphemeralKeyReveal
queries, which are allowed by the freshness condition, because B has the
ephemeral keys.
• Corrupt(U) query: Except for V ⇤, algorithm B can answer all other Corrupt
queries. In this case we consider the situation in which the adversary is not
allowed to corrupt the partner principal of the target session, so in fact, B
can answer all legitimate Corrupt queries.
• Test(U, V, s) query: Answers with the K which is computed at the Send
query when U = U⇤, V = V ⇤, s = s⇤.
If the oracle is using the real PRF with a hidden key, the simulation is
identical to Game 3, whereas if the oracle is using a random function, the
simulation constructed is identical to Game 4. If A can distinguish the di↵erence
between Game 3 and Game 4, then A can be used as a subroutine of an algorithm
B, which is used to distinguish whether the PRF challenger is real or random.
Hence,
|AdvGame 3(A)  AdvGame 4(A)|  AdvPRF(B). (4.4)
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Semantic security of the session key in Game 4. Since the session key K
of ⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤ is chosen randomly and independently from all other values, A does
not have any advantage in Game 4. Hence,
AdvGame 4(A) = 0. (4.5)
Combining the results above, we find,
Adv  CAFL⇡1,Case 1.1(A)  N2PN2s
 
AdvCCLA2PKE (D) + AdvPRF(B)
 
. (4.6)
Case 1.2: Adversary corrupts the peer of the test session, but does
not corrupt the owner.
In this case we consider the situation that A corrupts the partner of the test
session but not the owner. The proof structure and games are similar to the
previous case. The di↵erences in this case is that the algorithm D uses the
public key of the CCLA2 challenger as the public key of the protocol principal
U⇤ (di↵erence between Game 2 and Game 3), and OraclePRF is used when the
incoming message to U⇤ in the test session is used as the incoming message to
U⇤ in any other sessions (Game 3 and Game 4 analysis). We find,
Adv  CAFL⇡1,Case 1.2(A)  N2PN2s
 
AdvCCLA2PKE (D) + AdvPRF(B)
 
. (4.7)
Case 1.3: Adversary corrupts neither the owner nor the partner of the
test session
In this case we consider the situation that A corrupts neither the owner nor the
partner of the test session. So D can set the public key of the CCLA2 challenger
as the public key of either U⇤ or V ⇤. The proof structure and games are similar
to the previous case. We consider two sub cases under this case as follows:
• (a) Adversary does not ask EphemeralKeyReveal(V ⇤, U⇤, t⇤): simulation
and analysis of this case is similar to the Case 1.2, because here D can set
the public key of the CCLA2 challenger as the public key of the protocol
principal U⇤ and proceed with the simulation as in the Case 1.2 (only
di↵erence is that here the adversary does not corrupt the partner principal
of the test session, as in the Case 1.2, but rest of the simulation is same as
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in the Case 1.2). Thus,
Adv  CAFL⇡1,Case 1.3.a(A)  N2PN2s
 
AdvCCLA2PKE (D) + AdvPRF(B)
 
. (4.8)
• (b) Adversary does not ask EphemeralKeyReveal(U⇤, V ⇤, s⇤): simulation
and analysis of this case is similar to the Case 1.1, because here D can set
the public key of the CCLA2 challenger as the public key of the protocol
principal V ⇤ and proceed with the simulation as in the Case 1.1 (only
di↵erence is that here the adversary does not corrupt the owner of the test
session, as in the Case 1.1, but rest of the simulation is same as in the Case
1.1). Thus,
Adv  CAFL⇡1,Case 1.3.b(A)  N2PN2s
 
AdvCCLA2PKE (D) + AdvPRF(B)
 
. (4.9)
Case 2: Partner to the test session does not exist
Game 1. This game is the original game. When the Test query is asked, the
Game 1 challenger chooses a random bit b {0, 1}. If b = 1, the real session key
is given to A, otherwise a random value chosen from the same session key space
is given.
Game 2. Same as Game 1 with the following exception: before A begins, two
distinct random principals U⇤, V ⇤  {U1, . . . , UNP } are chosen and a random
number s⇤  {1, . . . , Ns} is chosen, where NP is the number of protocol principals
and Ns is the number of sessions on a principal. The session ⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤ is chosen
as the target session. If the test session is not the session ⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤ , the Game 2
challenger aborts the game.
Game 3. Same as Game 2 with the following exception: the Game 3 challenger
chooses a random value r0 $   {0, 1}k.
• If the test session is on the initiator, the challenger computes the session key
in the test session K  PRF(r0, U⇤||CU⇤ ||V ⇤||CV ⇤) PRF(rV ⇤ , U⇤||CU⇤ ||V ⇤
||CV ⇤).
• If the test session is on the responder, the challenger computes the session key
in the test session K  PRF(rV ⇤ , V ⇤||CV ⇤ ||U⇤||CU⇤) PRF(r0, V ⇤||CV ⇤ ||U⇤
||CU⇤).
80 Chapter 4. Continuous After-the-fact Leakage in Restricted-eCK Model
The session key is computed in the same way in the partner to the test session.
Game 4. Same as Game 3 with the following exception: In the Test query,
in the target session the Game 4 challenger randomly chooses K
$   {0, 1}k and
sends it to the adversary A as the answer to the Test query. In sessions at V ⇤
which has a same incoming message to V ⇤ as in the target session, the session
key is randomly chosen as K
$   {0, 1}k.
Di↵erences between games. Game 1 is the original game. Hence,
AdvGame 1(A) = Adv  CAFL⇡1,Case 2(A). (4.10)
Game 1 and Game 2. The probability of Game 2 to be halted due to incorrect
choice of the test session is 1  1
N2PNs
. Unless the incorrect choice happens, Game
2 is identical to Game 1. Hence,
AdvGame 2(A) = 1
NP
2Ns
AdvGame 1(A). (4.11)
Game 2 and Game 3. We introduce an algorithm D which is constructed
using the adversary A. If A can distinguish the di↵erence between Game 2
and Game 3, then D can be used against the CCLA2 challenger of underlying
public-key cryptosystem, PKE. The algorithm D uses the public key of the
CCLA2 challenger as the public key of the protocol principal V ⇤ and generates
public/secret key pairs for all other protocol principals. D runs a copy of A
and interacts with A, such that it is interacting with either Game 2 or Game
3. D picks two random strings, r00, r01  {0, 1}k and passes them to the CCLA2
challenger. From the CCLA2 challenger, D receives a challenge ciphertext C
such that C  Enc(pkV ⇤ , r0) where r0 = r00 or r0 = r01. The following describes
the procedure of answering queries.
• Send(U, V, s,m, f) query:
– U = U⇤, V = V ⇤ and s = s⇤:
∗ If U⇤ is the initiator, D sends the ciphertext C to A as the first
message of the test session. Upon receiving the second proto-
col message computes the session key K  PRF(r01, U⇤||CU⇤ ||V ⇤
||CV ⇤)  PRF(rV ⇤ , U⇤||CU⇤ ||V ⇤||CV ⇤).
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∗ If U⇤ is the responder, upon receiving the first protocol message
sends C to A, and computes the session key K  PRF(r01, V ⇤
||CV ⇤ ||U⇤||CU⇤)  PRF(rV ⇤ , V ⇤||CV ⇤ ||U⇤||CU⇤).
– U = U⇤, V = V ⇤, s 6= s⇤: Executes protocol normally.
– U = U⇤, V 6= V ⇤: Executes the protocol normally.
– U = V ⇤:
∗ If this is the initiator and it is the first message, then executes the
protocol normally.
∗ If this is the initiator and the second protocol message, or the
responder:
· If C has come as the incoming message uses r01 as the decryp-
tion of the incoming message. To obtain the corresponding
leakage, D first encrypts r01 using pkV ⇤ , gets that ciphertext
and access the leakage oracle of CCLA2 challenger with the
ciphertext of r01.
· Else uses the decryption oracle to decrypt incoming messages.
– U, V 6= U⇤ or V ⇤: Executes the protocol normally.
For all other leakage queries f(skV ⇤), D obtains the leakage accessing
the leakage oracle, whereas for all other leakage D can compute the
leakage by its own because D knows all other secret keys.
• SessionKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: SessionKeyReveal query is not allowed
to the target session or its partner.
– For sessions involving the principal V ⇤, and the incoming message to
V ⇤ is the same message which has come to V ⇤ in the target session,
uses r01 as the decryption.
– For other sessions involving the principal V ⇤, D can decrypt the
incoming messages to V ⇤ by using the decryption oracle.
– Otherwise, D can decrypt all the other incoming messages to protocol
principals by its own.
Then compute the session key using the PRF.
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• EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: For all EphemeralKeyReveal queries
allowed in the freshness condition, D can answer correctly, because D has
the ephemeral keys.
• Corrupt(U) query: Except for V ⇤, algorithm D can answer all other
Corrupt queries. In this case we consider the situation in which the adver-
sary is not allowed to corrupt the partner principal of the target session, so
in fact, D can answer all Corrupt queries.
• Test(U, V, s) query: To compute the answer to the Test(U⇤, V ⇤, s⇤) query,
the algorithm D uses r01 as the decryption of the ciphertext C and computes
the session key using the r01 value as the ephemeral key of the principal U
⇤.
If r01 is the decryption of C coming to, V
⇤ in the test session, the simulation
constructed by D is identical to Game 2 whereas if r00 is the decryption of C,
the simulation constructed by D is identical to Game 3. If A can distinguish
the di↵erence between Game 2 and Game 3, then D can distinguish whether
C  Enc(pkV ⇤ , r00) or C  Enc(pkV ⇤ , r01).
The algorithm D plays the CCLA2 game against the public-key cryptosystem
PKE according to the Definition 2.4.6 since D does not ask the decryption of the
challenge ciphertext C. Hence,
|AdvGame 2(A)  AdvGame 3(A)|  AdvCCLA2PKE (D). (4.12)
Game 3 and Game 4. If A can distinguish the di↵erence between Game 3
and Game 4, then A can be used as a subroutine of an algorithm B, which is used
to distinguish whether the session key value K is computed K is computed using
the real PRF with a hidden key, or using a random function. The adversary A is
given a K, such that it is computed using the PRF or randomly chosen from the
session key space. The following describes B’s procedure of answering queries.
• Send(U, V, s,m, f) query:
– U = U⇤, V = V ⇤ and s = s⇤:
∗ If U⇤ is the initiator, upon receiving the second protocol message
computes the session key K  OraclePRF(U⇤||CU⇤ ||V ⇤||CV ⇤)  
PRF(rV ⇤ , U⇤||CU⇤ ||V ⇤||CV ⇤).
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∗ If U⇤ is the responder, upon receiving the first protocol message
computes the session key K  OraclePRF(U⇤||CU⇤ ||V ⇤||CV ⇤)  
PRF(rV ⇤ , U⇤||CU⇤ ||V ⇤||CV ⇤).
– U = U⇤, V = V ⇤, s 6= s⇤: Executes protocol normally.
– U = U⇤, V 6= V ⇤: Executes the protocol normally.
– U = V ⇤:
∗ If this is the initiator and it is the first message, then executes the
protocol normally.
∗ If this is the initiator and the second protocol message, or the
responder:
· If the same message that came to V ⇤ in the test session has
come as the incoming message, computes the session key using
the OraclePRF.
· Otherwise, executes the protocol normally.
– U, V 6= U⇤ or V ⇤: Executes the protocol normally.
For all leakage queries, B can compute the leakage by its own, because B
knows all the secret keys.
• SessionKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: SessionKeyReveal query is not allowed
to the target session or its partner.
– For sessions involving the principal V ⇤, and the incoming message to
V ⇤ is the same message which has come to V ⇤ in the target session, B
uses OraclePRF to compute the session key.
– For all other sessions, B computes the session key by using the PRF.
• EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: B can answer all EphemeralKeyReveal
queries B which are allowed in the freshness condition, because B has the
ephemeral keys.
• Corrupt(U) query: Except for V ⇤, algorithm B can answer all other Corrupt
queries. In this case we consider the situation in which the adversary is not
allowed to corrupt the partner principal of the target session, so in fact, B
can answer all Corrupt queries.
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• Test(U, V, s) query: Answers with the K computed in Send query when
U = U⇤, V = V ⇤ and s = s⇤.
If the oracle is using the real PRF with a hidden key, the simulation is
identical to Game 3, whereas if the oracle is using a random function, the
simulation constructed is identical to Game 4. If A can distinguish the di↵erence
between Game 3 and Game 4, then A can be used as a subroutine of an algorithm
B, which is used to distinguish whether the PRF challenger is real or random.
Hence,
|AdvGame 3(A)  AdvGame 4(A)|  AdvPRF(B). (4.13)
Semantic security of the session key in Game 4. Since the session key K
of ⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤ is chosen randomly and independently from all other values, A does
not have any advantage in Game 4. Hence,
AdvGame 4(A) = 0. (4.14)
Combining the results above, we find,
Adv  CAFL⇡1,Case 2(A)  N2PNs
 
AdvCCLA2PKE (D) + AdvPRF(B)
 
. (4.15)
Combine Case 1 and Case 2
According to the analysis we can see the adversary A’s advantage of winning
against the protocol ⇡1 challenger is
Adv  CAFL⇡1 (A)  N2PN2s
 
AdvCCLA2PKE (D) + AdvPRF(B)
 
.
4.3.3 Leakage Tolerance of the CAFL-secure Protocol ⇡1
In the created protocol, a principal simply encrypts a randomly-chosen ephemeral
key using a CCLA2-secure public key encryption scheme, and sends it to the
partner principal. Therefore, the leakage tolerance is exactly same as the leakage
tolerance of the underlying CCLA2-secure public key encryption scheme.
Dziembowski and Faust. [DF11] constructed a CCLA2-secure public-key cryp-
tosystem, where the secret key sk = (x1, x2) 2 ( ⇤q)2 is split into two parts `sk, rsk
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such that `sk
$   ( ⇤q)n at random and rsk  ( ⇤q)n⇥2 holding `sk · rsk = sk, where
n is the statistical security parameter. They proved their public-key cryptosystem
is CCLA2-secure for   = 0.15 · n · log q   1. So if we consider n = 20 and
log(q   1) to be 1024, we can allow   = 3072 bits of leakage, from each split per
occurrence. Considering only the most expensive computations, the computation
cost of Enc and Dec is 5Exp for each, where Exp is the computational cost of
an exponentiation.
4.4 Summary
We have presented a security model and a key exchange protocol that improves
the amount and type of secret leakage. Our security model allows the adversary to
fully compromise a variety of long-term and short-term ephemeral values, as well
as to obtain partial, adaptive, continuous, after-the-fact leakage of long-term secret
keys. Previous key exchange security models either do not consider partial leakage
at all (BR, CK, eCK) or allow only bounded leakage before the test session is
queried and none after (Moriyama–Okamoto). Our model captures a wide variety
of practical attack scenarios, including cold boot, key compromise impersonation,
and side channel attacks. We have presented a generic key exchange protocol,
that relies on a CCLA2-secure public-key encryption scheme, and can achieve
the same amount of leakage tolerance as the underlying public-key encryption
scheme.
In the next chapter we will strengthen the security model by introducing
an eCK-like freshness condition and construct a leakage-resilient key exchange
protocol which can be proven secure in that stronger security model.
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In Chapter 4 we advanced modelling security by addressing more granular
partial leakage of long-term secret keys even after the test session is activated,
but enforcing additional restrictions to the freshness condition. In this chapter,
we address partial leakage of long-term secrets of protocol principals, even after
the session key is established, while stripping-o↵ the additional restrictions to
the freshness condition. We introduce a generic key exchange security model,
which can be instantiated allowing bounded or continuous leakage, even when
the adversary learns certain ephemeral secrets or session keys. Our model
is the strongest known partial-leakage-based security model for key exchange
protocols. We present a generic construction of a two-pass leakage-resilient key
exchange protocol that is secure in slightly weakened version of the presented
generic security model, by introducing a new concept: the leakage-resilient
NAXOS trick. We identify a special property for public-key cryptosystems:
pair generation indistinguishability, and show how to obtain the leakage-resilient
NAXOS trick from a pair generation indistinguishable leakage-resilient public-key
cryptosystem. The generic protocol can be instantiated with certain available
public-key encryption schemes and signature schemes in the literature. Further,
we present a concrete construction of a key exchange protocol, which can be
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proven secure in the continuous leakage variant of the presented model. The
concrete protocol is constructed using a leakage-resilient storage scheme and its
refreshing protocol, and is based on the Di e-Hellman key exchange.
5.1 Introduction
Previous key exchange models including leakage have been limited in one or more
ways. In most of the models [ADW09,DHLAW10,MO11] the total amount of
leakage allowed is bounded, which is troublesome because a protocol may reveal
a limited amount of leakage each time it runs, and hence reveal “continuous”
leakage. In addition, the adversary cannot obtain any leakage information after
the session key is established for the session which the adversary targets for its
attack. This is problematic because it does not address the security of one session,
even if some leakage happens in subsequent sessions. A recent paper [YMSW13]
uses a di↵erent leakage model with allows auxiliary input [DKL09] but this cannot
be directly compared with other leakage models. Although this model allows the
adversary to make leakage queries on the complete secret, the values returned to
the adversary are limited to those which are hard to invert and therefore are of
limited use to the adversary.
Moreover, the continuous after-the-fact leakage key exchange security model
(CAFL) we presented in the Chapter 4 enforces more restrictions to the freshness
definition, more than in the eCK model [LLM07] or Moriyama-Okamoto model
[MO11]: it does not allow to reveal the ephemeral keys of both principals as
to corrupt both protocol principals of the target session etc. So we need to
accommodate a reasonable security model which addresses more granular leakage
and at the same time does not enforce more restrictions than currently existing
key exchange security models.
In this chapter, we construct a generic leakage-security model for key exchange
protocols, which can be instantiated as a bounded leakage variant as well as a
continuous leakage variant. In the bounded leakage variant, the total amount
of leakage is bounded, whereas in the continuous leakage variant, a protocol
execution may reveal a small amount of leakage each time. Further, the adversary
is allowed to obtain the leakage even after the session key is established for
the session in which the adversary tries to distinguish the real session key from
a random session key. We emphasize that the leakage functions are arbitrary
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polynomial time functions with output length restrictions. Thus, our approach
allows after-the-fact leakage in bounded or continuous leakage model.
5.2 After-the-fact Leakage-eCK ((·)AFL-eCK) Model
The generic after-the-fact leakage eCK ((·)AFL-eCK) model can be instantiated
in two di↵erent ways which leads to two security models. Namely, bounded
after-the-fact leakage eCK (BAFL-eCK) model and continuous after-the-fact
leakage eCK (CAFL-eCK) model. The BAFL-eCK model allows the adversary to
obtain a bounded amount of leakage of the long-term secret keys of the protocol
principals, as well as reveal session keys, long-term secret keys and ephemeral keys.
Di↵erently, the CAFL-eCK model allows the adversary to continuously obtain
arbitrarily large amount of leakage of the long-term secret keys of the protocol
principals, enforcing the restriction that the amount of leakage per observation is
bounded.
In both instantiations of the generic (·)AFL-eCK model the partnering def-
inition and the adversarial powers are same. The freshness conditions di↵er
according to the leakage allowed. So we can define the partnering and adversarial
powers in the generic (·)AFL-eCK model and define the freshness separately in
each BAFL-eCK and CAFL-eCK models.
5.2.1 Modelling Leakage
Considering side-channel attacks which can be mounted against key exchange
protocols, the most realistic way is to obtain the leakage information of secret keys
from the protocol computations which use secret keys for computations. Following
the premise “only computation leaks information”, we have modeled the leakage
in a place where a computation takes place on secret keys. After issuing a Send
query, the adversary will get a protocol message which is computed according
to the normal protocol computations. So sending an adversary-chosen adaptive
leakage function with the Send query reflects the premise “only computation
leaks information”.
We introduce a tuple of n˜ adaptively chosen e ciently computable leakage
functions f = (f1j, f2j, . . . , fn˜j); the size n˜ of the tuple is protocol-specific, and j
indicates the jth leakage occurrence. A key exchange protocol may use more than
one cryptographic primitive and each primitive uses a distinct secret key or secret
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state (in signature schemes). Hence, we need to address the leakage of secret
keys or secret states from each of those primitives. Also, some cryptographic
primitives which have been used to construct a key exchange protocol may be
stateful cryptographic primitives. The execution of a stateful cryptographic
primitive is split into a number of sequential stages and each of these stages uses
one part of the secret key. The tuple of leakage functions f = (f1j, f2j, . . . , fn˜j)
leaks information from the secret key of each of the underlying primitives or
each split of the secret keys at occurrence j. There exists a leakage parameter
  = ( 1, . . . , n˜) where each  i bounds the leakage for the corresponding primitive
as key split.
5.2.2 Adversarial Powers
The adversary A is a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm that controls
the whole network. A interacts with a set of sessions which represent protocol
instances. The following query allows the adversary A to run the protocol.
• Send(U, V, s,m, f) query: The session ⇧sU,V , computes the next protocol
message according to the protocol specification and sends it to the adversary
A, along with the leakage f(skU). A can also use this query to activate a
new protocol instance as an initiator with blank m.
The following set of queries allow the adversary A to compromise certain ses-
sion specific ephemeral secrets and long-term secrets from the protocol principals.
• SessionKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: A is given the session key of the session
⇧sU,V .
• EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: A is given the ephemeral keys (per-
session randomness) of the session ⇧sU,V .
• Corrupt(U) query: A is given the long-term secrets of the principal U .
This query does not reveal any session keys or ephemeral keys to A.
Once the session ⇧sU,V has accepted a session key, the adversary A attempt to
distinguish it from a random session key by asking the following query. The Test
query is used to formalize the notion of the semantic security of a key exchange
protocol.
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• Test(U, s) query: When A asks the Test query, the challenger first chooses
a random bit b
$   {0, 1} and if b = 1 then the actual session key is returned
to A, otherwise a random string chosen from the same session key space
is returned to A. This query is only allowed to be asked once across all
sessions.
Remark 5.2.1 (Corrupt query vs Leakage queries). By issuing a Corrupt query,
the adversary gets the party’s entire long-term secret key. Separately, by issuing
leakage queries (using a tuple leakage function f embedded with the Send query)
the adversary gets respectively  -bounded leakage information about the long-
term secret key(s). It may seem paradoxical to consider Corrupt and Leakage
queries at the same time. But there is a good reason to consider both.
The eCK model addresses KCI attacks, because the adversary is allowed to
corrupt the owner of the test session before the activation of the test session. In
the generic (·)AFL-eCK model, we allow the adversary to obtain leakage from
the partner of the test session, in addition to allowing the adversary to corrupt
the owner of the test session.
Hence, the generic (·)AFL-eCK model allows the adversary to obtain more
information than the eCK model. Moreover, none of the existing security models
such as BR, CK, CKHMQV, eCK allow a Send query with a tuple leakage function
f . Hence, we can see that (·)AFL-eCK allows the adversary to obtain leakage
information which none of the existing security models allow. Further, we
emphasize that the technique of sending a tuple leakage function f with the Send
query can be applied to any of the existing key exchange security models to
obtain their leakage versions.
5.2.3 Bounded After-the-fact Leakage-eCK (BAFL-eCK)
Model
In the BAFL-eCK model the total amount of leakage of each secret key of
the underlying cryptographic primitives or each split of the secret key of the
underlying stateful cryptographic primitives are bounded by leakage parameters.
The leakage parameters are primitive-specific.
If the total leakage bound of the ith cryptographic primitive (or the total
leakage bound of the ith state of the stateful cryptographic primitive) is  i and the
leakage function fij outputs leakage bits of the secret key of the ith cryptographic
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primitive (or leakage bits of the ith split of the secret key), then for leakage
resilience of ith cryptographic primitive (or the stateful cryptographic primitive),
we need that
X
j
|fij(si)|   i.
Definition 5.2.1 (   BAFL-eCK-freshness). Let   = ( 1, . . . , n˜) be a vector
of n˜ elements (same size as f in Send query). A session ⇧sU,V is said to be
   BAFL-eCK-fresh if and only if:
1. The session ⇧sU,V or its partner, ⇧
s0
V,U (if it exists) has not been asked a
SessionKeyReveal.
2. If the partner ⇧s
0
V,U exists, none of the following combinations have been
asked:
(a) Corrupt(U) and EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s).
(b) Corrupt(V ) and EphemeralKeyReveal(V, U, s0).
3. If the partner ⇧s
0
V,U does not exist, none of the following combinations have
been asked:
(a) Corrupt(V ).
(b) Corrupt(U) and EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s).
4. For all Send(U, ·, ·, ·, f) queries,
X
j
|fij(skUi)|   i.
5. For all Send(V, ·, ·, ·, f) queries,
X
j
|fij(skVi)|   i.
5.2.4 Continuous After-the-fact Leakage-eCK (CAFL-eCK)
Model
In the CAFL-eCK model, continuous leakage of each secret key of the underlying
cryptographic primitives or each split of the secret key of the underlying stateful
cryptographic primitives is allowed. The only restriction is that the amount of
leakage per occurrence is bounded by leakage parameters. The leakage parameters
are primitive-specific.
If the leakage bound of the ith cryptographic primitive is  i per leakage
occurrence and the leakage function fij outputs leakage bits of the secret key of
the ith cryptographic primitive, then for leakage resilience of ith cryptographic
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primitive we need that |fij(ski)|   i, per leakage occurrence. If the leakage
bound of the ith state of the stateful cryptographic primitive is  i per leakage
occurrence and the leakage function fij outputs leakage bits of the ith split of the
secret key, then for leakage resilience of the stateful cryptographic primitive we
need that |fij(ski)|   i, per leakage occurrence.
Definition 5.2.2 (   CAFL-eCK-freshness). Let   = ( 1, . . . , n˜) be a vector
of n˜ elements (same size as f in Send query). A session ⇧sU,V is said to be
   CAFL-eCK-fresh if and only if: Conditions (1)-(3) of Definition 5.2.1 hold,
and
4. For each Send(U, ·, ·, ·, f) query, size of the output of |fij(skU i)|   i.
5. For each Send(V, ·, ·, ·, f) queries, size of the output of |fij(skV i)|   i.
5.2.5 Defining Security
In this section we give formal definitions for partner sessions and security in the
(·)AFL-eCK model.
Definition 5.2.3 (Partner sessions in generic (·)AFL-eCK model). Two sessions
⇧sU,V and ⇧
s0
U 0,V 0 are said to be partners if all of the following hold:
1. both ⇧sU,V and ⇧
s0
U 0,V 0 have computed session keys;
2. messages sent from ⇧sU,V and messages received by ⇧
s0
U 0,V 0 are identical;
3. messages sent from ⇧s
0
U 0,V 0 and messages received by ⇧
s
U,V are identical;
4. U 0 = V and V 0 = U ;
5. Exactly one of U and V is the initiator and the other is the responder.
The protocol is said to be correct if two partner sessions compute and accept
identical session keys.
We introduce the security game of the generic (·)AFL-eCK model. If we
consider   BAFL-eCK-freshness, the security game is BAFL-eCK, otherwise if
we consider    CAFL-eCK-freshness, it is CAFL-eCK security game.
Definition 5.2.4 (   (·)AFL-eCK security game). Security of a key exchange
protocol in the generic (·)AFL-eCK model is defined using the following security
game, which is played by PPT adversary A against the protocol challenger.
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• Stage 0: The challenger generates the keys by using the security parameter
k.
• Stage 1: Amay ask any of Send, SessionKeyReveal, EphemeralKeyReveal
and Corrupt queries to any session at will.
• Stage 2: A chooses a    (·)AFL-eCK-fresh session and asks a Test query.
• Stage 3: A may continue asking Send, SessionKeyReveal, Corrupt and
EphemeralKeyReveal queries. A may not ask a query that violates the
   (·)AFL-eCK-freshness of the test session.
• Stage 4: At some point A outputs the bit b0 2 {0, 1} which is its guess of
the value b on the test session. A wins if b0 = b.
SuccA is the event that the adversary A wins the security game in Definition
5.2.4.
Definition 5.2.5 (    (·)AFL-eCK-security). A protocol ⇡ is said to be    
(·)AFL-eCK-secure if there is no PPT algorithm A that can win the    
(·)AFL-eCK security game with non-negligible advantage. The advantage of
an adversary A is defined as Adv  (·)AFL-eCK⇡ (A) = |2Pr(SuccA)  1|.
The generic (·)AFL-eCK model addresses the real world attack scenarios
which were discussed in section 4.2.4, with the following di↵erences.
• Cold boot attacks: The (·)AFL-eCK model allows the adversary to reveal
either the long-term secret key (Corrupt query) or the ephemeral secret key
(EphemeralKeyReveal query) of the target session. The bounded leakage
instantiation of the (·)AFL-eCK model, BAFL-eCK model, allows bounded
amount of leakage of the long-term secret key with the ephemeral key
reveal. Thus these queries address the cold boot attacks to some extent,
where the cold boot attacks reveal either (i) the long-term secret key, (ii)
the ephemeral secret key, or (iii) the ephemeral secret key and part of
the long-term secret key of a protocol principal, which is same as in the
Moriyama-Okamoto model. The improvement of the BAFL-eCK model is
that it allows the adversary to obtain the partial leakage of long-term secret
key even after the test session is established, which is not allowed in the
Moriyama-Okamoto model.
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• Weak forward secrecy: (·)AFL-eCK-freshness allows the adversary to
corrupt both of the protocol principals of the target session, after the
test session is activated, as long as the adversary is passive. Hence, the
(·)AFL-eCK model addresses weak forward secrecy, as for the eCK model
and the Moriyama-Okamoto model.
• eCK security: The generic (·)AFL-eCK model is a leakage-resilient ver-
sion of the eCK model [LLM07], hence, the generic (·)AFL-eCK model
captures all possible attacks from ephemeral and long-term key compro-
mises. More precisely, in sessions where the adversary does not modify the
communication between parties (passive sessions), the adversary is allowed
to reveal both ephemeral secrets, both long-term secrets, or one of each from
two di↵erent parties, whereas in sessions where the adversary may forge
the communication of one of the parties (active sessions), the adversary is
allowed to reveal the long-term or ephemeral key of the other party.
The main reason to introduce a generic security model, (·)AFL-eCK model,
and then present two instantiations (BAFL-eCK model and CAFL-eCK model)
is to o↵er more flexibility to construct leakage-resilient key exchange protocols.
The generic (·)AFL-eCK model gives a reasonable security framework for key
exchange protocols capturing a wide range of practical attacks including side-
channel attacks. The only di↵erence between the two instantiations is the leakage
allowance (bounded or continuous). If we need to implement a key exchange
protocol which is resilient to cold boot attacks we use the BAFL-eCK model as
the security framework, whereas if we need to implement a key exchange protocol
which is secure against continuous-leakage side-channel attacks such as timing,
power analysis and EM radiation, we use the CAFL-eCK model as the security
framework.
5.3 Generic Construction of (·)AFL-eCK-secure
Key Exchange Protocol
We investigate how to construct (·)AFL-eCK-secure key exchange protocols. The
motivation of LaMacchia et al. [LLM07] in designing the eCK model was that an
adversary should have to compromise both the long-term and ephemeral secret
keys of a party in order to recover the session key. In their NAXOS protocol, the
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main way this is accomplished is using what is now called the “NAXOS trick”: a
“pseudo” ephemeral keygesk is computed as the hash of the long-term key lsk and
the actual ephemeral key esk: gesk  H(esk, lsk). The value gesk is never stored,
and thus in the eCK model the adversary must learn both esk and lsk in order to
be able to computegesk. Note however, that in the NAXOS protocol, the initiator
must compute gesk = H(esk, lsk) twice: once when sending its Di e–Hellman
ephemeral public key g
gesk, and once when computing the Di e–Hellman shared
secrets from the received values. This is to avoid storing a single value that, when
compromised, can be used to compute the session key.
5.3.1 Leakage-Resilient NAXOS Trick
Moving to the leakage-resilient setting requires rethinking the NAXOS trick.
In the model “only computation leaks information”, we must consider leakage
at any place the long-term secret key is used. Thus, we need some kind of
leakage-resilient NAXOS trick. As noted above, the initiator must not store the
pseudo-ephemeral value, gesk, and instead must apply the NAXOS trick twice
for each session. We replace the hash function H with a new leakage-resilient
NAXOS trick to compute the pseudo-ephemeral value. The requirement is, given
the long-term secret key and a particular ephemeral key, the NAXOS trick should
always compute the same pseudo-ephemeral value, such that without knowing
both the long-term and ephemeral keys the adversary is unable to compute the
pseudo-ephemeral value. Moreover, the NAXOS trick computation should be
resilient to the leakage of the long-term secret key, which happens even after the
test session is activated.
A leakage-resilient NAXOS trick can be achieved by using the decryption
function of a CPLA2-secure public-key cryptosystem [HL11]. Since decryption is
deterministic, given the long-term secret key and a randomly chosen ciphertext,
it will output the corresponding plaintext. So one can randomly choose an
ephemeral key and use it as the ciphertext to the decryption function, and obtain
the corresponding plaintext (output of the decryption function) as the pseudo-
ephemeral value. Without knowing both the long-term and ephemeral keys, it
is infeasible to compute the pesudo-ephemeral value. Thus, a leakage-resilient
NAXOS trick can be achieved and the pseudo-ephemeral value can be computed.
Further, bounded or continuous leakage-resilient key exchange protocol can be
constructed, if the underlying public-key cryptosystem is bounded or continuous
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leakage-resilient.
5.3.2 Pair Generation Indistinguishability
Using a decryption algorithm of a CPLA2-secure public-key cryptosystem does
not work for our requirement unless the public-key cryptosystem has a special
property: any randomly chosen ciphertext should be decrypted without rejection.
A randomly chosen ciphertext can be rejected with a significant probability if
NIZK proofs have been used for CPLA2-secure public-key cryptosystems. In
NIZK proofs, the party which creates a ciphertext should provide a proof of
knowledge of the plaintext, and the party which decrypts the ciphertext first
verifies the proof, then only if the proof is correct it decrypts the ciphertext,
otherwise rejects. Use of a CPLA2-secure public-key cryptosystem without the
special property would allow the adversary to break the protocol with a significant
probability, whenever a randomly chosen ciphertext is rejected. We formally
define the special property as pair generation indistinguishability.
Definition 5.3.1 (Pair Generation Indistinguishability). Let PKE = (KeyGen,
Enc,Dec) be a public-key cryptosystem. For (p, s)
$   KeyGen(1k), let D(p,s)1 ,
D(p,s)2 be two distributions such that D
(p,s)
1 = {(m, c) : m $  M, c $   Enc(p,m)}
and D(p,s)2 = {(m, c) : c $   C,m  Dec(s, c)} where M is the message space
and C is the ciphertext space. For ✏   0, the public-key cryptosystem PKE is
✏-pair-generation-indistinguishable (✏  PG-IND) if for all (p, s) $   KeyGen(1k),
SD(D(p,s)1 , D
(p,s)
2 )  ✏.
Recall that the statistical distance, SD, between two distributions X and Y
over a domain U is defined as SD(X, Y ) = 12
P
u2U
  Pr[X = u]  Pr[Y = u]  .
The notion of pair generation indistinguishability shares some resemblance
with the pseudorandom decapsulation notion introduced by Abdalla et al. [ACF09],
where the notion was needed for the construction of verifiable random functions
from identity-based key encapsulation schemes. They presented a methodology to
construct verifiable random functions (VRFs) from a class of identity based key
encapsulation mechanisms (IB-KEM) that is called VRF suitable. An IB-KEM
is VRF suitable if it provides an unique decryption (i.e. given a ciphertext C
produced with respect to an identity ID, all the secret keys corresponding to
identity ID0, decrypt to the same value, even if ID = ID0) and it satisfies an
additional property that is called pseudorandom decapsulation. Pseudorandom
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decapsulation means that if one decrypts a ciphertext C, produced with respect to
an identity ID, using the decryption key corresponding to any other identity ID0
the resulting value looks random to a polynomially bounded observer. Both the
pair generation indistinguisbability and the pseudorandom decapsulation notions
are similar, except that the pseudorandom decapsulation is in the identity-based
setting whereas the pair generation indistinguishability is in the public key setting.
Now we show a 0 PG-IND public-key cryptosystem available in the literature.
Naor and Segev [NS09] described the framework of a hash proof system [CS02] as
a key-encapsulation mechanism using the notion of Kiltz et al. [KPSY09]. Let K
be the symmetric key space, C be the valid ciphertext space and M be the message
space. Both K and C are the same size and elements of M are µ-bit strings. The
leakage-resilient public-key cryptosystem of Naor and Segev encrypts an arbitrary
message m
$   M as ( , c, seed), where c $   C with the corresponding witness !
(of the fact that c is indeed a valid ciphertext from C), seed
$   {0, 1}t is a random
seed and  = Ext(Pub(p, c,!), seed) m. Ext : K⇥{0, 1}t ! {0, 1}µ is a public
average-case strong extractor function [DRS04], p is the public key and Pub is
the deterministic public evaluation function of the underlying key-encapsulation
mechanism. Pub receives as input a public key p, a valid ciphertext c 2 C and
the corresponding witness !, and outputs an encapsulated key in K. Whenever a
random ( , c, seed) is sampled, the decryption, m    Ext(Priv(s, c), seed)
corresponds to a random m 2 M. Priv is a private evaluation algorithm of the
underlying key-encapsulation mechanism, receives as input the secret key s (of
the public key p) and a valid ciphertext c, and outputs an encapsulated key in
K. Thus, the leakage-resilient public-key cryptosystem of Naor and Segev is
0  PG-IND. The generic CPLA2-secure public-key cryptosystem of Halevi and
Lin [HL11] can be instantiated using the leakage-resilient public-key cryptosystem
of Naor and Segev Hence, instantiation of the generic CPLA2-secure public-key
cryptosystem of Halevi and Lin is also 0  PG-IND.
5.3.3 Authenticating Protocol Messages
After computing the pseudo-ephemeral value by the NAXOS trick, a principal
computes a Di e-Hellman exponentiation and sends it to the other protocol
principal. If that value is sent alone, the protocol is not secure because there is
no authentication for the protocol messages, and hence an attacker can simply
replace the original protocol message with its own value. In order to prevent this,
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we need to provide authenticity to the protocol messages. There are unforgeable
against chosen message leakage (UFCMLA) secure signature schemes available in
the literature [KV09,FKPR09,MTVY11,BKKV10], which we can use to sign the
protocol messages and provide authenticity. Further, the key exchange protocol
is bounded or continuous leakage-resilient, if the underlying signature scheme is
bounded or continuous leakage-resilient.
Weakening the (·)AFL-eCK Model
When we consider the EphemeralKeyReveal query in our (·)AFL-eCK model,
it allows the adversary to learn the randomness used in the session, including
the randomness used in signing. Full leakage of the randomness is not allowed
in leakage-resilient signature schemes. Thus, in order to use available leakage-
resilient signature schemes in our protocol instantiation, we will assume that the
EphemeralKeyReveal query will not reveal the randomness used to compute the
signature. Therefore, in this generic protocol construction, the security model
we consider is slightly weaker than the actual (·)AFL-eCK model, as it does not
reveal the randomness used for signing with the EphemeralKeyReveal query. We
name the weaker model as w(·)AFL-eCK model. Later, in this chapter we will
present di↵erent protocol construction, avoiding that additional restriction in the
model.
5.3.4 Protocol Construction
In Table 5.1, we show the construction of protocol ⇡. KeyGen, Enc and Dec
are the key generation, encryption and decryption algorithms of the underlying
CPLA2-secure (Section 2.4.3), ✏  PG-IND-public-key cryptosystem PKE with
ciphertext space bC. Moreover, we choose the message space M of the underlying
public-key encryption scheme PKE to be equal to Z⇤q. KG, Sign and Vfy are
the key generation, signature generation and signature verification algorithms
of the underlying leakage-resilient signature scheme SIG (Section 2.4.4). The
protocol ⇡ is a Di e-Hellman-type [DH76] key agreement protocol where G is a
group of prime order q with generator g. After exchanging the public values both
principals compute a Di e-Hellman-type shared secret value, KDF is a secure key
derivation function (Section 2.3.4) which generates a shared secret key (ms) using
the Di e-Hellman-type shared secret key, and PRF is a pseudo random function
(Section 2.3.5) that is used to compute the session key using that shared key, ms,
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and the protocol message sequence. The computations which leak information
are underlined.
Remark 5.3.1. In Table 5.1, let bC be the ciphertext space: in a setting like
Naor and Segev [NS09], the random r values are not just chosen from C, but frombC = {0, 1}µ ⇥ C⇥ {0, 1}t, which gives random r $   bC in the form ( , c, seed).
A (Initiator) B (Responder)
Initial Setup
skA, vkA
$   KG(1k) skB, vkB $   KG(1k)
sA, pA
$   KeyGen(1k) sB, pB $   KeyGen(1k)
Protocol Execution
rA
$   bC If Vfy(vkA, XA,  A) = “true”  frA  Dec(sA, rA) rB $   bC
XA  gfrA frB  Dec(sB, rB)
 A
$   Sign(skA, (A,B,XA)) A,B,XA, A      ! XB  gfrB
B,A,XB , B         B $   Sign(skB, (B,A,XB))
If Vfy(vkB, (B,A,XB),  B) = “true”
 
frA  Dec(sA, rA)
ms KDF(XfrAB ,?, k,?) ms KDF(XfrBA ,?, k,?)
K  PRF(ms,A||XA|| A||B||XB|| B) K  PRF(ms,A||XA|| A||B||XB|| B)  
K is the session key
Table 5.1: Generic w(·)AFL-eCK-secure protocol construction: Protocol ⇡
We found that the generic protocol construction presented in our initial
publication of this work [ASB14], is vulnerable against active adversary. Following
we explain the reason: In that protocol construction, the inputs to the key
derivation function contain the Di e-Hellman shared secret, and the identities of
the initiator and the responder, A and B, respectively: KDF(gfrAfrB ,?, k, A||B).
Assume that the target session is in B, if the adversary corrupts B and gets the
signing key of B, re-sign the protocol messageXB computing the new signature  0B,
that makes a di↵erent signature from  B, due to probabilistic signing algorithm.
Then if the adversary sends B,A,XB,  0B to B, instead of B,A,XB,  B, and
executes the rest of the protocol, it results that A’s session and B’s session are
not matching, because the message B,A,XB,  B computed by B is di↵erent from
the message B,A,XB,  0B received by A, but compute the same session key. Thus,
the adversary can issue SessionKeyReveal query to the session at A and thus
trivially learn the session key of the target session. Cremers [Cre11] showed that
such attacks can be avoided by using the session identifier in the key derivation
step together with other shared secrets. Thus, in this thesis we re-design the
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protocol accordingly to ensure that mismatching sessions do not compute same
session keys. Thus, the session key is derived using a pseudo random function as
K  PRF(ms,A||XA|| A||B||XB|| B), such that it contains the session identifier
A||XA|| A||B||XB|| B as an input to the pseudo random function. The shared
secret ms is derived as ms KDF(XfrAB ,?, k,?). The   input to the KDF is the
Di e-Hellman shared secret value XfrAB , and it is a uniformly random element of
the group, and therefore we can use KDF in the simulation without any problem.
5.3.5 Security Proof of the Protocol ⇡ in the w(·)AFL-eCK
Model
We prove the security of the generic protocol ⇡ in the w(·)AFL-eCK model. If
the underlying primitives are secure in the bounded or continuous leakage model,
the protocol ⇡ is BAFL-eCK-secure or CAFL-eCK-secure respectively (with the
restriction that EphemeralKeyReveal query does not reveal the randomness used
in the signature computation).
Theorem 5.3.1. The protocol ⇡ is Adv  w(·)AFL-eCK⇡ -secure, whenever the under-
lying public-key cryptosystem PKE is CPLA2-secure and ✏  PG-IND, the key
derivation function KDF is secure with respect to an uniformly random source
key material, the signature scheme SIG is UFCMLA-secure, PRF is a pseudo
random function, the DDH and the ODH assumptions hold.
Let U = {U1, . . . , UNP } be a set of NP parties. Each party Ui owns at most Ns
number of protocol sessions. Let A be any PPT adversary against the protocol
⇡. Then the advantage of A against     w(·)AFL-eCK-security of protocol ⇡,
Adv  w(·)AFL-eCK⇡ is:
Adv  w(·)AFL-eCK⇡ (A)  max
h
N2PN
2
s
⇥ 
AdvDDHq,g (C) + AdvKDF(B) + AdvPRF(J )
 
+
1
q
⇤
,
N2PN
2
s
⇥ 
AdvDDHq,g (C) + AdvKDF(B) + AdvPRF(J ) + 2AdvCPLA2PKE (D) + 2✏
 
+
1
q
⇤
,
N2PN
2
s
⇥ 
AdvODHq,g (R) + AdvPRF(J ) + 2AdvCPLA2PKE (D) + 2✏
 
+
1
q
⇤
, NPAdv
UFCMLA
SIG (E)
i
.
where B, C,D, E ,J ,R are e cient algorithms constructed using the adversary A,
against the underlying key derivation function, KDF, DDH problem, public-key
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cryptosystem, PKE, the signature scheme, SIG, pseudo random function, PRF,
and Oracle Di e-Hellman problem respectively. The PKE is ✏  PG-IND.
Proof. The proof is split into two main cases: when the partner to the test session
exists, and when it does not.
Case 1: A partner session to the test session exists
In this case, the adversary is allowed to corrupt both principals or reveal
ephemeral keys from both sessions. We assume that the adversary A can
win the     w(·)AFL-eCK challenge against the protocol ⇡ with advantage
Adv  w(·)AFL-eCK⇡ (A). We split this case into four sub cases as follows:
1. Adversary corrupts both the owner and partner principals to the test session.
2. Adversary corrupts neither owner or nor partner principal to the test session.
3. Adversary corrupts the owner to the test session, but does not corrupt the
partner to the test session.
4. Adversary corrupts the partner to the test session, but does not corrupt
the owner to the test session.
Case 1.1: Adversary corrupts both the owner and partner principals
to the test session
Game 1. This game is the original game. When the Test query is asked, the
Game 1 challenger chooses a random bit b
$   {0, 1}. If b = 1, the real session key
is given to A, otherwise a random value chosen from the same session key space
is given. This is the original game. Hence,
AdvGame 1(A) = Adv  w(·)AFL-eCK⇡,Case 1.1 (A). (5.1)
Game 2. Abort the simulation if there exists two sessions outputting the same
ephemeral public keys (SameX = gx values). Since the ephemeral keys are coming
from Z⇤q, the total number of ephemeral keys are q. Total number of session in
the simulation is NP
2Ns
2, because NP is the number of protocol principals and
each protocol principal owns Ns number of sessions. Hence,
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|AdvGame 1(A)  AdvGame 2(A)|  NP
2Ns
2
q
. (5.2)
Game 3. BeforeA begins, two distinct random principals U⇤, V ⇤ $   {U1, ..., UNP }
are chosen and two random numbers s⇤, t⇤ $   {1, ...Ns} are chosen, where NP is
the number of protocol principals and Ns is the number of sessions on a principal.
The session ⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤ is chosen as the target session and the session ⇧
t⇤
V ⇤,U⇤ is chosen
as the partner to the target session. If the test session is not the session ⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤
or partner to the session is not ⇧t
⇤
V ⇤,U⇤ , the Game 3 challenger aborts the game.
Unless the incorrect choice happens, Game 3 is identical to Game 2. Hence,
AdvGame 3(A) = 1
NP
2N2s
AdvGame 2(A). (5.3)
Game 4. Game 4 challenger randomly chooses z
$   ⇤q and computes the
session key of the target session and its partner session, using the KDF and
the PRF as ms  KDF(gz,?, k,?) and K  PRF(ms,U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤ ||V ⇤||XV ⇤
|| V ⇤), when U⇤ is the initiator, or K  PRF(ms, V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤ ||U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤),
when U⇤ is the responder.
We construct an algorithm C against the DDH challenge, using the adversary
A. The DDH challenger sends values (X = gx, Y = gy, Z = gz) such that either
z = xy or z
$   ⇤q, as the inputs to the algorithm C. C uses the value X as the
ephemeral public key of U⇤ and Y as the ephemeral public key of V ⇤ in the test
session, and computes the session key using Z as the input to the KDF in the
session key derivation process.
If C’s input is a Di e-Hellman triple, the simulation constructed by C is
identical to Game 3, otherwise it is identical to Game 4. If A can distinguish
whether gz = gxy or not, then C can answer the DDH challenge. Note that
EphemeralKeyReveal(U⇤, V ⇤, s⇤) or EphemeralKeyReveal(V ⇤, U⇤, t⇤) is prohib-
ited since the adversary corrupts both the owner and the partner to the test
session. C can answer all the adversarial queries allowed in this case, because it
has all the long-term and ephemeral secret keys of the allowed queries. Hence,
|AdvGame 3(A)  AdvGame 4(A)|  AdvDDHq,g (C). (5.4)
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Game 5. The Game 5 challenger randomly chooses ms
$   {0, 1}k and computes
the session key of the target session and its partner session, using the PRF as
K  PRF(ms,U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤ ||V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤), when U⇤ is the initiator or K  
PRF(ms, V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤ ||U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤), when U⇤ is the responder.
We construct an algorithm B against a KDF challenger, using the adversary
A. The KDF challenger sends a ms value which is either generated using the
KDF or randomly chosen. B uses the received ms value to compute the session
key of the target session using the PRF.
If ms is computed using the KDF, simulation constructed by B is identical to
Game 4, otherwise it is identical to Game 5. If A can distinguish the di↵erence
between Game 4 and Game 5, then A can be used as a subroutine of an algorithm
B, which is used to distinguish whether the ms value is computed using KDF or
randomly chosen. B can answer all the adversarial queries allowed in this case,
because it has all the long-term and ephemeral secret keys of the allowed queries.
Hence,
|AdvGame 4(A)  AdvGame 5(A)|  AdvKDF(B). (5.5)
Game 6. The Game 6 challenger randomly chooses K
$   {0, 1}k as session key
of the target session and its partner session.
We construct an algorithm J against an OraclePRF, using the adversary A.
The OraclePRF sends a K value which is either generated using the PRF with a
hidden key, or a random function. J uses the received K as the session key of
the target session.
If K is generated using the PRF with a hidden key, simulation constructed by
J is identical to Game 5, otherwise it is identical to Game 6. If A can distinguish
the di↵erence between Game 5 and Game 6, then A can be used as a subroutine
of an algorithm J , which is used to distinguish whether the OraclePRF is real or
a random function. J can answer all the adversarial queries allowed in this case,
because it has all the long-term and ephemeral secret keys of the allowed queries.
Hence,
|AdvGame 5(A)  AdvGame 6(A)|  AdvPRF(J ). (5.6)
Semantic security of the session key in Game 6. Since the session key K
of ⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤ is chosen randomly and independently from all other values, A does
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not have any advantage in Game 6. Hence,
AdvGame 6(A) = 0. (5.7)
We find,
Adv  w(·)AFL-eCK⇡,Case 1.1 (A)  N2PN2s
h 
AdvDDHq,g (C) + AdvKDF(B) + AdvPRF(J )
 
+
1
q
i
.
Case 1.2: Adversary corrupts neither owner or nor partner principal
to the test session
Game 1. This game is the original game. When the Test query is asked, the
Game 1 challenger chooses a random bit b
$   {0, 1}. If b = 1, the real session key
is given to A, otherwise a random value chosen from the same session key space
is given. This is the original game. Hence,
AdvGame 1(A) = Adv  w(·)AFL-eCK⇡,Case 1.2 (A). (5.8)
Game 2. Abort the simulation if there exists two sessions outputting the same
ephemeral public keys (SameX = gx values). Since the ephemeral keys are coming
from Z⇤q, the total number of ephemeral keys are q. Total number of session in
the simulation is NP
2Ns
2, because NP is the number of protocol principals and
each protocol principal owns Ns number of sessions. Hence,
|AdvGame 1(A)  AdvGame 2(A)|  NP
2Ns
2
q
. (5.9)
Game 3. BeforeA begins, two distinct random principals U⇤, V ⇤ $   {U1, ..., UNP }
are chosen and two random numbers s⇤, t⇤ $   {1, ...Ns} are chosen, where NP is
the number of protocol principals and Ns is the number of sessions on a principal.
The session ⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤ is chosen as the target session and the session ⇧
t⇤
V ⇤,U⇤ is chosen
as the partner to the target session. If the test session is not the session ⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤
or partner to the session is not ⇧t
⇤
V ⇤,U⇤ , the Game 3 challenger aborts the game.
Unless the incorrect choice happens, Game 3 is identical to Game 2. Hence,
AdvGame 3(A) = 1
NP
2N2s
AdvGame 2(A). (5.10)
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Game 4. Game 4 challenger randomly chooses a pseudo-ephemeral value frU⇤ $  
⇤
q, and computes the ephemeral key rU⇤
$   Enc(pU⇤ , frU⇤), in the target session.
We introduce an algorithm F which is constructed using the adversary A,
against the ✏-pair-generation indistinguishability challenger (✏-PG). F receives a
pair (rU⇤ , frU⇤) such that frU⇤ = Dec(sU⇤ , rU⇤). F uses rU⇤ as the ephemeral key
of U⇤ and frU⇤ as the pseudo-ephemeral key of U⇤ in the target session.
If a random ephemeral key rU⇤
$   ⇤q is chosen first and the pseudo-ephemeral
value frU⇤  Dec(sU⇤ , rU⇤) is computed, then the simulation constructed by F is
identical to Game 3. Otherwise if a random pseudo-ephemeral value frU⇤ $   ⇤q
is chosen first and the ephemeral key rU⇤
$   Enc(pU⇤ , frU⇤) is computed, then
the simulation constructed by F is identical to Game 4. If A can distinguish
the di↵erence between Game 3 and Game 4, then F can distinguish whether
a message/ciphertext pair (m, c) belongs to the distribution D1 or D2 (✏-pair-
generation indistinguishability challenge). F can answer all the adversarial queries
allowed in this case, because it has all the long-term and ephemeral secret keys
of the allowed queries. Hence,
|AdvGame 3(A)  AdvGame 4(A)|  ✏. (5.11)
Game 5. Game 5 challenger randomly chooses a pseudo-ephemeral value fr0U⇤ $  
⇤
q, and uses it as the pseudo ephemeral value of U
⇤ in the target session.
We introduce an algorithm D which is constructed using the adversary A,
against the CPLA2 challenger. The algorithm D uses the public-key of the
CPLA2 challenger as the public key of the protocol principal U⇤ and generates
public/secret key pairs for all other protocol principals. D generates signing/ver-
ification key pairs for every protocol principal. D picks two random strings,
r0, r1
$   {0, 1}k and passes them to the CPLA2 challenger. From the CPLA2
challenger, D receives a challenge ciphertext C1 such that C1 $   Enc(pU⇤ , r✓)
where r✓ = r0 or r✓ = r1. The following describes the procedure of answering
queries:
• Send(U, V, s,m, f) query: When U = U⇤, V = V ⇤ and s = s⇤, D takes r1 asfr0U⇤ , computes ggr0U⇤ and computes its signature using the signing key skU⇤ .
Then D creates the protocol message and sends it to A with the leakage
f(sU⇤), where the leakage f(sU⇤) is obtained by accessing the leakage oracle
of the CPLA2 challenger.
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For all other Send queries, D can execute the protocol normally, because
D has all the public keys and can compute protocol messages accordingly.
Except U⇤ D can compute the leakage by its own, and for U⇤ D accesses
the leakage oracle to obtain the leakage.
• SessionKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: D will abort if SessionKeyReveal(U⇤, V ⇤,
s⇤) or SessionKeyReveal(V ⇤, U⇤, t⇤) query is asked. D can easily com-
pute the answers using the corresponding psuedo-ephemeral keys for other
SessionKeyReveal queries.
• EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: For the EphemeralKeyReveal(U⇤, V ⇤,
s⇤) query, D uses C1 as the answer. For all other EphemeralKeyReveal
queries D will answer with the corresponding ephemeral-key which is com-
puted by encrypting a pseudo-ephemeral value with the secret key of the
corresponding principal.
• Corrupt(U) query: Except for U⇤ and V ⇤, algorithm D can answer all
other Corrupt queries. In this case we consider the situation in which the
adversary corrupts neither owner or nor partner principal to the test session,
so these exceptions will not occur.
• Test(U, s) query: The algorithm D will abort the game if the adversary
issues a Test query other than Test(U⇤, s⇤). To compute the answer to the
Test(U⇤, s⇤) query, the algorithm D computes:
– If U⇤ is the initiator, computes ms  KDF(Xgr0U⇤V ⇤ ,?, k,?), K  
PRF(ms,U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤ ||V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤) where fr0U⇤ = r1.
– If U⇤ is the responder, computes ms  KDF(Xgr0U⇤V ⇤ ,?, k,?), K  
PRF(ms, V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤ ||U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤).
Then using K answers the Test query.
If ✓ = 1, then r1 is the decryption of C1 and the simulation constructed by
D is identical to Game 4 whereas if ✓ = 0, then r0 is the decryption of C1 and
the simulation constructed by D is identical to Game 5. If A can distinguish the
di↵erence between Game 4 and Game 5, then D can be used against a CPLA2
challenger. Hence,
|AdvGame 4(A)  AdvGame 5(A)|  AdvCPLA2PKE (D). (5.12)
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Game 6. Game 6 challenger randomly chooses a pseudo-ephemeral value frV ⇤ $  
⇤
q, and computes the ephemeral key rV ⇤
$   Enc(pV ⇤ , frV ⇤) in the partner to the
target session.
We introduce an algorithm F which is constructed using the adversary A,
against the ✏-pair-generation indistinguishability challenger (✏-PG). F receives a
pair (rV ⇤ , frV ⇤) such that frV ⇤ = Dec(sV ⇤ , rV ⇤). F uses rV ⇤ as the ephemeral key
of V ⇤ and frV ⇤ as the pseudo-ephemeral key of V ⇤.
If a random ephemeral key rV ⇤
$   ⇤q is chosen first and the pseudo-ephemeral
value frV ⇤  Dec(sV ⇤ , rV ⇤) is computed, then the simulation constructed by F is
identical to Game 5. Otherwise if a random pseudo-ephemeral value frV ⇤ $   ⇤q
is chosen first and the ephemeral key rV ⇤
$   Enc(pV ⇤ , frV ⇤) is computed, then
the simulation constructed by F is identical to Game 6. If A can distinguish
the di↵erence between Game 5 and Game 6, then F can distinguish whether
a message/ciphertext pair (m, c) belongs to the distribution D1 or D2 (✏-pair-
generation indistinguishability challenge). F can answer all the adversarial queries
allowed in this case, because it has all the long-term and ephemeral secret keys
of the allowed queries. Hence,
|AdvGame 5(A)  AdvGame 6(A)|  ✏. (5.13)
Game 7. Game 7 challenger randomly chooses a pseudo-ephemeral value fr0V ⇤ $  
⇤
q, and uses it as the pseudo ephemeral value of V
⇤ in the partner to the target
session.
We introduce an algorithm D which is constructed using the adversary A,
against the CPLA2 challenger. The algorithm D uses the public-key of the
CPLA2 challenger as the public key of the protocol principal V ⇤ and generates
public/secret key pairs for all other protocol principals. D generates signing/ver-
ification key pairs for every protocol principal. D picks two random strings,
r00, r
0
1
$   {0, 1}k and passes them to the CPLA2 challenger. From the CPLA2
challenger, D receives a challenge ciphertext C2 such that C2 $   Enc(pV ⇤ , r0✓)
where r0✓ = r
0
0 or r
0
✓ = r
0
1. The following describes the procedure of answering
queries:
• Send(U, V, s,m, f) query: When U = V ⇤, V = U⇤ and s = t⇤, D takes r01 asfr0V ⇤ , computes ggr0V ⇤ and computes its signature using the signing key skV ⇤ .
Then D creates the protocol message and sends it to A with the leakage
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f(sV ⇤), where the leakage f(sV ⇤) is obtained by accessing the leakage oracle
of the CPLA2 challenger.
For all other Send queries, D can execute the protocol normally, because
D has all the public keys and can compute protocol messages accordingly.
Except V ⇤ D can compute the leakage by its own, and for V ⇤ D accesses
the leakage oracle to obtain the leakage.
• SessionKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: D will abort if SessionKeyReveal(U⇤, V ⇤,
s⇤) or SessionKeyReveal(V ⇤, U⇤, t⇤) query is asked. D can easily com-
pute the answers using the corresponding psuedo-ephemeral keys for other
SessionKeyReveal queries.
• EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: For the EphemeralKeyReveal(V ⇤, U⇤,
t⇤) query, D uses C2 as the answer. For all other EphemeralKeyReveal
queries D will answer with the corresponding ephemeral-key which is com-
puted by encrypting a pseudo-ephemeral value with the secret key of the
corresponding principal.
• Corrupt(U) query: Except for U⇤ and V ⇤, algorithm D can answer all
other Corrupt queries. In this case we consider the situation in which the
adversary corrupts neither owner or nor partner principal to the test session,
so these exceptions will not occur.
• Test(U, s) query: The algorithm D will abort the game if the adversary
issues a Test query other than Test(U⇤, s⇤). To compute the answer to the
Test(U⇤, s⇤) query, the algorithm D computes:
– If U⇤ is the initiator, computes ms  KDF(Xgr0V ⇤U⇤ ,?, k,?), K  
PRF(ms,U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤ ||V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤).
– If U⇤ is the responder, ms KDF(Xgr0V ⇤U⇤ ,?, k,?), K  PRF(ms, V ⇤
||XV ⇤ || V ⇤ ||U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤).
Then using K answers the Test query.
If ✓ = 1, then r01 is the decryption of C2 and the simulation constructed by
D is identical to Game 6 whereas if ✓ = 0, then r00 is the decryption of C2 and
the simulation constructed by D is identical to Game 7. If A can distinguish the
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di↵erence between Game 6 and Game 7, then D can be used against a CPLA2
challenger. Hence,
|AdvGame 6(A)  AdvGame 7(A)|  AdvCPLA2PKE (D). (5.14)
Game 8. Game 8 challenger randomly chooses z
$   ⇤q and computes the
session key of the target session and its partner session, using the KDF and
the PRF as ms  KDF(gz,?, k,?) and K  PRF(ms,U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤ ||V ⇤||XV ⇤
|| V ⇤), when U⇤ is the initiator or K  PRF(ms, V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤ ||U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤),
when U⇤ is the responder.
We construct an algorithm C against the DDH challenge, using the adversary
A. The DDH challenger sends values (X = gx, Y = gy, Z = gz) such that either
z = xy or z
$   ⇤q, as the inputs to the algorithm C. C uses the value X as the
ephemeral public key of U⇤ and Y as the ephemeral public key of V ⇤ in the test
session, and computes the session key using Z as the input to the KDF in the
session key derivation process.
If C’s input is a Di e-Hellman triple, the simulation constructed by C is
identical to Game 7, otherwise it is identical to Game 8. If A can distinguish
whether gz = gxy or not, then C can answer the DDH challenge. C can answer all
the adversarial queries allowed in this case, because it has all the long-term and
ephemeral secret keys of the allowed queries. In this case EphemeralKeyReveal
query is not allowed to the target session and its partner. Hence,
|AdvGame 7(A)  AdvGame 8(A)|  AdvDDHq,g (C). (5.15)
Game 9. The Game 9 challenger randomly chooses ms
$   {0, 1}k and computes
the session key of the target session and its partner session, using the PRF as
K  PRF(ms,U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤ ||V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤), when U⇤ is the initiator or K  
PRF(ms, V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤ ||U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤), when U⇤ is the responder.
We construct an algorithm B against a KDF challenger, using the adversary
A. The KDF challenger sends a ms value which is either generated using the
KDF or randomly chosen. B uses the received ms value to compute the session
key of the target session using the PRF.
If ms is computed using the KDF, simulation constructed by B is identical to
Game 8, otherwise it is identical to Game 9. If A can distinguish the di↵erence
between Game 8 and Game 9, then A can be used as a subroutine of an algorithm
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B, which is used to distinguish whether the ms value is computed using KDF or
randomly chosen. B can answer all the adversarial queries allowed in this case,
because it has all the long-term and ephemeral secret keys of the allowed queries.
Hence,
|AdvGame 8(A)  AdvGame 9(A)|  AdvKDF(B). (5.16)
Game 10. The Game 10 challenger randomly chooses K
$   {0, 1}k as session
key of the target session and its partner session.
We construct an algorithm J against an OraclePRF, using the adversary A.
The OraclePRF sends a K value which is either generated using the PRF with a
hidden key, or a random function. J uses the received K as the session key of
the target session.
If K is generated using the PRF with a hidden key, simulation constructed
by J is identical to Game 9, otherwise it is identical to Game 10. If A can
distinguish the di↵erence between Game 9 and Game 10, then A can be used as a
subroutine of an algorithm J , which is used to distinguish whether the OraclePRF
is real or a random function. J can answer all the adversarial queries allowed
in this case, because it has all the long-term and ephemeral secret keys of the
allowed queries. Hence,
|AdvGame 9(A)  AdvGame 10(A)|  AdvPRF(J ). (5.17)
Semantic security of the session key in Game 10. Since the session key
K of ⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤ is chosen randomly and independently from all other values, A does
not have any advantage in Game 10. Hence,
AdvGame 10(A) = 0. (5.18)
We find,
Adv  w(·)AFL-eCK⇡,Case 1.2 (A)  N2PN2s
h 
AdvDDHq,g (C) + AdvKDF(B) + AdvPRF(J )
+2AdvCPLA2PKE (D) + 2✏
 
+
1
q
i
.
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Case 1.3: Adversary corrupts the partner, but not the owner to the
test session
Game 1. This game is the original game. When the Test query is asked, the
Game 1 challenger chooses a random bit b
$   {0, 1}. If b = 1, the real session key
is given to A, otherwise a random value chosen from the same session key space
is given. This is the original game. Hence,
AdvGame 1(A) = Adv  w(·)AFL-eCK⇡,Case 1.3 (A). (5.19)
Game 2. Abort the simulation if there exists two sessions outputting the same
ephemeral public keys (SameX = gx values). Since the ephemeral keys are coming
from Z⇤q, the total number of ephemeral keys are q. Total number of session in
the simulation is NP
2Ns
2, because NP is the number of protocol principals and
each protocol principal owns Ns number of sessions. Hence,
|AdvGame 1(A)  AdvGame 2(A)|  NP
2Ns
2
q
. (5.20)
Game 3. BeforeA begins, two distinct random principals U⇤, V ⇤ $   {U1, ..., UNP }
are chosen and two random numbers s⇤, t⇤ $   {1, ...Ns} are chosen, where NP is
the number of protocol principals and Ns is the number of sessions on a principal.
The session ⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤ is chosen as the target session and the session ⇧
t⇤
V ⇤,U⇤ is chosen
as the partner to the target session. If the test session is not the session ⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤
or partner to the session is not ⇧t
⇤
V ⇤,U⇤ , the Game 3 challenger aborts the game.
Unless the incorrect choice happens, Game 3 is identical to Game 2. Hence,
AdvGame 3(A) = 1
NP
2N2s
AdvGame 2(A). (5.21)
Game 4. Game 4 challenger randomly chooses a pseudo-ephemeral value frU⇤ $  
⇤
q, and computes the ephemeral key rU⇤
$   Enc(pU⇤ , frU⇤) in the target session.
We introduce an algorithm F which is constructed using the adversary A,
against the ✏-pair-generation indistinguishability challenger (✏-PG). F receives a
pair (rU⇤ , frU⇤) such that frU⇤ = Dec(sU⇤ , rU⇤). F uses rU⇤ as the ephemeral key
of U⇤ and frU⇤ as the pseudo-ephemeral key of U⇤ in the target session.
If a random ephemeral key rU⇤
$   ⇤q is chosen first and the pseudo-ephemeral
value frU⇤  Dec(sU⇤ , rU⇤) is computed, then the simulation constructed by F is
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identical to Game 3. Otherwise if a random pseudo-ephemeral value frU⇤ $   ⇤q
is chosen first and the ephemeral key rU⇤
$   Enc(pU⇤ , frU⇤) is computed, then
the simulation constructed by F is identical to Game 4. If A can distinguish
the di↵erence between Game 3 and Game 4, then F can distinguish whether
a message/ciphertext pair (m, c) belongs to the distribution D1 or D2 (✏-pair-
generation indistinguishability challenge). F can answer all the adversarial queries
allowed in this case, because it has all the long-term and ephemeral secret keys
of the allowed queries. Hence,
|AdvGame 3(A)  AdvGame 4(A)|  ✏. (5.22)
Game 5. Game 5 challenger randomly chooses a pseudo-ephemeral value fr0U⇤ $  
⇤
q, and uses it as the pseudo ephemeral value of U
⇤ in the target session.
We introduce an algorithm D which is constructed using the adversary A,
against the CPLA2 challenger. The algorithm D uses the public-key of the
CPLA2 challenger as the public key of the protocol principal U⇤ and generates
public/secret key pairs for all other protocol principals. D generates signing/ver-
ification key pairs for every protocol principal. D picks two random strings,
r0, r1
$   {0, 1}k and passes them to the CPLA2 challenger. From the CPLA2
challenger, D receives a challenge ciphertext C1 such that C1 $   Enc(pU⇤ , r✓)
where r✓ = r0 or r✓ = r1. The following describes the procedure of answering
queries:
• Send(U, V, s,m, f) query: When U = U⇤, V = V ⇤ and s = s⇤, D takes r1 asfr0U⇤ , computes ggr0U⇤ and computes its signature using the signing key skU⇤ .
Then D creates the protocol message and sends it to A with the leakage
f(sU⇤), where the leakage f(sU⇤) is obtained by accessing the leakage oracle
of the CPLA2 challenger.
For all other Send queries, D can execute the protocol normally, because
D has all the public keys and can compute protocol messages accordingly.
Except U⇤ D can compute the leakage by its own, and for U⇤ D accesses
the leakage oracle to obtain the leakage.
• SessionKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: D will abort if SessionKeyReveal(U⇤, V ⇤,
s⇤) or SessionKeyReveal(V ⇤, U⇤, t⇤) query is asked. D can easily com-
pute the answers using the corresponding psuedo-ephemeral keys for other
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SessionKeyReveal queries.
• EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: For the EphemeralKeyReveal(U⇤, V ⇤,
s⇤) query, D uses C1 as the answer. For all other EphemeralKeyReveal
queries D will answer with the corresponding ephemeral-key which is com-
puted by encrypting a pseudo-ephemeral value with the secret key of the
corresponding principal.
• Corrupt(U) query: Except for U⇤, algorithm D can answer all other
Corrupt queries. In this case we consider the situation in which the adver-
sary does not corrupt the partner to the test session, so these exceptions
will not occur.
• Test(U, s) query: The algorithm D will abort the game if the adversary
issues a Test query other than Test(U⇤, s⇤). To compute the answer to the
Test(U⇤, s⇤) query, the algorithm D computes:
– If U⇤ is the initiator, computes ms  KDF(Xgr0U⇤V ⇤ ,?, k,?), K  
PRF(ms,U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤ ||V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤).
– If U⇤ is the responder, computes ms  KDF(Xgr0U⇤V ⇤ ,?, k,?), K  
PRF(ms, V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤ ||U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤).
Then using K answers the Test query.
If ✓ = 1, then r1 is the decryption of C1 and the simulation constructed by
D is identical to Game 4 whereas if ✓ = 0, then r0 is the decryption of C1 and
the simulation constructed by D is identical to Game 5. If A can distinguish the
di↵erence between Game 4 and Game 5, then D can be used against a CPLA2
challenger. Hence,
|AdvGame 4(A)  AdvGame 5(A)|  AdvCPLA2PKE (D). (5.23)
Game 6. Game 6 challenger randomly chooses z
$   ⇤q and computes the
session key of the target session and its partner session, using the KDF and
the PRF as ms  KDF(gz,?, k,?) and K  PRF(ms,U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤ ||V ⇤||XV ⇤
|| V ⇤), when U⇤ is the initiator, or K  PRF(ms, V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤ ||U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤),
when U⇤ is the responder.
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We construct an algorithm C against the DDH challenge, using the adversary
A. The DDH challenger sends values (X = gx, Y = gy, Z = gz) such that either
z = xy or z
$   ⇤q, as the inputs to the algorithm C. C uses the value X as the
ephemeral public key of U⇤ and Y as the ephemeral public key of V ⇤ in the test
session, and computes the session key using Z as the input to the KDF in the
session key derivation process.
If C’s input is a Di e-Hellman triple, the simulation constructed by C is
identical to Game 5, otherwise it is identical to Game 6. If A can distinguish
whether gz = gxy or not, then C can answer the DDH challenge. C can answer all
the adversarial queries allowed in this case, because it has all the long-term and
ephemeral secret keys of the allowed queries. Hence,
|AdvGame 5(A)  AdvGame 6(A)|  AdvDDHq,g (C). (5.24)
Game 7. The Game 7 challenger randomly chooses ms
$   {0, 1}k and computes
the session key of the target session and its partner session, using the PRF as
K  PRF(ms,U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤ ||V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤), when U⇤ is the initiator or K  
PRF(ms, V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤ ||U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤), when U⇤ is the responder.
We construct an algorithm B against a KDF challenger, using the adversary
A. The KDF challenger sends a ms value which is either generated using the
KDF or randomly chosen. B uses the received ms value to compute the session
key of the target session using the PRF.
If ms is computed using the KDF, simulation constructed by B is identical to
Game 6, otherwise it is identical to Game 7. If A can distinguish the di↵erence
between Game 6 and Game 7, then A can be used as a subroutine of an algorithm
B, which is used to distinguish whether the ms value is computed using KDF or
randomly chosen. B can answer all the adversarial queries allowed in this case,
because it has all the long-term and ephemeral secret keys of the allowed queries.
Hence,
|AdvGame 6(A)  AdvGame 7(A)|  AdvKDF(B). (5.25)
Game 8. The Game 8 challenger randomly chooses K
$   {0, 1}k as session key
of the target session and its partner session.
We construct an algorithm J against an OraclePRF, using the adversary A.
The OraclePRF sends a K value which is either generated using the PRF with a
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hidden key, or a random function. J uses the received K as the session key of
the target session.
If K is generated using the PRF with a hidden key, simulation constructed by
J is identical to Game 7, otherwise it is identical to Game 8. If A can distinguish
the di↵erence between Game 7 and Game 8, then A can be used as a subroutine
of an algorithm J , which is used to distinguish whether the OraclePRF is real or
a random function. J can answer all the adversarial queries allowed in this case,
because it has all the long-term and ephemeral secret keys of the allowed queries.
Hence,
|AdvGame 7(A)  AdvGame 8(A)|  AdvPRF(J ). (5.26)
Semantic security of the session key in Game 8. Since the session key K
of ⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤ is chosen randomly and independently from all other values, A does
not have any advantage in Game 8. Hence,
AdvGame 8(A) = 0. (5.27)
We find,
Adv  w(·)AFL-eCK⇡,Case 1.3 (A)  N2PN2s
h 
AdvDDHq,g (C) + AdvKDF(B) + AdvPRF(J )
+AdvCPLA2PKE (D) + ✏
 
+
1
q
i
.
Case 1.4: Adversary corrupts the owner, but not the partner to the
test session
Game 1. This game is the original game. When the Test query is asked, the
Game 1 challenger chooses a random bit b
$   {0, 1}. If b = 1, the real session key
is given to A, otherwise a random value chosen from the same session key space
is given. This is the original game. Hence,
AdvGame 1(A) = Adv  w(·)AFL-eCK⇡,Case 1.4 (A). (5.28)
Game 2. Abort the simulation if there exists two sessions outputting the same
ephemeral public keys (SameX = gx values). Since the ephemeral keys are coming
from Z⇤q, the total number of ephemeral keys are q. Total number of session in
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the simulation is NP
2Ns
2, because NP is the number of protocol principals and
each protocol principal owns Ns number of sessions. Hence,
|AdvGame 1(A)  AdvGame 2(A)|  NP
2Ns
2
q
. (5.29)
Game 3. BeforeA begins, two distinct random principals U⇤, V ⇤ $   {U1, ..., UNP }
are chosen and two random numbers s⇤, t⇤ $   {1, ...Ns} are chosen, where NP is
the number of protocol principals and Ns is the number of sessions on a principal.
The session ⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤ is chosen as the target session and the session ⇧
t⇤
V ⇤,U⇤ is chosen
as the partner to the target session. If the test session is not the session ⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤
or partner to the session is not ⇧t
⇤
V ⇤,U⇤ , the Game 3 challenger aborts the game.
Unless the incorrect choice happens, Game 3 is identical to Game 2. Hence,
AdvGame 3(A) = 1
NP
2N2s
AdvGame 2(A). (5.30)
Game 4. Game 4 challenger randomly chooses a pseudo-ephemeral value frV ⇤ $  
⇤
q, and computes the ephemeral key rV ⇤
$   Enc(pV ⇤ , frV ⇤), in the partner to the
target session.
We introduce an algorithm F which is constructed using the adversary A,
against the ✏-pair-generation indistinguishability challenger (✏-PG). F receives a
pair (rV ⇤ , frV ⇤) such that frV ⇤ = Dec(sV ⇤ , rV ⇤). F uses rV ⇤ as the ephemeral key
of V ⇤ and frV ⇤ as the pseudo-ephemeral key of V ⇤ in the partner to the target
session.
If a random ephemeral key rV ⇤
$   ⇤q is chosen first and the pseudo-ephemeral
value frV ⇤  Dec(sV ⇤ , rV ⇤) is computed, then the simulation constructed by F is
identical to Game 3. Otherwise if a random pseudo-ephemeral value frV ⇤ $   ⇤q
is chosen first and the ephemeral key rV ⇤
$   Enc(pV ⇤ , frV ⇤) is computed, then
the simulation constructed by F is identical to Game 4. If A can distinguish
the di↵erence between Game 3 and Game 4, then F can distinguish whether
a message/ciphertext pair (m, c) belongs to the distribution D1 or D2 (✏-pair-
generation indistinguishability challenge). F can answer all the adversarial queries
allowed in this case, because it has all the long-term and ephemeral secret keys
of the allowed queries. Hence,
|AdvGame 3(A)  AdvGame 4(A)|  ✏. (5.31)
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Game 5. Game 5 challenger randomly chooses a pseudo-ephemeral value fr0V ⇤ $  
⇤
q, and uses it as the pseudo ephemeral value of V
⇤ in the partner to the target
session.
We introduce an algorithm D which is constructed using the adversary A,
against the CPLA2 challenger. The algorithm D uses the public-key of the
CPLA2 challenger as the public key of the protocol principal V ⇤ and generates
public/secret key pairs for all other protocol principals. D generates signing/ver-
ification key pairs for every protocol principal. D picks two random strings,
r00, r
0
1
$   {0, 1}k and passes them to the CPLA2 challenger. From the CPLA2
challenger, D receives a challenge ciphertext C2 such that C2 $   Enc(pV ⇤ , r0✓)
where r0✓ = r
0
0 or r
0
✓ = r
0
1. The following describes the procedure of answering
queries:
• Send(U, V, s,m, f) query: When U = V ⇤, V = U⇤ and s = t⇤, D takes r01 asfr0V ⇤ , computes ggr0V ⇤ and computes its signature using the signing key skV ⇤ .
Then D creates the protocol message and sends it to A with the leakage
f(sV ⇤), where the leakage f(sV ⇤) is obtained by accessing the leakage oracle
of the CPLA2 challenger.
For all other Send queries, D can execute the protocol normally, because
D has all the public keys and can compute protocol messages accordingly.
Except V ⇤ D can compute the leakage by its own, and for V ⇤ D accesses
the leakage oracle to obtain the leakage.
• SessionKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: D will abort if SessionKeyReveal(U⇤, V ⇤,
s⇤) or SessionKeyReveal(V ⇤, U⇤, t⇤) query is asked. D can easily com-
pute the answers using the corresponding psuedo-ephemeral keys for other
SessionKeyReveal queries.
• EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: For the EphemeralKeyReveal(V ⇤, U⇤,
t⇤) query, D uses C2 as the answer. For all other EphemeralKeyReveal
queries D will answer with the corresponding ephemeral-key which is com-
puted by encrypting a pseudo-ephemeral value with the secret key of the
corresponding principal.
• Corrupt(U) query: Except for U⇤ and V ⇤, algorithm D can answer all
other Corrupt queries. In this case we consider the situation in which the
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adversary does not corrupt the partner principal to the test session, so these
exceptions will not occur.
• Test(U, s) query: The algorithm D will abort the game if the adversary
issues a Test query other than Test(U⇤, s⇤). To compute the answer to the
Test(U⇤, s⇤) query, the algorithm D computes:
– If U⇤ is the initiator, ms  KDF(Xgr0V ⇤U⇤ ,?, k,?), K  PRF(ms,U⇤
||XU⇤ || U⇤ ||V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤) where fr0U⇤ = r1..
– If U⇤ is the responder computes ms  KDF(Xgr0V ⇤U⇤ ,?, k,?), K  
PRF(ms, V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤ ||U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤).
Then using K answers the Test query.
If ✓ = 1, then r01 is the decryption of C2 and the simulation constructed by
D is identical to Game 4 whereas if ✓ = 0, then r00 is the decryption of C2 and
the simulation constructed by D is identical to Game 5. If A can distinguish the
di↵erence between Game 4 and Game 5, then D can be used against a CPLA2
challenger. Hence,
|AdvGame 4(A)  AdvGame 5(A)|  AdvCPLA2PKE (D). (5.32)
Game 6. Game 6 challenger randomly chooses z
$   ⇤q and computes the
session key of the target session and its partner session, using the KDF and
the PRF as ms  KDF(gz,?, k,?) and K  PRF(ms,U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤ ||V ⇤||XV ⇤
|| V ⇤), when U⇤ is the initiator, or K  PRF(ms, V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤ ||U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤),
when U⇤ is the responder.
We construct an algorithm C against the DDH challenge, using the adversary
A. The DDH challenger sends values (X = gx, Y = gy, Z = gz) such that either
z = xy or z
$   ⇤q, as the inputs to the algorithm C. C uses the value X as the
ephemeral public key of U⇤ and Y as the ephemeral public key of V ⇤ in the test
session, and computes the session key using Z as the input to the KDF in the
session key derivation process.
If C’s input is a Di e-Hellman triple, the simulation constructed by C is
identical to Game 5, otherwise it is identical to Game 6. If A can distinguish
whether gz = gxy or not, then C can answer the DDH challenge. C can answer all
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the adversarial queries allowed in this case, because it has all the long-term and
ephemeral secret keys of the allowed queries. Hence,
|AdvGame 5(A)  AdvGame 6(A)|  AdvDDHq,g (C). (5.33)
Game 7. The Game 7 challenger randomly chooses ms
$   {0, 1}k and computes
the session key of the target session and its partner session, using the PRF as
K  PRF(ms,U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤ ||V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤), when U⇤ is the initiator or K  
PRF(ms, V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤ ||U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤), when U⇤ is the responder.
We construct an algorithm B against a KDF challenger, using the adversary
A. The KDF challenger sends a ms value which is either generated using the
KDF or randomly chosen. B uses the received ms value to compute the session
key of the target session using the PRF.
If ms is computed using the KDF, simulation constructed by B is identical to
Game 6, otherwise it is identical to Game 7. If A can distinguish the di↵erence
between Game 6 and Game 7, then A can be used as a subroutine of an algorithm
B, which is used to distinguish whether the ms value is computed using KDF or
randomly chosen. B can answer all the adversarial queries allowed in this case,
because it has all the long-term and ephemeral secret keys of the allowed queries.
Hence,
|AdvGame 6(A)  AdvGame 7(A)|  AdvKDF(B). (5.34)
Game 8. The Game 8 challenger randomly chooses K
$   {0, 1}k as session key
of the target session and its partner session.
We construct an algorithm J against an OraclePRF, using the adversary A.
The OraclePRF sends a K value which is either generated using the PRF with a
hidden key, or a random function. J uses the received K as the session key of
the target session.
If K is generated using the PRF with a hidden key, simulation constructed by
J is identical to Game 7, otherwise it is identical to Game 8. If A can distinguish
the di↵erence between Game 7 and Game 8, then A can be used as a subroutine
of an algorithm J , which is used to distinguish whether the OraclePRF is real or
a random function. J can answer all the adversarial queries allowed in this case,
because it has all the long-term and ephemeral secret keys of the allowed queries.
Hence,
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|AdvGame 7(A)  AdvGame 8(A)|  AdvPRF(J ). (5.35)
Semantic security of the session key in Game 8. Since the session key K
of ⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤ is chosen randomly and independently from all other values, A does
not have any advantage in Game 8. Hence,
AdvGame 8(A) = 0. (5.36)
We find,
Adv  w(·)AFL-eCK⇡,Case 1.4 (A)  N2PN2s
h 
AdvDDHq,g (C) + AdvKDF(B) + AdvPRF(J )
+AdvCPLA2PKE (D) + ✏
 
+
1
q
i
.
Case 2: A partner session to the test session does not exist
When the partner session does not exist, the owner of the test session shares the
session key with the active adversary. In this situation adversary is not allowed
to corrupt the intended partner principal to the test session. We split this case
into two sub cases as follows:
1. Test session is at the responder.
2. Test session is at the initiator.
Case 2.1: Test session is at the responder Let V ⇤ be the initiator and U⇤
be the responder. Let XU⇤ be the ephemeral public key of U⇤, and XV ⇤ be the
ephemeral public key of V ⇤, in the target session. In this case there are three
sub cases, which address the three di↵erent situations occur when the challenger
interacts with the adversary. We will analyze the adversaries advantage in winning
the w(·)AFL-eCK challenge in following three di↵erent cases.
• (a) There is no session at peer V ⇤ with XV ⇤ : Here the adversary tries to
compute the protocol message from V ⇤ to U⇤, by its own.
• (b) There exists a session at V ⇤ with XV ⇤ and XU⇤ (but  U⇤ computed by
U⇤ is di↵erent from the  U⇤ received to V ⇤ with the protocol message, in the
target session): For instance the adversary corrupts U⇤, re-sign the protocol
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message from U⇤ to V ⇤, executes the protocol and makes a non-matching
session at V ⇤. Then, tries to reveal the session key of that non-matching
session at V ⇤, and win the game.
• (c) There exists a session at V ⇤ with XV ⇤ and X 0U⇤ 6= XU⇤ : Here the
adversary, changes the message from U⇤ to V ⇤, such that there is no
matching session at V ⇤.
Case 2.1.a: There is no session at V ⇤ with XV ⇤
Assume that the adversary A asks a Send query to some fresh session, such that
it accepts, but the signature used in the query is not generated by a legitimate
party.
Game 1. This game is the original game. Hence,
AdvGame 1(A) = Adv  w(·)AFL-eCK⇡,Case 2.1.a (A). (5.37)
Game 2. Before A begins, the Game 2 challenger guesses the identity, V ⇤, of
the partner principal to the test session and if the guess is incorrect it aborts
the game. The probability of Game 2 to be aborted due to incorrect guess of
the partner principal to the test session is 1   1NP . Unless the incorrect guess
happens, Game 2 is identical to Game1. Hence,
AdvGame 2(A) = 1
NP
AdvGame 1(A). (5.38)
The algorithm E sets the verification key of the signature scheme challenger
to the principal V ⇤. The owner principal accepts the message coming from the
intended partner, because the owner computes Vfy(vkV ⇤ , XV ⇤ ,  V ⇤) is “true”.
But the principal V ⇤ is not corrupted and the message XV ⇤ is not signed by the
principal V ⇤, because there is no partner to the test session. Hence,
AdvGame 2(A) = AdvUFCMLASIG (E). (5.39)
We find,
Adv  w(·)AFL-eCK⇡,Case 2.1.a (A) = NPAdvUFCMLASIG (E).
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Case 2.1.b: There exists a session at V ⇤ with XV ⇤ and XU⇤ (but  V ⇤
computed by V ⇤ is di↵erent from the  V ⇤ received to U⇤ with the
protocol message)
Game 1. This game is the original game. When the Test query is asked, the
Game 1 challenger chooses a random bit b
$   {0, 1}. If b = 1, the real session key
is given to A, otherwise a random value chosen from the same session key space
is given. This is the original game. Hence,
AdvGame 1(A) = Adv  w(·)AFL-eCK⇡,Case 2.1.b (A). (5.40)
Game 2. Abort the simulation if there exists two sessions outputting the same
ephemeral public keys (SameX = gx values). Since the ephemeral keys are coming
from Z⇤q, the total number of ephemeral keys are q. Total number of session in
the simulation is NP
2Ns
2, because NP is the number of protocol principals and
each protocol principal owns Ns number of sessions. Hence,
|AdvGame 1(A)  AdvGame 2(A)|  NP
2Ns
2
q
. (5.41)
Game 3. BeforeA begins, two distinct random principals U⇤, V ⇤ $   {U1, ..., UNP }
are chosen as the owner and the peer, and two random numbers s⇤, t⇤ $   {1, ...Ns}
are chosen, where NP is the number of protocol principals and Ns is the number
of sessions on a principal. The session ⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤ is chosen as the target session and
the session ⇧t
⇤
V ⇤,U⇤ is chosen as the almost partner session to the target session. If
the test session is not the session ⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤ , the Game 3 challenger aborts the game.
Unless the incorrect choice happens, Game 3 is identical to Game 2. Hence,
AdvGame 3(A) = 1
NP
2N2s
AdvGame 2(A). (5.42)
The almost partner session is the session, which communicates with the target
session but due to adversaries interaction it does not preserve the partnering
conditions.
Game 4. Game 4 challenger randomly chooses a pseudo-ephemeral value frU⇤ $  
⇤
q, and computes the ephemeral key rU⇤
$   Enc(pU⇤ , frU⇤) in the target session.
We introduce an algorithm F which is constructed using the adversary A,
5.3. Generic Construction of (·)AFL-eCK-secure Key Exchange Protocol 125
against the ✏-pair-generation indistinguishability challenger (✏-PG). F receives a
pair (rU⇤ , frU⇤) such that frU⇤ = Dec(sU⇤ , rU⇤). F uses rU⇤ as the ephemeral key
of U⇤ and frU⇤ as the pseudo-ephemeral key of U⇤ in the target session.
If a random ephemeral key rU⇤
$   ⇤q is chosen first and the pseudo-ephemeral
value frU⇤  Dec(sU⇤ , rU⇤) is computed, then the simulation constructed by F is
identical to Game 3. Otherwise if a random pseudo-ephemeral value frU⇤ $   ⇤q
is chosen first and the ephemeral key rU⇤
$   Enc(pU⇤ , frU⇤) is computed, then
the simulation constructed by F is identical to Game 4. If A can distinguish
the di↵erence between Game 3 and Game 4, then F can distinguish whether
a message/ciphertext pair (m, c) belongs to the distribution D1 or D2 (✏-pair-
generation indistinguishability challenge). F can answer all the adversarial queries
allowed in this case, because it has all the long-term and ephemeral secret keys
of the allowed queries. Hence,
|AdvGame 3(A)  AdvGame 4(A)|  ✏. (5.43)
Game 5. Game 5 challenger randomly chooses a pseudo-ephemeral value fr0U⇤ $  
⇤
q, and uses it as the pseudo ephemeral value of U
⇤ in the target session.
We introduce an algorithm D which is constructed using the adversary A,
against the CPLA2 challenger. The algorithm D uses the public-key of the
CPLA2 challenger as the public key of the protocol principal U⇤ and generates
public/secret key pairs for all other protocol principals. D generates signing/ver-
ification key pairs for every protocol principal. D picks two random strings,
r0, r1
$   {0, 1}k and passes them to the CPLA2 challenger. From the CPLA2
challenger, D receives a challenge ciphertext C1 such that C1 $   Enc(pU⇤ , r✓)
where r✓ = r0 or r✓ = r1. The following describes the procedure of answering
queries:
• Send(U, V, s,m, f) query: When U = U⇤, V = V ⇤ and s = s⇤, D takes r1 asfr0U⇤ , computes ggr0U⇤ and computes its signature using the signing key skU⇤ .
Then D creates the protocol message and sends it to A with the leakage
f(sU⇤), where the leakage f(sU⇤) is obtained by accessing the leakage oracle
of the CPLA2 challenger.
For all other Send queries, D can execute the protocol normally, because
D has all the public keys and can compute protocol messages accordingly.
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Except U⇤ D can compute the leakage by its own, and for U⇤ D accesses
the leakage oracle to obtain the leakage.
• SessionKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: D will abort if SessionKeyReveal(U⇤, V ⇤,
s⇤) or SessionKeyReveal(V ⇤, U⇤, t⇤) query is asked. D can easily com-
pute the answers using the corresponding psuedo-ephemeral keys for other
SessionKeyReveal queries.
• EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: For the EphemeralKeyReveal(U⇤, V ⇤,
s⇤) query, D uses C1 as the answer. For all other EphemeralKeyReveal
queries D will answer with the corresponding ephemeral-key which is com-
puted by encrypting a pseudo-ephemeral value with the secret key of the
corresponding principal.
• Corrupt(U) query: Algorithm D can answer all the Corrupt queries allowed
in the freshness condition.
• Test(U, s) query: The algorithm D will abort the game if the adversary
issues a Test query other than Test(U⇤, s⇤). To compute the answer to the
Test(U⇤, s⇤) query, the algorithm D computes:
– If U⇤ is the initiator, computes ms  KDF(Xgr0U⇤V ⇤ ,?, k,?), K  
PRF(ms,U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤ ||V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤) where fr0U⇤ = r1, when U⇤ is the
initiator.
– If U⇤ is the responder, computes ms  KDF(Xgr0U⇤V ⇤ ,?, k,?), K  
PRF(ms, V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤ ||U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤).
Then using K answers the Test query.
If ✓ = 1, then r1 is the decryption of C1 and the simulation constructed by
D is identical to Game 4 whereas if ✓ = 0, then r0 is the decryption of C1 and
the simulation constructed by D is identical to Game 5. If A can distinguish the
di↵erence between Game 4 and Game 5, then D can be used against a CPLA2
challenger. Hence,
|AdvGame 4(A)  AdvGame 5(A)|  AdvCPLA2PKE (D). (5.44)
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Game 6. Game 6 challenger randomly chooses a pseudo-ephemeral value frV ⇤ $  
⇤
q, and computes the ephemeral key rV ⇤
$   Enc(pV ⇤ , frV ⇤) in the almost partner
session.
We introduce an algorithm F which is constructed using the adversary A,
against the ✏-pair-generation indistinguishability challenger (✏-PG). F receives a
pair (rV ⇤ , frV ⇤) such that frV ⇤ = Dec(sV ⇤ , rV ⇤). F uses rV ⇤ as the ephemeral key
of V ⇤ and frV ⇤ as the pseudo-ephemeral key of V ⇤ in the almost partner session.
If a random ephemeral key rV ⇤
$   ⇤q is chosen first and the pseudo-ephemeral
value frV ⇤  Dec(sV ⇤ , rV ⇤) is computed, then the simulation constructed by F is
identical to Game 5. Otherwise if a random pseudo-ephemeral value frV ⇤ $   ⇤q
is chosen first and the ephemeral key rV ⇤
$   Enc(pV ⇤ , frV ⇤) is computed, then
the simulation constructed by F is identical to Game 6. If A can distinguish
the di↵erence between Game 5 and Game 6, then F can distinguish whether
a message/ciphertext pair (m, c) belongs to the distribution D1 or D2 (✏-pair-
generation indistinguishability challenge). F can answer all the adversarial queries
allowed in this case, because it has all the long-term and ephemeral secret keys
of the allowed queries. Hence,
|AdvGame 5(A)  AdvGame 6(A)|  ✏. (5.45)
Game 7. Game 7 challenger randomly chooses a pseudo-ephemeral value fr0V ⇤ $  
⇤
q , and uses it as the pseudo ephemeral value of V
⇤ in the almost partner session.
We introduce an algorithm D which is constructed using the adversary A,
against the CPLA2 challenger. The algorithm D uses the public-key of the
CPLA2 challenger as the public key of the protocol principal V ⇤ and generates
public/secret key pairs for all other protocol principals. D generates signing/ver-
ification key pairs for every protocol principal. D picks two random strings,
r00, r
0
1
$   {0, 1}k and passes them to the CPLA2 challenger. From the CPLA2
challenger, D receives a challenge ciphertext C2 such that C2 $   Enc(pV ⇤ , r0✓)
where r0✓ = r
0
0 or r
0
✓ = r
0
1. The following describes the procedure of answering
queries:
• Send(U, V, s,m, f) query: When U = V ⇤, V = U⇤ and s = t⇤, D takes r01 asfr0V ⇤ , computes ggr0V ⇤ and computes its signature using the signing key skV ⇤ .
Then D creates the protocol message and sends it to A with the leakage
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f(sV ⇤), where the leakage f(sV ⇤) is obtained by accessing the leakage oracle
of the CPLA2 challenger.
For all other Send queries, D can execute the protocol normally, because
D has all the public keys and can compute protocol messages accordingly.
Except V ⇤ D can compute the leakage by its own, and for V ⇤ D accesses
the leakage oracle to obtain the leakage.
• SessionKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: D will abort if SessionKeyReveal(U⇤, V ⇤,
s⇤) or SessionKeyReveal(V ⇤, U⇤, t⇤) query is asked. D can easily com-
pute the answers using the corresponding psuedo-ephemeral keys for other
SessionKeyReveal queries.
• EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: For the EphemeralKeyReveal(V ⇤, U⇤,
t⇤) query, D uses C2 as the answer. For all other EphemeralKeyReveal
queries D will answer with the corresponding ephemeral-key which is com-
puted by encrypting a pseudo-ephemeral value with the secret key of the
corresponding principal.
• Corrupt(U) query: Algorithm D can answer all the Corrupt queries allowed
in the freshness condition.
• Test(U, s) query: The algorithm D will abort the game if the adversary
issues a Test query other than Test(U⇤, s⇤). To compute the answer to the
Test(U⇤, s⇤) query, the algorithm D computes:
– If U⇤ is the initiator, computes ms  KDF(Xgr0V ⇤U⇤ ,?, k,?), K  
PRF(ms,U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤ ||V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤) where fr0U⇤ = r1.
– If U⇤ is the responder, computes ms  KDF(Xgr0V ⇤U⇤ ,?, k,?), K  
PRF(ms, V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤ ||U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤).
Then using K answers the Test query.
If ✓ = 1, then r01 is the decryption of C2 and the simulation constructed by
D is identical to Game 6 whereas if ✓ = 0, then r00 is the decryption of C2 and
the simulation constructed by D is identical to Game 7. If A can distinguish the
di↵erence between Game 6 and Game 7, then D can be used against a CPLA2
challenger. Hence,
|AdvGame 6(A)  AdvGame 7(A)|  AdvCPLA2PKE (D). (5.46)
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Game 8. Game 8 challenger randomly chooses z
$   ⇤q and computes the session
key of the target session, using the KDF and the PRF as ms  KDF(gz,?, k,
?) and K  PRF(ms,U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤ ||V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤), when U⇤ is the initiator, or
K  PRF(ms, V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤ ||U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤), when U⇤ is the responder.
We construct an algorithm C against the DDH challenge, using the adversary
A. The DDH challenger sends values (X = gx, Y = gy, Z = gz) such that either
z = xy or z
$   ⇤q, as the inputs to the algorithm C. C uses the value X as the
ephemeral public key of U⇤ and Y as the ephemeral public key of V ⇤ in the test
session, and computes the session key using Z as the input to the KDF in the
session key derivation process. In this game, for the almost partner session, the
value Z is used as the Di e-Hellman shared secret.
If C’s input is a Di e-Hellman triple, the simulation constructed by C is
identical to Game 7, otherwise it is identical to Game 8. If A can distinguish
whether gz = gxy or not, then C can answer the DDH challenge. C can answer all
the adversarial queries allowed in this case, because it has all the long-term and
ephemeral secret keys of the allowed queries. Hence,
|AdvGame 7(A)  AdvGame 8(A)|  AdvDDHq,g (C). (5.47)
Game 9. The Game 9 challenger randomly chooses ms
$   {0, 1}k and computes
the session key of the target session, using the PRF as K  PRF(ms,U⇤||XU⇤
|| U⇤ ||V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤), when U⇤ is the initiator or K  PRF(ms, V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤
||U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤), when U⇤ is the responder.
We construct an algorithm B against a KDF challenger, using the adversary
A. The KDF challenger sends a ms value which is either generated using the
KDF or randomly chosen. B uses the received ms value to compute the session
key of the target session using the PRF. In this game, for the almost partner
session, the value ms is used as the shared value derived using the KDF.
If ms is computed using the KDF, simulation constructed by B is identical to
Game 8, otherwise it is identical to Game 9. If A can distinguish the di↵erence
between Game 8 and Game 9, then A can be used as a subroutine of an algorithm
B, which is used to distinguish whether the ms value is computed using KDF or
randomly chosen. B can answer all the adversarial queries allowed in this case,
because it has all the long-term and ephemeral secret keys of the allowed queries.
Hence,
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|AdvGame 8(A)  AdvGame 9(A)|  AdvKDF(B). (5.48)
Game 10. The Game 10 challenger randomly chooses K
$   {0, 1}k as session
key of the target session.
We construct an algorithm J against an OraclePRF, using the adversary A.
The OraclePRF sends a K value which is either generated using the PRF with a
hidden key, or a random function. J uses the received K as the session key of
the target session.
If K is generated using the PRF with a hidden key, simulation constructed
by J is identical to Game 9, otherwise it is identical to Game 10. If A can
distinguish the di↵erence between Game 9 and Game 10, then A can be used as a
subroutine of an algorithm J , which is used to distinguish whether the OraclePRF
is real or a random function. J can answer all the adversarial queries allowed
in this case, because it has all the long-term and ephemeral secret keys of the
allowed queries. Hence,
|AdvGame 9(A)  AdvGame 10(A)|  AdvPRF(J ). (5.49)
Semantic security of the session key in Game 10. Since the session key
K of ⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤ is chosen randomly and independently from all other values, A does
not have any advantage in Game 10. Hence,
AdvGame 10(A) = 0. (5.50)
We find,
Adv  w(·)AFL-eCK⇡,Case 2.1.b (A)  N2PN2s
h 
AdvDDHq,g (C) + AdvKDF(B) + AdvPRF(J )
+2AdvCPLA2PKE (D) + 2✏
 
+
1
q
i
.
Case 2.1.c: There exists a session at V ⇤ with XV ⇤ and X 0U⇤ 6= XU⇤
Game 1. This game is the original game. When the Test query is asked, the
Game 1 challenger chooses a random bit b
$   {0, 1}. If b = 1, the real session key
is given to A, otherwise a random value chosen from the same session key space
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is given. This is the original game. Hence,
AdvGame 1(A) = Adv  w(·)AFL-eCK⇡ (A). (5.51)
Game 2. Abort the simulation if there exists two sessions outputting the same
ephemeral public keys (SameX = gx values). Since the ephemeral keys are coming
from Z⇤q, the total number of ephemeral keys are q. Total number of session in
the simulation is NP
2Ns
2, because NP is the number of protocol principals and
each protocol principal owns Ns number of sessions. Hence,
|AdvGame 1(A)  AdvGame 2(A)|  NP
2Ns
2
q
. (5.52)
Game 3. BeforeA begins, two distinct random principals U⇤, V ⇤ $   {U1, ..., UNP }
are chosen as the owner and the peer, and two random numbers s⇤, t⇤ $   {1, ...Ns}
are chosen, where NP is the number of protocol principals and Ns is the number
of sessions on a principal. The session ⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤ is chosen as the target session and
the session ⇧t
⇤
V ⇤,U⇤ is chosen as the almost partner session to the target session. If
the test session is not the session ⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤ , the Game 3 challenger aborts the game.
Unless the incorrect choice happens, Game 3 is identical to Game 2. Hence,
AdvGame 3(A) = 1
NP
2N2s
AdvGame 2(A). (5.53)
Game 4. Game 4 challenger randomly chooses a pseudo-ephemeral value frU⇤ $  
⇤
q, and computes the ephemeral key rU⇤
$   Enc(pU⇤ , frU⇤) in the target session.
We introduce an algorithm F which is constructed using the adversary A,
against the ✏-pair-generation indistinguishability challenger (✏-PG). F receives a
pair (rU⇤ , frU⇤) such that frU⇤ = Dec(sU⇤ , rU⇤). F uses rU⇤ as the ephemeral key
of U⇤ and frU⇤ as the pseudo-ephemeral key of U⇤ in the target session.
If a random ephemeral key rU⇤
$   ⇤q is chosen first and the pseudo-ephemeral
value frU⇤  Dec(sU⇤ , rU⇤) is computed, then the simulation constructed by F is
identical to Game 3. Otherwise if a random pseudo-ephemeral value frU⇤ $   ⇤q
is chosen first and the ephemeral key rU⇤
$   Enc(pU⇤ , frU⇤) is computed, then
the simulation constructed by F is identical to Game 4. If A can distinguish
the di↵erence between Game 3 and Game 4, then F can distinguish whether
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a message/ciphertext pair (m, c) belongs to the distribution D1 or D2 (✏-pair-
generation indistinguishability challenge). F can answer all the adversarial queries
allowed in this case, because it has all the long-term and ephemeral secret keys
of the allowed queries. Hence,
|AdvGame 3(A)  AdvGame 4(A)|  ✏. (5.54)
Game 5. Game 5 challenger randomly chooses a pseudo-ephemeral value fr0U⇤ $  
⇤
q, and uses it as the pseudo ephemeral value of U
⇤ in the target session.
We introduce an algorithm D which is constructed using the adversary A,
against the CPLA2 challenger. The algorithm D uses the public-key of the
CPLA2 challenger as the public key of the protocol principal U⇤ and generates
public/secret key pairs for all other protocol principals. D generates signing/ver-
ification key pairs for every protocol principal. D picks two random strings,
r0, r1
$   {0, 1}k and passes them to the CPLA2 challenger. From the CPLA2
challenger, D receives a challenge ciphertext C1 such that C1 $   Enc(pU⇤ , r✓)
where r✓ = r0 or r✓ = r1. The following describes the procedure of answering
queries:
• Send(U, V, s,m, f) query: When U = U⇤, V = V ⇤ and s = s⇤, D takes r1 asfr0U⇤ , computes ggr0U⇤ and computes its signature using the signing key skU⇤ .
Then D creates the protocol message and sends it to A with the leakage
f(sU⇤), where the leakage f(sU⇤) is obtained by accessing the leakage oracle
of the CPLA2 challenger.
For all other Send queries, D can execute the protocol normally, because
D has all the public keys and can compute protocol messages accordingly.
Except U⇤ D can compute the leakage by its own, and for U⇤ D accesses
the leakage oracle to obtain the leakage.
• SessionKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: D will abort if SessionKeyReveal(U⇤, V ⇤,
s⇤) or SessionKeyReveal(V ⇤, U⇤, t⇤) query is asked. D can easily com-
pute the answers using the corresponding psuedo-ephemeral keys for other
SessionKeyReveal queries.
• EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: For the EphemeralKeyReveal(U⇤, V ⇤,
s⇤) query, D uses C1 as the answer. For all other EphemeralKeyReveal
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queries D will answer with the corresponding ephemeral-key which is com-
puted by encrypting a pseudo-ephemeral value with the secret key of the
corresponding principal.
• Corrupt(U) query: Algorithm D can answer all the Corrupt queries allowed
in the freshness condition.
• Test(U, s) query: The algorithm D will abort the game if the adversary
issues a Test query other than Test(U⇤, s⇤). To compute the answer to the
Test(U⇤, s⇤) query, the algorithm D computes:
– If U⇤ is the initiator, ms  KDF(Xgr0U⇤V ⇤ ,?, k,?), K  PRF(ms,U⇤
||XU⇤ || U⇤ ||V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤) where fr0U⇤ = r1.
– If U⇤ is the responder computes ms  KDF(Xgr0U⇤V ⇤ ,?, k,?), K  
PRF(ms, V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤ ||U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤).
Then using K answers the Test query.
If ✓ = 1, then r1 is the decryption of C1 and the simulation constructed by
D is identical to Game 4 whereas if ✓ = 0, then r0 is the decryption of C1 and
the simulation constructed by D is identical to Game 5. If A can distinguish the
di↵erence between Game 4 and Game 5, then D can be used against a CPLA2
challenger. Hence,
|AdvGame 4(A)  AdvGame 5(A)|  AdvCPLA2PKE (D). (5.55)
Game 6. Game 6 challenger randomly chooses a pseudo-ephemeral value frV ⇤ $  
⇤
q, and computes the ephemeral key rV ⇤
$   Enc(pV ⇤ , frV ⇤) in the almost partner
session.
We introduce an algorithm F which is constructed using the adversary A,
against the ✏-pair-generation indistinguishability challenger (✏-PG). F receives a
pair (rV ⇤ , frV ⇤) such that frV ⇤ = Dec(sV ⇤ , rV ⇤). F uses rV ⇤ as the ephemeral key
of V ⇤ and frV ⇤ as the pseudo-ephemeral key of V ⇤ in the almost partner session.
If a random ephemeral key rV ⇤
$   ⇤q is chosen first and the pseudo-ephemeral
value frV ⇤  Dec(sV ⇤ , rV ⇤) is computed, then the simulation constructed by F is
identical to Game 5. Otherwise if a random pseudo-ephemeral value frV ⇤ $   ⇤q
is chosen first and the ephemeral key rV ⇤
$   Enc(pV ⇤ , frV ⇤) is computed, then
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the simulation constructed by F is identical to Game 6. If A can distinguish
the di↵erence between Game 5 and Game 6, then F can distinguish whether
a message/ciphertext pair (m, c) belongs to the distribution D1 or D2 (✏-pair-
generation indistinguishability challenge). F can answer all the adversarial queries
allowed in this case, because it has all the long-term and ephemeral secret keys
of the allowed queries. Hence,
|AdvGame 5(A)  AdvGame 6(A)|  ✏. (5.56)
Game 7. Game 7 challenger randomly chooses a pseudo-ephemeral value fr0V ⇤ $  
⇤
q , and uses it as the pseudo ephemeral value of V
⇤ in the almost partner session.
We introduce an algorithm D which is constructed using the adversary A,
against the CPLA2 challenger. The algorithm D uses the public-key of the
CPLA2 challenger as the public key of the protocol principal V ⇤ and generates
public/secret key pairs for all other protocol principals. D generates signing/ver-
ification key pairs for every protocol principal. D picks two random strings,
r00, r
0
1
$   {0, 1}k and passes them to the CPLA2 challenger. From the CPLA2
challenger, D receives a challenge ciphertext C2 such that C2 $   Enc(pV ⇤ , r0✓)
where r0✓ = r
0
0 or r
0
✓ = r
0
1. The following describes the procedure of answering
queries:
• Send(U, V, s,m, f) query: When U = V ⇤, V = U⇤ and s = t⇤, D takes r01 asfr0V ⇤ , computes ggr0V ⇤ and computes its signature using the signing key skV ⇤ .
Then D creates the protocol message and sends it to A with the leakage
f(sV ⇤), where the leakage f(sV ⇤) is obtained by accessing the leakage oracle
of the CPLA2 challenger.
For all other Send queries, D can execute the protocol normally, because
D has all the public keys and can compute protocol messages accordingly.
Except V ⇤ D can compute the leakage by its own, and for V ⇤ D accesses
the leakage oracle to obtain the leakage.
• SessionKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: D will abort if SessionKeyReveal(U⇤, V ⇤,
s⇤) or SessionKeyReveal(V ⇤, U⇤, t⇤) query is asked. D can easily com-
pute the answers using the corresponding psuedo-ephemeral keys for other
SessionKeyReveal queries.
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• EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: For the EphemeralKeyReveal(V ⇤, U⇤,
t⇤) query, D uses C2 as the answer. For all other EphemeralKeyReveal
queries D will answer with the corresponding ephemeral-key which is com-
puted by encrypting a pseudo-ephemeral value with the secret key of the
corresponding principal.
• Corrupt(U) query: Algorithm D can answer all the Corrupt queries allowed
in the freshness condition.
• Test(U, s) query: The algorithm D will abort the game if the adversary
issues a Test query other than Test(U⇤, s⇤). To compute the answer to the
Test(U⇤, s⇤) query, the algorithm D computes:
– If U⇤ is the initiator, ms  KDF(Xgr0V ⇤U⇤ ,?, k,?), K  PRF(ms,U⇤
||XU⇤ || U⇤ ||V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤) where fr0U⇤ = r1.
– If U⇤ is the responder computes ms  KDF(Xgr0V ⇤U⇤ ,?, k,?), K  
PRF(ms, V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤ ||U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤).
Then using K answers the Test query.
If ✓ = 1, then r01 is the decryption of C2 and the simulation constructed by
D is identical to Game 6 whereas if ✓ = 0, then r00 is the decryption of C2 and
the simulation constructed by D is identical to Game 7. If A can distinguish the
di↵erence between Game 6 and Game 7, then D can be used against a CPLA2
challenger. Hence,
|AdvGame 6(A)  AdvGame 7(A)|  AdvCPLA2PKE (D). (5.57)
Game 8. Game 8 challenger randomly chooses ms
$   {0, 1}k and computes
the session key of the target session, using the PRF as K  PRF(ms,U⇤||XU⇤
|| U⇤ ||V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤), when U⇤ is the initiator or K  PRF(ms, V ⇤||XV ⇤ || V ⇤
||U⇤||XU⇤ || U⇤), when U⇤ is the responder.
We construct an algorithm R against the ODH challenge, using the adversary
A. The ODH challenge being for group G with prime order q, generator g and
function KDF(·,?, k, ·). The ODH challenger sends values (X = gx, Y = gy, Z)
such that either Z  KDF(gxy,?, k,?) or Z $   {0, 1}k, as the inputs to the
algorithm R. R uses the value X as the ephemeral public key of U⇤ and Y as the
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ephemeral public key of V ⇤ in the test session, and computes the session key using
Z as the ms value, which is the input to the PRF, in the session key derivation
process. In this game, for the almost partner session (a session at V ⇤ with XV ⇤
and X 0U⇤ 6= XU⇤), the ODH oracle OODH is used to compute the ms value. For all
the other honest sessions, simulator knows the ephemeral keys and can compute
the shared Di e-Hellman value and compute the session key normally.
If R’s input Z = KDF(gxy,?, k,?), the simulation constructed by R is
identical to Game 7, otherwise it is identical to Game 8. Hence,
|AdvGame 7(A)  AdvGame 8(A)|  AdvODHKDF(·,?,k,?),q,g(R). (5.58)
Game 9. The Game 9 challenger randomly chooses K
$   {0, 1}k as session key
of the target session.
We construct an algorithm J against an OraclePRF, using the adversary A.
The OraclePRF sends a K value which is either generated using the PRF with a
hidden key, or a random function. J uses the received K as the session key of
the target session.
If K is generated using the PRF with a hidden key, simulation constructed by
J is identical to Game 8, otherwise it is identical to Game 9. If A can distinguish
the di↵erence between Game 8 and Game 9, then A can be used as a subroutine
of an algorithm J , which is used to distinguish whether the OraclePRF is real or
a random function. J can answer all the adversarial queries allowed in this case,
because it has all the long-term and ephemeral secret keys of the allowed queries.
Hence,
|AdvGame 8(A)  AdvGame 9(A)|  AdvPRF(J ). (5.59)
Semantic security of the session key in Game 9. Since the session key K
of ⇧s
⇤
U⇤,V ⇤ is chosen randomly and independently from all other values, A does
not have any advantage in Game 9. Hence,
AdvGame 9(A) = 0. (5.60)
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We find,
Adv  w(·)AFL-eCK⇡,Case 2.1.c (A)  N2PN2s
h 
AdvODHq,g (R) + AdvPRF(J )
+2AdvCPLA2PKE (D) + 2✏
 
+
1
q
i
.
Therefore, in Case 2.1,
Adv  w(·)AFL-eCK⇡,Case 2.1 (A)  max
h
N2PN
2
s
⇥ 
AdvDDHq,g (C) + AdvKDF(B) + AdvPRF(J )
+2AdvCPLA2PKE (D) + 2✏
 
+
1
q
⇤
, N2PN
2
s
⇥ 
AdvODHq,g (R) + AdvPRF(J )
+2AdvCPLA2PKE (D) + 2✏
 
+
1
q
⇤
, NPAdv
UFCMLA
SIG (E)
i
.
Case 2.2: Test session is at the initiator Let U⇤ be the initiator and V ⇤
be the responder. Let XU⇤ be the ephemeral public key of U⇤, and XV ⇤ be the
ephemeral public key of V ⇤, in the target session. In this case there are three
sub cases, which address the three di↵erent situations occur when the challenger
interacts with the adversary, which are same as to the Case 2.1.
• (a) There is no session at V ⇤ with XV ⇤ .
• (b) There exists a session at V ⇤ with XU⇤ and XV ⇤ (but  U⇤ computed by
U⇤ is di↵erent from the  U⇤ received to V ⇤ with the protocol message, in
the target session).
• (c) There exists a session at V ⇤ with XV ⇤ and X 0U⇤ 6= XU⇤ .
This is almost same as the Case 2.1. The di↵erence is that in this case the
initiator is the owner of the test session. Same as to the Case 2.1, here we obtain,
Adv  w(·)AFL-eCK⇡,Case 2.2 (A)  max
h
N2PN
2
s
⇥ 
AdvDDHq,g (C) + AdvKDF(B) + AdvPRF(J )
+2AdvCPLA2PKE (D) + 2✏
 
+
1
q
⇤
, N2PN
2
s
⇥ 
AdvODHq,g (R) + AdvPRF(J )
+2AdvCPLA2PKE (D) + 2✏
 
+
1
q
⇤
, NPAdv
UFCMLA
SIG (E)
i
.
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Combining Case 1 and Case 2
According to the analysis we can obtain,
Adv  w(·)AFL-eCK⇡ (A)  max
h
N2PN
2
s
⇥ 
AdvDDHq,g (C) + AdvKDF(B) + AdvPRF(J )
 
+
1
q
⇤
,
N2PN
2
s
⇥ 
AdvDDHq,g (C) + AdvKDF(B) + AdvPRF(J ) + 2AdvCPLA2PKE (D) + 2✏
 
+
1
q
⇤
,
N2PN
2
s
⇥ 
AdvODHq,g (R) + AdvPRF(J ) + 2AdvCPLA2PKE (D) + 2✏
 
+
1
q
⇤
, NPAdv
UFCMLA
SIG (E)
i
.
5.3.6 Leakage Tolerance of the w(·)AFL-eCK-secure Pro-
tocol ⇡: wBAFL-eCK-Secure Instantiation
In the presented protocol, a principal uses a decryption function of a CPLA2-secure
✏  PG-IND-public-key cryptosystem to compute the NAXOS value in a leakage-
resilient manner and sets the Di e-Hellman exponent as the decrypted message.
Then, the principal uses a UFCMLA-secure signature scheme to authenticate the
message. Therefore, the leakage tolerance from the secret key used to compute
the NAXOS value is exactly same as the leakage tolerance of the underlying
CPLA2-secure public key encryption scheme, and the leakage tolerance from the
secret key used to compute the signature is exactly same as the leakage tolerance
of the underlying UFCMLA-secure signature scheme.
As noted in Section 5.3.2, Halevi and Lin [HL11] constructed a generic
CPLA2-secure public-key cryptosystem which is secure against bounded leakage
and also satisfies pair generation indistinguishability. It can be instantiated
with the DDH-based leakage-resilient public-key encryption scheme of Naor and
Segev [NS09] with decryption cost of 4 exponentiations, and for a key length k the
leakage is bounded by (1  o(1))k. Katz and Vaikuntanathan [KV09] constructed
an UFCMLA-secure signature scheme in the bounded leakage model, where a
signature can be generated with cost of 2 exponentiations, and verified with
cost of 4 exponentiations (with a simple NIZK proof). The signature scheme
of Katz and Vaikuntanathan contains signing and verification operations based
on NIZK protocols. For a key length k, the signature scheme tolerates leakage
of (1  kt) · k, for any constant t < 1. Hence, this protocol can be instantiated
with the above mentioned leakage-resilient signature scheme and the public-
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key encryption scheme, and achieve leakage tolerance according to the leakage
parameters specified in the above mentioned cryptographic constructions.
5.4 Concrete Construction of CAFL-eCK-secure
Key Exchange Protocol
In section 5.3 we presented a generic construction for a protocol which is proven
secure in the w(·)AFL-eCK security model. However, when it comes to a concrete
construction, the presented generic protocol can only be instantiated in a way
that is secure in the bounded version of the security model and the model we
considered is slightly weaker than the desired (·)AFL-eCK model. Up to now
there are no suitable cryptographic primitives which can be used to instantiate the
generic protocol in the continuous leakage variant of the security model, as well as
in the desired (·)AFL-eCK model. Now our aim is to present a concrete protocol
construction which can be proven secure in the continuous leakage instantiation of
the generic (·)AFL-eCK, namely CAFL-eCK model. Moreover, this construction
does not require a weaker variant of the model for the security proof. Thus,
we introduce the first concrete construction of a continuous and after-the-fact
leakage-resilient key exchange protocol.
Moving to the leakage-resilient setting of the eCK-style secure key exchange
requires rethinking the NAXOS trick. We have presented a generic construction of
a weak after-the-fact leakage eCK (w(·)AFL-eCK)-secure key exchange protocol
in Section 5.3, which uses a leakage-resilient NAXOS trick. The leakage-resilient
NAXOS trick is obtained using a decryption function of an after-the-fact leakage-
resilient public key encryption scheme. A concrete construction of a wBAFL-eCK-
secure protocol is possible since there exists a bounded after-the-fact leakage-
resilient public key encryption scheme which can be used to obtain the required
leakage-resilient NAXOS trick, but it is not currently possible to construct a
CAFL-eCK-secure protocol since there is currently no continuous after-the-fact
leakage-resilient public-key encryption scheme available. Therefore, an attempt to
construct a CAFL-eCK-secure key exchange protocol using the leakage-resilient
NAXOS approach is not possible at this stage.
In section 3.3 we presented a eCK-secure protocol construction which does not
use the NAXOS trick, namely the protocol P1. The protocol P1 is based on Di e-
Hellman key exchange, which requires exponentiation computations. Moving to
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the leakage-resilient setting requires rethinking the exponentiation computation
in a leakage-resilient manner. Since there exist leakage-resilient encoding schemes
and leakage-resilient refreshing protocols for them (Definition 2.4.1 and 2.4.4),
our aim is to compute the required exponentiations in a leakage-resilient manner
using the available leakage-resilient storage and refreshing schemes.
5.4.1 Leakage-Resilient Construction of Protocol P1: Pro-
tocol P2
Protocol P1 is an eCK-secure key exchange protocol (Theorem 3.3.1). The eCK
model considers an environment where partial information leakage does not take
place. Following the concept that only computation leaks information, we now
assume that the leakage of long-term secret keys happens when computations
are performed using them. Then, instead of the non-leakage eCK model which
we used for the security proof of protocol P1, we consider the CAFL-eCK model
which additionally allows the adversary to obtain continuous leakage of long-term
secret keys.
Our idea is to perform the computations which use long-term secret keys
(exponentiation operations) in such a way that the resulting leakage from the
long-term secrets should not leak su cient information to reveal them to the
adversary. To overcome that challenge we use a leakage-resilient storage scheme
and a leakage-resilient refreshing protocol, and modify the architecture of the
protocol P1, in such a way that the secret keys s are encoded into two portions
sL, sR, Exponentiations are computed using two portions sL, sR instead of directly
using s, and the two portions sL, sR are being refreshed continuously. Thus, we
add leakage resiliency to the eCK-secure protocol P1 and construct protocol P2
such that it is leakage-resilient and eCK-secure.
Obtaining Leakage Resiliency by Encoding Secrets
In this setting we encode a secret s using an Encode function of a leakage-
resilient storage scheme ⇤ = (Encode,Decode). So the secret s is encoded as
(sL, sR) Encode(s). As mentioned in the Definition 2.4.1 the leakage-resilient
storage scheme randomly chooses sL and then computes sR such that sL · sR = s.
We define the tuple leakage parameter   = ( 1, 2) as follows:  -limited adversary
A sends a leakage function f = (f1j, f2j) and obtains at most  1, 2 amount of
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leakage from each of the two encodings of the secret s respectively: f1j(sL) and
f2j(sR).
As mentioned in Definition 2.4.4, the leakage-resilient storage scheme can
continuously refresh the encodings of the secret. Therefore, after executing the
refreshing protocol it outputs new random-looking encodings of the same secret.
So for the  -limited adversary again the situation is as before. Thus, refreshing
the encodings will help to obtain leakage resilience over a number of protocol
executions.
The computation of exponentiations is also split into two parts. Let G be a
group of prime order q with generator g. Let s
$   Z⇤q be a long-term secret key and
E = ge be a received ephemeral value. Then, the value Z needs to be computed
as Z  Es. In the leakage-resilient setting, in the initial setup the secret key
is encoded as sL, sR  Encoden,1Z⇤q (s). So the vector sL = (sL1, · · · , sLn) and the
vector sR = (sR1, · · · , sRn) are such that s = sL1sR1+· · ·+sLnsRn. Then the com-
putation of Es can be performed as two component-wise computations as follows:
compute the intermediate vector T  EsL = (EsL1 , · · · , EsLn) and then compute
the element Z  T sR = EsL1sR1EsL2sR2 · · ·EsL1sR1 = EsL1sR1+···+sLnsRn = Es.
Protocol Construction
Using the above ideas, by encoding the secret using a leakage-resilient storage
scheme, and refreshing the encoded secret using a refreshing protocol, it is
possible to hide the secret from a  -limited adversary. Further, it is possible to
successfully compute the exponentiation using the encoded secrets. We now use
these primitives to construct a CAFL-eCK-secure key exchange protocol, using
an eCK-secure key exchange protocol as an underlying primitive.
Let ⇤n,1Z⇤q = (Encode
n,1
Z⇤q ,Decode
n,1
Z⇤q ) be the leakage-resilient storage scheme
which is used to encode secret keys and Refreshn,1Z⇤q be the (`, , ✏)-secure leakage-
resilient refreshing protocol of ⇤n,1Z⇤q .
As we can see, the obvious way of key generation (initial setup) in a protocol
principal of this protocol is as follows: first pick a
$   Z⇤q as the long-term secret
key, then encode the secret key as (a0L, a
0
R)  Encoden,1Z⇤q (a), then compute the
long-term public key A = ga using the two encodings (a0L, a
0
R), and finally erase
a from the memory. The potential threat to that key generation mechanism
is that even though the long-term secret key a is erased from the memory, it
might not be properly erased and can be leaked to the adversary during the key
142 Chapter 5. Bounded/Continuous After-the-fact Leakage eCK Model
generation. In order to avoid such a vulnerability, we randomly picks two values
a0L
$   (Z⇤q)n\{(0n)}, a0R $   (Z⇤q)n⇥1\{(0n⇥1)} and use them as the encodings of the
long-term secret key a of a protocol principal. As explained earlier, we use a0L, a
0
R
to compute the corresponding long-term public key A in two steps as a0  ga0L
and A a0a0R . Thus, it is possible to avoid exposing the un-encoded secret key
a at any point of time in the key generation and hence avoid leaking directly
from a at the key generation step. Further, the random vector a0L is multiplied
with the random vector a0R, such that a = a
0
L · a0R, which will give a random
integer a in the group Z⇤q. Therefore, this approach is same as picking a
$   Z⇤q at
first and then encode, but in the reverse order. During the protocol execution
both a0L, a
0
R are continuously refreshed and refreshed encodings a
j
L, a
j
R are used
to exponentiation computations.
Table 5.2 shows the protocol P2. In this setting leakage of a long-term secret
key does not happen directly from the long-term secret key itself, but from the two
encodings of the long-term secret key (the leakage function f = (f1j, f2j) directs
to the each individual encoding). During the exponentiation computations and
the refreshing operation collectively at most   = ( 1, 2) leakage is allowed to the
adversary from each of the two portions independently. Then, the two portions
of the encoded long-term secret key are refreshed and in the next protocol session
another  -bounded leakage is allowed. Thus, continuous leakage is allowed.
Alice (Initiator) Bob (Responder)
Initial Setup
a0L
$   (Z⇤q)n\{(0n)}, a0R $   (Z⇤q)n⇥1\{(0n⇥1)} b0L $   (Z⇤q)n\{(0n)}, b0R $   (Z⇤q)n⇥1\{(0n⇥1)}
a0  ga0L , A (a0)a0R b0  gbjL , B  (b0)b0R
Protocol Execution
x
$   Z⇤q, X  gx Alice,X    ! y $   Z⇤q, Y  gy
Bob,Y    
T1  BajL , Z1  T a
j
R
1 T3  Ab
j
L , Z 01  T b
j
R
3
Z2  Bx T4  XbjL , Z 02  T b
j
R
4
T2  Y ajL , Z3  T a
j
R
2 Z
0
3  Ay
Z4  Y x Z 04  Xy
(aj+1L , a
j+1
R ) Refreshn,1Z⇤q (a
j
L, a
j
R) (b
j+1
L , b
j+1
R ) Refreshn,1Z⇤q (b
j
L, b
j
R)
K  H(Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, Alice,X,Bob, Y ) K  H(Z 01, Z 02, Z 03, Z 04, Alice,X,Bob, Y )
K is the session key
Table 5.2: Concrete construction of Protocol P2
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5.4.2 Security Proof of the Protocol P2 in the CAFL-eCK
Model
Theorem 5.4.1. If the underlying refreshing protocol Refreshn,1Z⇤q is (`, , ✏)-secure
leakage-resilient refreshing protocol of the leakage-resilient storage scheme ⇤n,1Z⇤q
and the underlying key exchange protocol P1 is eCK-secure key exchange protocol,
then the protocol P2 is    CAFL-eCK-secure.
Let A be any PPT adversary against the key exchange protocol P2. Then the
advantage ofA against the CAFL-eCK-security of the protocol P2, Adv  CAFL-eCKP2
is:
Adv  CAFL-eCKP2 (A)  NP
⇣
AdveCKP1 (A) + ✏
⌘
. (5.61)
Proof. Sequence of Games.
Game 1. This is the original game.
Game 2. Same as the Game 1 with the following exception: before A begins,
an identity of a random principal U⇤ $   {U1, . . . , UNP } is chosen. Challenger
expects that the adversary will issue the Test for a session which involves the
principal U⇤ (⇧·U⇤,· or ⇧
·
·,U⇤). If not the challenger aborts the game.
Game 3. Same as the Game 2 with the following exception: challenger picks
a random s
$   Z⇤q and uses encodings of s to simulate the adversarial leakage
queries f = (f1j, f2j).
Di↵erences between games.
In this section the adversary’s advantage of distinguishing each game from the
previous game is investigated. Let AdvGame x(A) denotes the advantage of the
adversary A winning the Game x.
Game 1 is the original game. Hence,
AdvGame 1(A) = Adv  CAFL-eCKP2 (A) . (5.62)
Game 1 and Game 2. The probability of Game 2 to be halted due to incorrect
choice of the test session is 1  1NP . Unless the incorrect choice happens, Game 2
is identical to Game 1. Hence,
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AdvGame 2(A) = 1
NP
AdvGame 1(A) . (5.63)
Game 2 and Game 3. We construct an algorithm B against a leakage-resilient
refreshing protocol challenger of Refreshn,1Z⇤q , using the adversary A as a subroutine.
The (`, , ✏)   Refreshn,1Z⇤q refreshing protocol challenger chooses s0, s1
$   Z⇤q
and sends them to the algorithm B. Further, the refreshing protocol challenger
randomly chooses s
$   {s0, s1} and uses s as the secret to compute the leakage
from encodings of s. Let   = ( 1, 2) be the leakage bound and assume the
refreshing protocol challenger continuously refreshes the two encodings of the
secret s.
When the algorithm B gets the challenge of s0, s1 from the refreshing protocol
challenger, B uses s0 as the secret key of the protocol principal U⇤ and computes
the corresponding public key. For all other protocol principals B sets secret/public
key pairs by itself. Using the setup keys, B computes answers to all the queries
from A and simulates the view of CAFL-eCK challenger of the protocol P2. B
computes the leakage of secret keys by computing the adversarial leakage function
f on the corresponding secret key (encodings of secret key), except the secret
key of the protocol principal U⇤. In order to obtain the leakage of the secret
key of U⇤, algorithm B queries the the refreshing protocol challenger with the
adversarial leakage function f , and passes that leakage to A.
If the secret s chosen by the refreshing protocol challenger is s0, the leakage
of the secret key of U⇤ simulated by B (with the aid of the refreshing protocol
challenger) is the real leakage. Then the simulation is identical to Game 2.
Otherwise, the leakage of the secret key of U⇤ simulated by B is a leakage of a
random value. Then the simulation is identical to Game 3. Hence,
|AdvGame 2(A)  AdvGame 3(A)|  ✏ . (5.64)
Game 3. Since the leakage is computed using a random s value, the adversary
A will not get any advantage due to the leakage. Therefore, the advantage A
will get is same as the advantage that A has against an eCK challenger of the
protocol P1, because both P1 and P2 are e↵ectively doing the same computation,
regardless of the leakage-resilient exponentiation computation in the protocol
P2, and with no useful leakage the CAFL-eCK model is same as the eCK model.
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Hence,
AdvGame 3(A) = AdveCKP1 (A) . (5.65)
We find,
Adv  CAFL-eCKP2 (A)  NP
⇣
AdveCKP1 (A) + ✏
⌘
. (5.66)
5.4.3 Leakage Tolerance of the Protocol P2
The order of the group G is q. Let m = 1 in the leakage-resilient storage
scheme ⇤n,1Z⇤q . According to the Lemma 2.4.1, if m < n/20, then the leakage
parameter for the leakage-resilient storage scheme is  ⇤ = (0.3n log q, 0.3n log q).
Let n = 21, then  ⇤ = (6.3 log q, 6.3 log q) bits. According to the Theorem 2.4.1,
if m/3  n and n   16, the refreshing protocol Refreshn,1Z⇤q of the leakage-resilient
storage scheme ⇤n,1Z⇤q is tolerant to (continuous) leakage up to  Refresh =  ⇤/2 =
(3.15 log q, 3.15 log q) bits, per occurrence.
When a secret key s (of size log q bits) of the protocol P2 is encoded into two
parts, the left part sL will be n · log q = 21 log q bits and the right part sR will
be n · 1 · log q = 21 log q bits. For a tuple leakage function f = (f1j, f2j) (each
leakage function f(·) for each of the two parts sL and sR), there exists a tuple
leakage bound   = ( , ) for each leakage function f(·), such that   = 3.15 log q
bits, per occurrence, which is 3.15 log q21 log q ⇥ 100% = 15% of the size of a part. The
overall leakage amount is unbounded since continuous leakage is allowed.
5.5 Summary
We have presented a generic security model, namely the (·)AFL-eCK model,
improving the amount and type of secret leakage that can be tolerated in au-
thenticated key exchange protocols. Our generic model allows the adversary to
fully compromise a variety of long-term and short-term ephemeral values, as well
as obtain partial, adaptive, either bounded or continuous, after-the-fact leakage
of long-term secret keys. Previous key exchange security models either do not
consider partial leakage at all (BR, CK, eCK) or allow only leakage before the
test session is queried and none after (MO). Even the CAFL model we presented
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in Chapter 4 enforces more restrictions to the freshness definition than the generic
(·)AFL-eCK model in this chapter. The generic (·)AFL-eCK model captures a
wide variety of practical attack scenarios, including side channel attacks. Further,
the model gives flexibility to choose either bounded or continuous leakage setting
and available underlying primitives, and it provides a security framework to
analyze after-the-fact leakage-resilient key exchange protocols. We have given a
generic protocol, secure in a weaker variant of our generic model, that relies on
a CPLA2-secure ✏  PG-IND-public-key cryptosystem and an UFCMLA-secure
signature scheme.
Further, we presented a concrete construction of a CAFL-eCK-secure key
exchange protocol by using a leakage-resilient storage scheme and its refreshing
protocol. The main technique used to achieve after-the-fact leakage resilience is
encoding the secret key into two parts and only allowing the independent leakage
from each part.
5.6 Comparison of Key Exchange Security Mod-
els and Protocols
In this thesis, we have presented two security models for key exchange proto-
cols, addressing more granular partial leakage of long-term secret keys, namely
continuous after-the-fact leakage model (CAFL) and the generic after-the-fact
leakage eCK model ((·)AFL-eCK) (and w(·)AFL-eCK) model). Further, we
presented generic protocol constructions for each of CAFL and w(·)AFL-eCK)
models and a concrete protocol construction for the continuous leakage variant of
the (·)AFL-eCK model, the CAFL-eCK model.
5.6.1 Comparison of Security Models
Table 5.3 summarizes the adversarial powers of the two instantiations of the generic
(·)AFL-eCK model and the CAFL model, in comparison with the adversarial
powers of the eCK model [LLM07] and the Moriyama–Okamoto (MO) model
[MO11]. There are four Corrupt–EphemeralKeyReveal query combinations which
do not trivially expose the session key. In the column “Combinations” of Table 5.3,
we mention how many of them are allowed in the corresponding security model.
We discussed query combinations in detail in Section 4.2.3. The ⇤ indicates that
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the w(·)AFL-eCK model does not allow the EphemeralKeyReveal query to reveal
the randomness used in the underlying signature scheme.
Security model Combinations Leakage model After-the-fact
eCK [LLM07] 4/4 No No
MO [MO11] 4/4 Bounded No
CAFL (Chapter 4) 2/4 Continuous Yes
(·)AFL-eCK (Chapter 5) 4/4 Bounded/Continuous Yes
w(·)AFL-eCK (Chapter 5) 4⇤/4 Bounded/Continuous Yes
Table 5.3: Key exchange security models with reveal queries and leakage allowed
The eCK model is a non-leakage security model and Moriyama and Okamoto
have constructed a leakage security model based on eCK model. The Moriyama-
Okamoto model allows bounded leakage, only before the target session is estab-
lished. We constructed the CAFL model, allowing continuous leakage even after
the target session is established, while enforcing additional restrictions to the
eCK-style freshness condition. Therefore, the strength of the CAFL model is
not directly comparable with eCK or Moriyama-Okamoto models, but the CAFL
model clearly allows more granular partial leakage. Then we constructed the
generic (·)AFL-eCK, releasing the additional restrictions to the freshness condi-
tion which had been introduced in the CAFL model. Thus, the two instantiations
of the generic (·)AFL-eCK model, namely the BAFL-eCK and CAFL-eCK models
are stronger than the eCK, the Moriyama-Okamoto and the CAFL models.
5.6.2 Comparison of Key Exchange Protocols
The Table 5.4 compares the protocol ⇡1 of Chapter 4, the protocol ⇡ of Chapter
5 and the protocol P2 of Chapter 5, with the NAXOS protocol [LLM07] and the
Moriyama–Okamoto protocol [MO11].
Protocol Security Model Assumptions Construction
NAXOS [LLM07] eCK GDH, RO Concrete
MO [MO11] MO DDH, HPS, PRF, ( , ✏)-Ext Concrete
⇡1 of Chapter 4 CAFL CCLA2-secure PKE, PRF, Generic
⇡ of Chapter 5 w(·)AFL-eCK DDH, ODH, ✏  PG-IND and CPLA2-secure PKE, secure KDF, PRF Generic
P2 of Chapter 5 CAFL-eCK GDH, RO Concrete
Table 5.4: Comparison of key exchange protocols
The NAXOS protocol is the first concrete protocol which is proven secure in the
eCK model. Being an eCK-secure protocol, NAXOS does not provide any security
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guarantee for side-channel attacks. The Moriyama-Okamoto protocol is the first
concrete protocol which is proven secure in a leakage security model, namely
the Moriyama-Okamoto model. The Moriyama-Okamoto protocol is resistant
to a bounded amount of leakage of long-term secret keys only before the target
session is activated. We constructed a generic CAFL-secure protocol, which can
be instantiated using any suitable leakage-resilient public-key encryption scheme,
in a way that it is secure against continuous leakage of long-term secret keys even
after the target session is activated. Then we constructed a generic w(·)AFL-eCK-
secure protocol in a way that it is possible to instantiate a wBAFL-eCK or
wCAFL-eCK-secure key exchange protocol using any suitable leakage-resilient
public-key encryption scheme and a leakage-resilient signature scheme. Since
there are currently no suitable leakage-resilient public-key encryption schemes
to instantiate the continuous leakage-resilient variant of the generic protocol, we
constructed a concrete CAFL-eCK-secure protocol, namely protocol P2, using
leakage-resilient storage schemes. Protocol P2 is proven secure in the strongest
leakage-security model for key exchange, guaranteeing the eCK-style security as
well as tolerance against continuous leakage of long-term secret keys even after
the target session is activated.
The generic CAFL-secure protocol of Chapter 4 can be instantiated with the
CCLA2-secure public-key encryption scheme of Dziemboski and Faust [DF11],
whereas the generic w(·)AFL-eCK-secure protocol of Chapter 5 can be instanti-
ated as a wBAFL-eCK-secure protocol using the CPLA2-secure pair generation
indistinguishable public-key encryption scheme of Halevi and Lin [HL11] and the
UFCMLA-secure signature scheme of Katz and Vaikuntanathan [KV09]. Table
5.5 compares these protocol instantiations and the protocol P2 with the NAXOS
protocol [LLM07] and the Moriyama-Okamoto (MO) protocol [MO11], in terms
of computation cost and the security model.
Protocol Initiator Cost Responder Cost Security Model
NAXOS [LLM07] 4 Exp 4 Exp eCK
MO [MO11] 8 Exp 8 Exp MO
⇡1 of Chapter 4 instantiation 10 Exp 10 Exp CAFL
⇡ of Chapter 5 instantiation 12 Exp 12 Exp wBAFL-eCK
P2 protocol of Chapter 5 6 Exp 6 Exp CAFL-eCK
Table 5.5: Security and e ciency comparison of key exchange protocols
Generally, while adding security features we have to sacrifice the computation
cost. The same thing happens when coming from the NAXOS protocol to the
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protocol ⇡ of Chapter 5. But we can see an exception when coming to the protocol
P2 from the protocol ⇡ of Chapter 5. The reason for this is that we use the
leakage-resilient storage scheme to store the secret values and only rearrange
the way we do the necessary exponentiation computation. By contrast in the ⇡1
and ⇡ constructions we use the whole Enc/Dec operation of the leakage-resilient
public-key encryption scheme, which is a combination of several exponentiation
operations and hence more expensive.
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Compression-based Leakage
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Compression is desirable for network applications as it saves bandwidth; how-
ever, when data is compressed before being encrypted, the amount of compression
leaks information about the amount of redundancy in the plaintext. This side
channel has led to the successful CRIME and BREACH attacks on web tra c
protected by the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The general guidance
in light of these attacks has been to disable compression, preserving confidentiality
but sacrificing bandwidth. We examine two techniques—heuristic separation of
secrets and fixed-dictionary compression—for enabling compression while pro-
tecting high-value secrets, such as cookies, from attack. We model the security
o↵ered by these techniques and report on the amount of compressibility that they
can achieve.
6.1 Introduction
To save communication costs, network applications often compress data before
transmitting it; for example, the Hypertext Transport Protocol (HTTP) [FR14,
§4.2] has an optional mechanism in which a server compresses the body of an
HTTP response, most commonly using the gzip algorithm. When encryption is
used to protect communication, compression must be applied before encryption
(since ciphertexts should look random, they should have little apparent redundancy
that can be compressed). In fact, to facilitate this, the Transport Layer Security
(TLS) protocol [DR08, §6.2.2] has an optional compression mode that will compress
all application data before encrypting it. While compression is useful for reducing
the size of transmitted data, it has had a negative impact when combined with
encryption, because the amount of compression acts as a side channel.
Compression-based Leakage. In 2002, Kelsey [Kel02] showed how compres-
sion can act as a form of side-channel leakage. If plaintext data is compressed
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before being encrypted, the length of the ciphertext reveals information about the
amount of compression, which in turn can reveal information about the plaintext.
Kelsey notes that this side channel di↵ers from other types of side channels in two
key ways: “it reveals information about the plaintext, rather than key material”,
and “it is a property of the algorithm, not the implementation”.
Kelsey’s most powerful attack is an adaptive chosen input attack : if an attacker
is allowed to choose inputs x that are combined with a target secret s and the
concatenation xks is compressed and encrypted, observing the length of the
outputs can eventually allow the attacker to extract the secret s. For example,
to determine the first character of s, the attacker could ask to have the string
x = prefix*prefix combined with s, then compressed and encrypted, for every
possible character *; in one case, when * = s1, the amount of redundancy is
higher and the ciphertext should be shorter. Once each character of s is found,
the attack can be carried out on the next character.
Key to this attack is the fact that most compression algorithms (such as
the deflate algorithm underlying gzip) are adaptive: they adaptively build
and maintain a dictionary of recently observed strings, and replace subsequent
occurrences of that string with a code.
The CRIME and BREACH Attacks. In 2012, Rizzo and Duong [RD12]
showed how to apply Kelsey’s adaptive chosen input attack against gzip compres-
sion as used in TLS, in what they called the Compression Ratio Info-leak Mass
Exploitation (CRIME) attack. The primary target of the CRIME attack was the
user’s cookie in the HTTP header. If the victim visited an attacker-controlled
web page, the attacker could use Javascript to cause the victim to send HTTP
requests to URLs of the attacker’s choice on a specified server. The attacker
could adaptively choose those URLs to include a prefix to carry out Kelsey’s
adaptive chosen input attack. Some care is required to ensure the padding does
not hide the length with block ciphers, but this can be dealt with. The CRIME
attack also applies to compression as used in the SPDY protocol [The09].
Trustworthy Internet Movement’s SSL Pulse report for June 2015 finds that
just 4.8% of websites have TLS compression enabled and vulnerable to the CRIME
attack [Tru15]; moreover, all major browsers have disabled it.
However, compression is also built into the HTTP protocol: servers can
optionally compress the body of HTTP responses. While this excludes the
cookie in the header, this attack can still succeed against secret values in the
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HTTP body, such as anti-cross-site request forgery (CSRF) tokens. Suggested
by Rizzo and Duong, this was demonstrated by Gluck et al. [GHP13] in the
Browser Reconnaissance and Exfiltration via Adaptive Compression of Hypertext
(BREACH) attack.
Mitigation Techniques. Gluck et al. [GHP13] discussed several possible mit-
igation techniques against the BREACH attack, listed in decreasing order of
e↵ectiveness:
1. Disabling HTTP compression
2. Separating secrets from user input
3. Randomizing secrets per request
4. Masking secrets (e↵ectively randomizing by XORing with a random nonce)
5. Length hiding (by adding a random number of bytes to the responses)
6. Rate-limiting the requests
Despite the demonstrated practicality of the BREACH attack, support for
and use of HTTP compression remains widespread, due in large part to the value
of decreasing communication costs and time. In fact, compression is even more
tightly integrated into the proposed HTTP version 2 [BPT14] than previous
versions. Techniques 2–4 generally require changes to both browsers and web
servers. For example, masking secrets such as anti-CSRF tokens requires new
mark-up for secrets, which browsers and servers can interpret to apply the
randomized masking technique. Techniques 5–6 can be unilaterally applied by
web servers, though length hiding can be defeated with statistical averaging, and
rate-limiting must find a balance between legitimate requests and information
leakage.
Despite these attacks, Klinc et al. [KHJ+10] demonstrated that block ciphers
operating in various chaining modes can be compressed without compromising
the security of the encryption scheme. Di↵erently, Peon and Ruellan [PR15]
introduced a technique of header compression for HTTP/2, namely HPACK. It
compresses header fields independently from other inputs, and after the compres-
sion resets the dictionary. So each header is compressed in its own context.
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There has been little academic study of compression and encryption. Besides
Kelsey’s adaptive chosen input attack and the related CRIME and BREACH
attacks, the only relevant work we are aware of is that of Kelley and Tamassia
[KT14]. They give a new security notion called entropy-restricted semantic
security (ER-IND-CPA) for keyed compression functions which combine both
encryption and compression: compared with the normal indistinguishability
under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) security notion, in ER-IND-CPA the
adversary should not be able to distinguish between the encryption of two
messages that compress to the same length. Kelley and Tamassia then show how
to construct a cipher based on the LZW compression algorithm by rerandomizing
the compression dictionary. Unfortunately, the ER-IND-CPA notion does not
capture the CRIME and BREACH attacks, which depend on observing messages
that compress to di↵erent lengths.
In leakage-resilient security definitions [AGV09,NS09], leakage of the secret
key is addressed. This di↵ers from the setting in compression-based side-channel
attacks, which addresses leakage of the plaintext. Thus, previous leakage-resilient
approaches are not suitable to model compression-based side-channel attacks.
6.2 Preliminaries
Notation. If x is a string, then xi denotes the ith character of x; xi:` denotes
the length-` substring of x starting at position i: xi:` = xik . . . kxi+` 1. If x and y
are strings, then x   y denotes that x is a substring of y. The index of x in y is
the smallest i such that yi:|x| = x and is denoted by indy(x); if x 6  y, we denote
indy(x) = ?. The empty string is denoted by ✏.
6.2.1 Encryption and Compression Schemes
Recall the standard definition of an encryption scheme:
Definition 6.2.1 (Symmetric-key encryption). A symmetric-key encryption
scheme ⇧ for message space M and ciphertext space C is a tuple of algorithms:
• KeyGen() $! k: A probabilistic key generation algorithm that generates a
random key k in the keyspace K.
• Enck(m)
$! c: A possibly probabilistic encryption algorithm that takes as
input a key k 2 K and a message m 2M and outputs a ciphertext c 2 C.
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• Deck(c) ! m0 or ?: A deterministic decryption algorithm that takes as
input a key k 2 K and a ciphertext c 2 C, and outputs either a message
m0 2M or an error symbol ?.
Correctness of symmetric-key encryption is defined in the obvious way: for all
k
$ KeyGen() and all m 2M, we require that Deck(Enck(m)) = m.
Definition 6.2.2 (Compression scheme). A compression scheme   for message
space M with output space O is a pair of algorithms:
• Comp(m) $! o: A possibly probabilistic compression algorithm that takes
as input a message m 2M and outputs an encoded value o 2 O.
• Decomp(o)! m0 or ?: A decompression algorithm that takes as input an
encoded value o 2 O and outputs a message m0 2M or an error symbol ?.
Note that |Comp(m)| may not necessarily be less than |m|; Shannon’s coding
theorem [Cas00] implies that no algorithm can encode every message with shorter
length, so not all messages may actually be “compressed”: some may increase in
length.
Correctness of a compression scheme is again defined in the obvious way: for
all m 2M, we require that Decomp(Comp(m)) = m.
We are interested in symmetric-key compression-encryption schemes, which
formally are just symmetric-key encryption schemes as in Definition 6.2.1, but
usually have the goal of outputting shorter ciphertexts via some form of compres-
sion. Of course, every symmetric-key encryption scheme is also a symmetric-key
compression-encryption scheme, with “compression” being the identity function.
We will often deal with the following specific, natural composition of compression
and symmetric-key encryption:
Definition 6.2.3 (Composition of compression and encryption). Let   = (Comp,
Decomp) be a compression scheme with message space M and output space O.
Let ⇧ = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be a symmetric-key encryption scheme with message
space O and ciphertext space C. The symmetric-key compression-encryption
scheme ⇧     constructed from   and ⇧ is the following tuple:
(⇧    ).KeyGen() = ⇧.KeyGen()
(⇧    ).Enck(m) = ⇧.Enck( .Comp(m))
(⇧    ).Deck(c) =  .Decomp(⇧.Deck(c))
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ExpIND-CPA⇧ (A)
1: k
$ ⇧.KeyGen()
2: b
$ {0, 1}
3: (m0,m1, st)
$ AE()
4: if |m0| 6= |m1|, then return ?
5: c ⇧.Enck(mb)
6: b0 $ AE(c, st)
7: return (b0 = b)
E(m)
1: return ⇧.Enck(m)
ExpER-IND-CPA⇧,L (A)
1: k
$ ⇧.KeyGen()
2: b
$ {0, 1}
3: (m0,m1, st)
$ AE()
4: if m0 62 L or m1 62 L, then return ?
5: c ⇧.Enck(mb)
6: b0 $ AE(c, st)
7: return (b0 = b)
E(m)
1: return ⇧.Enck(m)
Figure 6.1: Security experiments for indistinguishability under chosen plaintext
attack (IND-CPA, left) and entropy-restricted IND-CPA (ER-IND-CPA, right)
Note that ⇧     is itself a symmetric-key encryption scheme with message
space M and ciphertext space C. If   and ⇧ are both correct, then so is ⇧    .
6.2.2 Existing Security Notions
The standard security notion for symmetric-key encryption is indistinguishability
of encrypted messages. Here we focus on chosen plaintext attack. The security
experiment ExpIND-CPA⇧ (A) for indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack
(IND-CPA) of a symmetric-key encryption scheme ⇧ against a stateful adversary
A is given in Figure 6.1. The advantage of A in breaking the IND-CPA experiment
for ⇧ is AdvIND-CPA⇧ (A) =
  2Pr  ExpIND-CPA⇧ (A) = 1   1  .
Kelley and Tamassia [KT14] give a definition of entropy-restricted IND-CPA
security which applies to keyed compression schemes ⇧, and demands indistin-
guishability of encryptions of messages from the same class L ✓M; typically, L
is the class of messages that encrypt (compress) to the same length under ⇧.Enc,
such as:
L` = {m 2M : |⇧.Enc(m)| = `} .
The ER-IND-CPA security experiment is given in Figure 6.1; the corresponding
advantage is defined similarly. Kelley and Tamassia note that any IND-CPA-
secure symmetric-key encryption scheme ⇧, combined with any compression
scheme  , is immediately ER-IND-CPA-secure. As well, it is easily seen that if
a symmetric-key encryption scheme is ER-IND-CPA-secure for the class L` =
{m 2M : |m| = `}, then that scheme is also an IND-CPA-secure symmetric-key
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encryption.
6.2.3 New Security Notions
We focus on the ability of an attacker to learn about a secret piece of data inside
a larger piece of data, where the attacker controls everything except the secret
data. We use the term cookie to refer to the secret data; in practice, this could
be an HTTP cookie in a header, an anti-CSRF token, or some piece of personal
information. We will allow the attacker to adaptively obtain encryptions of
compressions of data of the form m0kckkm00 for a secret cookie ck and adversary-
chosen message prefix m0 and su x m00.
We now present three notions for the security of cookies in the context of
compression-encryption schemes:
• Cookie recovery (CR) security : A simple, but relatively weak, security
notion for symmetric-key compression-encryption schemes: it should be
hard for the attacker to fully recover a secret value, even given adaptive
access to an oracle that encrypts plaintexts of its choosing with the target
cookie embedded.
• Random cookie indistinguishability (RCI) security : The adversary has to
decide which of two randomly chosen cookies was embedded in the encrypted
plaintext, given adaptive access to an oracle that encrypts plaintexts of its
choosing with the target cookie embedded.
• Chosen cookie indistinguishability (CCI) security : Here, the adversary has
to decide which of two cookies of the adversary’s choice was embedded in
the encrypted plaintext, given adaptive access to an oracle that encrypts
plaintexts of its choosing with the target cookie embedded.
These security notions are formalized in the following definition, which refers
to the security experiments shown in Figure 6.2.
Definition 6.2.4 (CR,RCI,CCI security). Let be a symmetric-key compression-
encryption scheme. Let A denote an algorithm. Let CK denote the cookie space.
Let xxx 2 {CR,RCI,CCI} be a security notion. Consider the security exper-
iment Expxxx ,CK(A) in Figure 6.2. Define AdvCR ,CK(A) = Pr
 
ExpCR ,CK(A) = 1
 
as the probability that A wins the cookie recovery experiment for  and CK.
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ExpCR ,CK(A)
1: k
$  .KeyGen()
2: ck
$ CK
3: ck0 $ AE1,E2()
4: return (ck0 = ck)
E1(m0,m00)
1: return  .Enck(m0kckkm00)
E2(m)
1: return  .Enck(m)
ExpRCI/CCI ,CK (A)
1: k
$  .KeyGen()
2: if RCI then
3: (ck0, ck1)
$ CK s.t. |ck0| = |ck1|; st ?
4: else if CCI then
5: (ck0, ck1, st)
$ AE2() s.t. |ck0| = |ck1|
6: b
$ {0, 1}
7: b0 $ AE1,E2(ck0, ck1, st)
8: return (b0 = b)
E1(m0,m00)
1: return  .Enck(m0kckbkm00)
E2(m)
1: return  .Enck(m)
Figure 6.2: Security experiments for cookie recovery (left) and random cookie
indistinguishability and chosen cookie indistinguishability (right) attacks
Similarly, define Advxxx ,CK(A) =
  2Pr  Expxxx ,CK(A) = 1   1  , xxx 2 {RCI,CCI},
as the advantage that A has in winning the random cookie and chosen cookie
indistinguishability experiments.
Remark 6.2.1. The CR, RCI, and CCI security notions intentionally include
only the confidentiality of the cookie as a security goal, and not the confidentiality
of any non-cookie data in the rest of the message. In most applications it would
be desirable to obtain confidentiality of non-cookie data as well, and in many
real-world situations, the application layer’s cookie and non-cookie data are jointly
sent to the security layer (such as SSL/TLS) for encryption. Our notions do
not preclude the scheme from encrypting the non-cookie data as well (and in
fact our constructions in Sections 6.4 and 6.5 do so). However, it is not possible
in general to require confidentiality of the non-cookie data while still allowing
it to be compressed, as that brings us back around to the original problem
that motivated the work—compression of adversary-provided data can lead to
ciphertexts of di↵erent lengths that break indistinguishability. This cycle can be
broken by demanding some length restriction on the separated non-cookie data,
such as in the ER-IND-CPA notion described in Section 6.2.2, but we omit that
complication to focus solely on the security of the high-value secret cookies.
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6.3 Relations and Separations between Security
Notions
Cookie recovery, being a computational problem rather than a decisional problem,
is a weaker security notion. Keeping CR as an initial step, the RCI and CCI
notions gradually increase the security a↵orded to the cookie.
The following relations exist between security notions for symmetric-key
compression-encryption schemes:
CCI =) RCI =) CR .
In other words, every scheme that provides chosen cookie indistinguishability
provides random cookie indistinguishability, and so on. Moreover, these notions
are distinct, and we can show separations between them:
CR 6=) RCI 6=) CCI .
Additionally, we can connect our new notions with existing notions:
ER-IND-CPA =) IND-CPA =) CCI and CCI 6=) IND-CPA .
These last relations should be interpreted as follows. A standard (non-compressing)
IND-CPA-secure symmetric-key encryption scheme is also CCI-secure. This is
not to say, however, that an IND-CPA-secure symmetric-key encryption scheme
combined with a compression scheme, such as ⇧     in Definition 6.2.3, is CCI-
secure.
Full proofs of these relations and separations are provided below, but first we
provide a brief overview of each proof.
• IND-CPA =) CCI: A (non-compressing) IND-CPA-secure symmetric-key
encryption scheme provides indistinguishability of any pair of equal-length
chosen messages, including messages involving a cookie. The proof proceeds
by a hybrid argument, making the cookie used in each query made by the
adversary to its E1 oracle independent of the secret bit b.
• CCI 6=) IND-CPA: A degenerate scheme that uses a separating-secrets
filter (to be discussed in the Section 6.4) to extract secret cookies then
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encrypt the cookies but not the non-cookie data is CCI-secure but not
IND-CPA-secure for the whole message.
• CCI =) RCI: A straightforward simulation: an adversary who cannot
distinguish between encryptions of equal-length cookies of its choosing can
also not distinguish between encryptions of randomly chosen equal-length
cookies.
• RCI 6=) CCI: A counterexample is constructed that uses a separating-
secrets filter: an extra ciphertext component c2 is added, consisting of a
point function applied to the separated secrets, where the point function is
1 on a single, publicly known cookie value z. With high probability, two
randomly chosen cookies will not match z, so c2 carries no useful information
and the scheme is RCI-secure, but a CCI adversary can choose one cookie
that matches z and one that does not, so c2 allows distinguishing of the
chosen cookies.
• RCI =) CR: A straightforward simulation: an adversary who recovers a
cookie given only ciphertexts easily distinguishes encryptions of cookies.
• CR 6=) RCI: A counterexample is constructed: an extra ciphertext
component c2 is added, consisting of a random oracle applied to the message.
The adversary gets encryptions ofm0kckkm00 form0,m00 of its choice; without
querying the random oracle on exactlym0kckkm00, c2 provides no information
to the adversary, so the scheme is CR-secure. However, an RCI adversary
can check the random oracle on the two given random cookies, so c2 allows
distinguishing of the given random cookies.
6.3.1 IND-CPA =) CCI: IND-CPA implies CCI
Theorem 6.3.1. Let  be an IND-CPA-secure symmetric-key encryption scheme.
Then  is also a CCI-secure symmetric-key compression-encryption scheme for
any cookie space CK. Formally, let A be an adversary against the CCI security
of  , and let q denote the number of queries that A makes to its E1 oracle. Then
AdvCCI ,CK(A)  q · AdvIND-CPA (BA) ,
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where B is an algorithm, constructed using the adversary A as described in the
proof, against the IND-CPA security of the underlying symmetric-key encryption
scheme  .
Proof. The proof proceeds in a sequence of games, using a hybrid approach. Each
Game i proceeds as in the original CCI security experiment, except that the
queries to E1 are answered as in Figure 6.3. Let Adv
i denote the probability that
game i outputs 1.
E1(m0,m00)
1: if query #  i then
2: return  .Enck(m0kck0km00)
3: else if query # > i then
4: return  .Enck(m0kckbkm00)
Figure 6.3: Oracle E1 used in Game i in proof of Theorem 6.3.1.
Game 0. This is the original CCI security game for ⇧. By definition,
AdvCCI ,CK(A) = Adv0 .
Transition from Game (i 1) to Game i, 1  i  q. Each hybrid transition
changes how one query is answered; if the adversary’s behaviour di↵ers because of
the change in answering the query, we can construct a simulator Bi that wins the
IND-CPA game for  , as shown in Figure 6.4. When the IND-CPA challenger
uses b = 0, c⇤ is the encryption of m0kckbˆkm00, so Bi is playing game (i  1) with
A. When the IND-CPA challenger uses b = 1, c⇤ is the encryption of m0kck0ˆkm00,
so Bi is playing game i with A. Thus,  Advi 1   Advi    AdvIND-CPA (BAi ) .
Analysis of Game q. Since the adversary’s view is independent of b in Game
q, we have
Advq = 0 .
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BA,Ei ()
1: (ck0, ck1, st)
$ AE2()
s.t. |ck0| = |ck1|
2: bˆ
$ {0, 1}
3: b0 $ AE1,E2(ck0, ck1, st)
4: return b0
E2(m)
1: return E(m)
E1(m0,m00)
1: if query # < i then
2: return E(m0kck0km00)
3: else if query # = i then
4: Give (m0kckbˆkm00,m0kck0km00) to IND-CPA
challenger
5: Receive c⇤ from IND-CPA challegner
6: return c⇤
7: else if query # > i then
8: return E(m0kckbˆkm00)
Figure 6.4: Simulator Bi used in the proof of Theorem 6.3.1
Conclusion. Combining the above results, we have
AdvCCI ,CK(A) 
qX
i=1
AdvIND-CPA (Bi) = q · AdvIND-CPA (B)
(with a small abuse of notation in creating a single B from the disparate Bi).
6.3.2 CCI 6=) IND-CPA: CCI does not imply IND-CPA
Theorem 6.3.2. There exists a symmetric-key compression-encryption scheme
that is CCI-secure but not IND-CPA-secure.
Theorem 6.3.2 is shown using a degenerate counterexample involving the
separating-secrets technique. The basic idea is that we encrypt only secret cookies
and not the message. Technically, the CCI security definition only requires any
confidentiality for the cookie portion of the ciphertext and not the rest of it, so a
scheme that extracts and encrypts only the cookies is CCI-secure, but is clearly
not IND-CPA-secure.
In particular, let ⇧ be a (non-compressing) symmetric-key encryption scheme.
Let CK be the cookie space recognized by secret[A-Za-z0-9]  and f be
the corresponding filter, as described in Section 6.4.1. This filter is e↵ective at
separating out CK.
We construct  from ⇧ and f as in Figure 6.5. We will show that  is
CCI-secure, but is not IND-CPA-secure.
Claim 6.3.1.  in Figure 6.5 is CCI-secure, assuming ⇧ is IND-CPA-secure.
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 .KeyGen()
1: return
⇧.KeyGen()
 .Enck(m)
1: ptskptns  f(m)
2: c1
$ ⇧.Enck(pts)
3: return c1kptns
 .Deck(c)
1: Parse c1kptns  c
2: pts  ⇧.Deck(c1)
3: m f 1(pts, ptns)
4: return m
Figure 6.5: Scheme  used in the proof of Theorem 6.3.2
Proof. Since f is e↵ective at separating out CK, only c1 components carry any
information about b. However, c1 is the encryption of the secrets extracted from
m0 and m00 as well as ckb. Since f is safe for CK, the length of pts is the same
when derived from either m0kck0km00 or m0kck1km00. Thus any adversary that can
guess the bit b serves as a distinguisher for ⇧ under chosen plaintext attack.
Claim 6.3.2.  in Figure 6.5 is not IND-CPA-secure.
Proof. The construction of a successful A against the IND-CPA security of  is
straightforward. A picks two distinct messages m00 and m01 that do not match
the regular expression defining f , and gives these as the challenge messages to
the IND-CPA challenger for  . The resulting ciphertext will have an empty c1
component (since neither m00 nor m
0
1 has any value that will be separated out),
and the second ciphertext component is unencrypted, so the adversary receives
back m0b directly. The adversary then can immediately provide a correct guess of
b.
6.3.3 CCI =) RCI: CCI implies RCI
Theorem 6.3.3. Let  be a CCI-secure symmetric-key compression-encryption
scheme. Then  is also an RCI-secure symmetric-key compression-encryption
scheme. Formally, let CK be a cookie space, and let A be an algorithm against
the RCI security of  . Then, for the algorithm B given in Figure 6.6,
AdvRCI ,CK(A)  AdvCCI ,CK(BA) .
Proof. The proof proceeds via direct simulation. We are given an adversary A
against the RCI security of  . We must construct an adversary B against the
CCI security of  ; note that B will have access to oracles E1 and E2 described
in the CCI security experiment. The simulator B is constructed in Figure 6.6.
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Notice in particular that B uses the CCI challenger’s E1 and E2 oracles to answer
A’s queries.
BA,E1,E2()
1: (ck0, ck1)
$ CK s.t. |ck0| = |ck1|
2: Give (ck0, ck1) to the CCI challenger
3: b0 $ AE1,E2(ck0, ck1,?)
4: return b0
Figure 6.6: Simulator used in the proof of Theorem 6.3.3.
B’s simulation of the RCI experiment to A is perfect. If A’s guess b0 of the b
is correct in the RCI experiment, then it is also correct for the CCI experiment,
and similarly when the guess is wrong. This yields the bound in the theorem.
6.3.4 RCI 6=) CCI: RCI does not imply CCI
Theorem 6.3.4. There exists a symmetric-key compression-encryption scheme
that is RCI-secure but not CCI-secure.
Theorem 6.3.4 is shown using a counterexample involving the separating-
secrets technique and a point function involving a hard-coded publicly known
string. The basic idea is that we append to each ciphertext a single bit representing
the output of the point function on the cookie(s) in the message. Since randomly
chosen cookies are highly unlikely to be the same as the hard-coded value in the
point function, this extra bit provides no useful information for an RCI adversary,
but a chosen-cookie adversary could easily pick one cookie to be the hard-coded
value and one not to be, the bit thereby allowing him to easily distinguish the
two.
In particular, let ⇧ be a symmetric-key encryption scheme and let   be a com-
pression scheme. Let CK be the cookie space recognized by secret[A-Za-z0-9] 
and f be the corresponding filter, as described in Section 6.4.1. Recall this filter
is safe for CK.
Let  = ⇧   SSf,  be the symmetric-key compression-encryption scheme
constructed using the separating-secrets technique. We will show in Theorem 6.4.1
that  is CCI-secure if ⇧ is IND-CPA secure. By Theorem 6.3.3,  is thus also
RCI-secure.
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Additionally, let z 2 CK, and define the point function
gz(x) =
8<:1, if z   x,0, otherwise.
We will construct  0 as in Figure 6.7 from  = ⇧   SSf,  and gz. We will
show that  0 remains RCI-secure, but is not CCI-secure.
 0.KeyGen()
1: return
 .KeyGen()
 0.Enck(m)
1: ptskgptns  SSf, .Comp(m)
2: c1
$ ⇧.Enck(ptskgptns)
3: c2  gz(pts)
4: return c1kc2
 0.Deck(c)
1: Parse c1kc2  c
2: return  .Deck(c1)
Figure 6.7: Scheme  0 used in the proof of Theorem 6.3.4
Claim 6.3.3.  0 in Figure 6.7 is RCI-secure, assuming ⇧ is IND-CPA-secure
and CK is large.
Proof. Let ck⇤0 and ck
⇤
1 denote the random cookies to be distinguished.
Because ⇧ SSf,  is RCI-secure, c1 gives the adversary no advantage in guessing
the bit b. We need to assess whether c2 helps the adversary at all in winning the
RCI game.
The second ciphertext component c2 is only useful to the adversary if the
adversary can construct a pair (m0,m00) such that c2 is di↵erent for m0kck⇤0km00
versus m0kck⇤1km00.
Consider the construction of pts from m in  0.Enck(m). Since pts consists of
a comma-separated list of cookies, and no cookie contains a comma, gz(pts) = 1
if and only if there exists some i such that gz(cki) = 1, where m is parsed as
m0kck1km1kck2km2k . . . kcknkmn.
Now consider the handling of m = m0kck⇤bkm00 for m0,m00 of the adversary’s
choosing. By the argument above, gz(pts) = gz(ck⇤b )_ gz(m0)_ gz(m00). Moreover,
gz(ck⇤0) 6= gz(ck⇤1) if and only if one of them is equal to z but the other is not.
Since ck⇤0 and ck
⇤
1 are chosen uniformly at random from CK, this occurs with
probability at most 2/|CK|.
Claim 6.3.4.  0 in Figure 6.7 is not CCI-secure.
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Proof. The construction of a successful A against the CCI security of  0 is
straightforward. Note that A knows the value z in the point function gz. Thus,
A could issue a CCI challenge with ck0 = z and ck1 6= z, and then make the
query E1(✏, ✏), thereby obtaining c1 = Enck(ckb) and c2 = gz(ckb). The last bit of
such a ciphertext immediately indicates whether ckb = z or not.
6.3.5 RCI =) CR: RCI implies CR
Theorem 6.3.5. Let  be an RCI-secure symmetric-key compression-encryption
scheme. Then  is also a CR-secure symmetric-key compression-encryption
scheme. Formally, let CK be a cookie space, and let A be an algorithm against
the CR security of  . Then, for the algorithm B given in Figure 6.8,
AdvCR ,CK(A)  AdvRCI ,CK(BA) .
Proof. The proof proceeds via direct simulation. We are given an adversary A
against the CR security of  . We must construct an adversary B against the RCI
security of  ; note that B will have access to oracles E1 and E2 described in the
RCI security experiment. The simulator B is constructed in Figure 6.8. Notice
in particular that B uses the RCI challenger’s E1 and E2 oracles to answer A’s
queries.
BA,E1,E2(ck0, ck1)
1: ck0 $ AE1,E2()
2: if ck0 = ck0 then
3: return 0
4: else if ck0 = ck1 then
5: return 1
6: else
7: return b0 $ {0, 1}
Figure 6.8: Simulator used in the proof of Theorem 6.3.5.
B’s simulation of the CR experiment to A is perfect: the value ckb used by
the E1 oracle in the RCI challenger was indeed chosen at random, just as in the
CR experiment, and is indeed consistent.
If A’s guess ck0 of the cookie is correct in the CR simulation, then it is also
correct for the RCI experiment, and so B’s output will be correct. If A’s guess is
wrong, then B does as good as random guessing.
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6.3.6 CR 6=) RCI: CR does not imply RCI
Theorem 6.3.6. There exists a symmetric-key compression-encryption scheme
that is CR-secure but not RCI-secure.
Theorem 6.3.6 is shown using a counterexample involving a random oracle.
The basic idea is that we append to each ciphertext the output of the random
oracle applied to the message. For an adversary who is trying to guess an unknown
cookie, this provides no information unless it queries the random oracle on the
cookie itself, but a random-cookie adversary, who knows that the cookie is one of
two values, could easily determine which by querying both to the random oracle.
Let  be a symmetric-key compression-encryption scheme. Let H : {0, 1}⇤ !
{0, 1}  be a random oracle. Construct  0 as shown in Figure 6.9.
 0.KeyGen()
1: return
 .KeyGen()
 0.Enck(m)
1: c1
$  .Enck(m)
2: c2  H(m)
3: return c1kc2
 0.Deck(c)
1: Parse c1kc2  c
2: return  .Deck(c1)
Figure 6.9: Scheme  0 used in the proof of Theorem 6.3.6
Claim 6.3.5.  0 is CR-secure in the random oracle model, assuming  is CR-
secure and CK is su ciently large. Formally,
AdvCR 0,CK(A)  qH · ` · AdvCR ,CK(BA) ,
where qH is the number of queries that A makes to the random oracle, ` is the
maximum length of a message queried by A to the random oracle, and B is the
algorithm given in Figure 6.10.
Proof. Let ck⇤ denote the cookie to be recovered.
The intuition of the proof is as follows. Because  is CR-secure, c1 does not
help the adversary in guessing the cookie ck⇤. We need to assess whether c2 helps
the adversary at all in winning the CR game. The second ciphertext component
c2 is only useful to the adversary if the adversary queries the random oracle on
the plaintext of c1, which would mean that the adversary queries the random
oracle on the target cookie ck⇤. We can thus use this to win the CR experiment
for  0.
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More precisely, the proof proceeds via direct simulation. We are given an
adversary A against the CR security of  0. We must construct an adversary B
against the CR security of  ; note that B will have access to oracles E1 and E2
described in the CR security experiment for for  . The simulator B is constructed
in Figure 6.10.
BA,E1,E2()
1: i
$ {1, . . . , qH}
2: j
$ {1, . . . , `}
3: rand
$ CK
4: ck0 $ AE01,E02,H()
E 01(m
0,m00)
1: c1
$ E1(m0,m00)
2: c2  H(m0krandkm00)
3: return c1kc2
E 02(m)
1: c1
$ E2(m)
2: c2  H(m)
3: return c1kc2
H(m)
1: if query # = i then
2: Parse m to identify every substring of m that
is in CK
3: Pick one uniformly at random
4: Output it to the CR challenger for  
5: else
6: Answer H(m) as normal for a random oracle
Figure 6.10: Simulator used in the proof of Theorem 6.3.6.
B’s simulation of the CR experiment for  0 to A is perfect so long as E 01 and
H remain consistent. The only time an inconsistency arises is if A queries H on
m0kck⇤km00 for some m0,m00 that it also queries to E 01. With probability 1/q, B
will correctly guess that the first such query to H is the ith query. Moreover,
with probability at least 1/`, B will correctly guess which substring of that query
to H is the target cookie c⇤. For simplicity, we ignore the possibility of collisions
on the output of the random oracle.
Claim 6.3.6.  0 is not RCI-secure.
Proof. The construction of a successful A against the RCI security of  0 is
straightforward. An adversary A against the RCI security of  0 is told that the
target cookie is one of two values, ck0 and ck1. A could make the query E1(✏, ✏),
thereby obtaining c1 = Enck(ckb) and c2 = H(ckb). A could then query H(ck0)
and H(ck1); one of these will equal c2, telling the adversary the value of b.
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6.4 Technique 1: Separating Secrets from User
Inputs
In this section we analyze a mitigation technique against attacks that recover
secrets from compressed data: separating secrets from user inputs. The basic
idea of separating secrets from user inputs is: given an input, use a filter to
separate all the secrets from the rest of the content, including user inputs. Then
the rest of the content is compressed, while the secrets are kept uncompressed.
This mitigation technique is a generic mitigation technique against a whole class
of compression-based side-channel attacks.
6.4.1 The Scheme
Definition 6.4.1 (Filter). A filter is an invertible (e cient) function f : {0, 1}⇤ !
{0, 1}⇤ ⇥ {0, 1}⇤.
Given a filter f and a compression scheme  , the separating-secrets scheme
SSf,  is given in Figure 6.11.
SSf, .Comp(m)
1: (pts, ptns) f(m)
2: gptns   .Comp(ptns)
3: return ptskgptns
SSf, .Decomp(pt)
1: Parse ptskgptns  pt
2: ptns   .Decomp(gptns)
3: m f 1(pts, ptns)
4: return m
Figure 6.11: Abstract separating-secrets compression scheme SS
Our results will make use of the following two conditions on filters. Intuitively,
a filter is e↵ective if it removes cookies from an input string, and is safe if no
prefix/su x can fool the filter into separating out one cookie but not another.
Definition 6.4.2 (E↵ective filter). Let CK be a cookie space, and let f be a
filter. We say that f is e↵ective at separating out CK if, for all ck 2 CK and all
m0,m00, we have that ck 6  y, where (x, y) = f(m0kckkm00).
Definition 6.4.3 (Safe filter). Let CK be a cookie space, and let f be a filter.
We say that f is safe for CK if, for all ck0, ck1 2 CK such that |ck0| = |ck1| and
all m0,m00, we have that |x0| = |x1| and y0 = y1, where (x0, y0) = f(m0kck0km00)
and (x1, y1) = f(m0kck1km00).
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Example cookie space and filter. Let   2 N and let CK be the set of
alphanumeric strings starting with the literal “secret” and starting and ending
with a space (denoted by ), i.e., strings matched by the regular expression
secret[A-Za-z0-9] 
Let f be a filter that uses the above regular expression to separate out secrets.
Consider a string of the form m = m0 ck1 m1 ck2 m2 . . . ckn mn, where mi
contains no substring matching the above regular expression and cki is a string
completely matching the above regular expression (excluding the initial and
terminal space ). Then f(m) = (pts, ptns), where pts = ck1k . . . kckn and
ptns = m0k⌧km1k⌧k . . . kmn, and ⌧ represents a fixed replacement token that
can not appear as a substring of any m 2 M. The above filter f is e↵ective
at separating out and safe for the above CK. The intuitive reason for this is
that, since each cookie begins and ends with a character which does not appear
within the cookie, no prefix or su x can cause the filter to not separate a cookie.
Claim 6.4.1. The above filter f is e↵ective at separating out and safe for the
above CK.
Proof sketch. Since each cookie begins and ends with a character which does not
appear within the cookie, no prefix or su x can cause the filter to not separate a
cookie.
More precisely, for any ck 2 CK and anym0 that contains no substring match-
ing the above regular expression and any m00 6= ✏, we have that f(m0k ck km00) =
(ckkx, m0k⌧ky), where (x, y) = f(m00). Such an f is e↵ective at separating out CK
since it separates every substring of m that is a cookie into the first component
of the output. Moreover, f is safe for CK by recursively applying the above
identity.
6.4.2 CCI Security of Basic Separating-Secrets Technique
In this section we analyze the security of separating-secrets mitigation technique
according to the CCI notion. Let ⇧ = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be an IND-CPA-secure
symmetric-key encryption scheme and SSf,  be the separating-secrets compression
scheme given in Figure 6.11. We consider the security of the resulting symmetric-
key compression-encryption scheme ⇧   SSf, , showing that, if the filter f safely
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separates out cookies, then breaking chosen cookie indistinguishability of ⇧ SSf, 
is as hard as breaking indistinguishability (IND-CPA) of encryption scheme ⇧.
Theorem 6.4.1. Let ⇧ be a symmetric-key encryption scheme and let   be a
compression scheme. Let CK be a cookie space, and let f be a filter that is safe
for CK. Let A be any adversary against the CCI security of the separating-secrets
symmetric-key compression-encryption scheme ⇧   SSf, , and let q denote the
number of queries that A makes to its E1 oracle. Then AdvCCI⇧ SSf, ,CK(A) 
q · AdvIND-CPA⇧ (BA) , where B is an algorithm, constructed using the adversary
A as described in the proof, against the IND-CPA security of the symmetric-key
encryption scheme ⇧.
Proof. The proof proceeds in a sequence of games, using a hybrid approach. Each
Game i proceeds as in the original CCI security experiment, except that the
queries to E1 are answered as in Figure 6.12. Let Adv
i denote the probability
that game i outputs 1.
E1(m0,m00)
1: if query #  i then
2: return ⇧.Enck(SSf, (m0kck0km00))
3: else if query # > i then
4: return ⇧.Enck(SSf, (m0kckbkm00))
Figure 6.12: Oracle E1 used in Game i in proof of Theorem 6.4.1.
Game 0. This is the original CCI security game for ⇧. By definition,
AdvCCI⇧ SSf, ,CK(A) = Adv0 .
Transition from Game (i 1) to Game i, 1  i  q. Each hybrid transition
changes how one query is answered; if the adversary’s behaviour di↵ers because of
the change in answering the query, we can construct a simulator Bi that wins the
IND-CPA game for  , as shown in Figure 6.13. When the IND-CPA challenger
uses b = 0, c⇤ is the encryption of the separating-secrets compression ofm0kckbˆkm00,
so Bi is playing game (i  1) with A. When the IND-CPA challenger uses b = 1,
c⇤ is the encryption of the separating-secrets compression of m0kck0km00, so Bi is
playing game i with A. Since f is safe for CK, the separating-secrets compressions
of m0kck0km00 and m0kck1km00 have the same length, and thus the pair of chosen
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BA,Ei ()
1: (ck0, ck1, st)
$ AE2()
s.t. |ck0| = |ck1|
2: bˆ
$ {0, 1}
3: b0 $ AE1,E2(ck0, ck1, st)
4: return b0
E2(m)
1: return
⇧.Enck(SSf, .Comp(m))
E1(m0,m00)
1: if query # < i then
2: return ⇧.Enck(SSf, .Comp(m0kck0km00))
3: else if query # = i then
4: ptkgptns  SSf, .Comp(m0kckbˆkm00)
5: pt0kgptns0  SSf, .Comp(m0kck0km00)
6: Give (ptkgptns, pt0kgptns0) to IND-CPA chal-
lenger
7: Receive c⇤ from IND-CPA challenger
8: return c⇤
9: else if query # > i then
10: return ⇧.Enck(SSf, .Comp(m0kckbˆkm00))
Figure 6.13: Simulator Bi used in the proof of Theorem 6.4.1
messages given from the simulator in E1 to the IND-CPA challenger is valid
according to the IND-CPA experiment. Thus,  Advi 1   Advi    AdvIND-CPA (BAi ) .
Analysis of Game q. Since the adversary’s view is independent of b in Game
q, we have
Advq = 0 .
Conclusion. Combining the above results, we have
AdvCCI ,CK(A) 
qX
i=1
AdvIND-CPA (BAi ) = q · AdvIND-CPA (BA)
(with a small abuse of notation in creating a single B from the disparate Bi).
6.4.3 Separating Secrets in HTML
Separating secrets from user inputs is a realistic mitigation technique against the
BREACH attack: in the application layer, some fields which contain secrets (such
as anti-CSRF tokens) can be identified and separated from the HTTP response
body. In order to implement separating secrets from user inputs in HTML we
need to describe a filter fHTML.
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One possible method to separate secrets in HTML is to separate the content
assigned to the value attribute of HTML elements. Among other uses, the value
attribute defines the value of a specific field in a form. The HTML code segment
of Figure 6.14 shows inclusion of a secret anti-CSRF token as a hidden input
field in a web form, which will appear in a HTML response body. By separating
the content in the value attribute, we separate the anti-CSRF token.
<form action="/money_transfer" method="post">
<input type="hidden" name="csrftoken"
value="OWT4NmQlODE4ODRjN2Q1NTlhMmZlYWE ...">
...
</form>
Figure 6.14: HTML code segment showing inclusion of anti-CSRF token in a web
form
The following (case-insensitive) regular expression can be used to separate
out quoted anti-CSRF tokens in the value attribute of HTML elements:
value\s*=\s*"[A-Za-z0-9]+"|value\s*=\s*’[A-Za-z0-9]+’
This filter is e↵ective at separating out and safe for the implied set of cookies, in
the sense of Definitions 6.4.2 and 6.4.3.
However, the above regular expression is not perfect, highlighting the chal-
lenges of using heuristic techniques to separate out secrets.
First, the above regular expression will also capture the value attribute of
HTML elements other than hidden input elements, such as option, which may
not need to be treated as secret, so it is not as e cient as it could be.
Second, the above regular expression does not capture anti-CSRF tokens
in unquoted value attributes, such as value=OWT4NmQl, which are allowed by
the HTML specification. While it is easy to add an additional term such as
|value\s*=\s*[A-Za-z0-9]+ to the regular expression to capture unquoted
attributes, this filter would no longer be e↵ective in the sense of Definition 6.4.2:
if a cookie is value=OWT4NmQl, and the adversary constructs m0 = value=, then
m0kck = value=value=OWT4NmQl, and the filter applied to m0kck would separate
out value=value as the cookie and leave =OWT4NmQl unprotected.
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Website Uncompressed gzip full page Separating secrets Fixed dictionary
Google.com 145 599 41 455 (3.51⇥) 41 502 (3.51⇥) 117 794 (1.23⇥)
Facebook.com 48 226 13 785 (3.50⇥) 15 863 (3.04⇥) 35 036 (1.37⇥)
Youtube.com 467 928 41 813 (11.19⇥) 41 893 (11.17⇥) 181 676 (2.58⇥)
Yahoo.com 444 408 82 572 (5.38⇥) 83 342 (5.33⇥) 318 386 (1.40⇥)
Baidu.com 74 979 17 519 (4.28⇥) 17 727 (4.23⇥) 55 950 (1.34⇥)
Wikipedia.org 48 548 11 217 (4.33⇥) 11 809 (4.11⇥) 38 406 (1.26⇥)
Twitter.com 57 777 12 520 (4.61⇥) 16 618 (3.48⇥) 39 712 (1.46⇥)
Qq.com 626 297 124 108 (5.05⇥) 125 747 (4.98⇥) 519 830 (1.21⇥)
Amazon.com 234 609 54 922 (4.27⇥) 56 278 (4.17⇥) 150 924 (1.55⇥)
Taobao.com 192 068 23 658 (8.12⇥) 23 898 (8.04⇥) 93 410 (2.06⇥)
Table 6.1: Compression performance (file size in bytes and compression ratio) for
separating secrets (Section 6.4) and fixed dictionary (Section 6.5) techniques
6.4.4 Results on Separating-Secrets in HTML
Table 6.1 shows the result of applying the above regular expression to separate
secrets on the top 10 global websites of Alexa Top Sites. As most pages contain
little data in value attributes, the total amount of space required to transmit
the separated secrets plus the remaining data is not much more than when the
full page is compressed. (Table 6.1 also contains performance results of the fixed
dictionary technique, to be discussed in Section 6.5.)
Source code of separating-secrets from HTML files and separating-secrets
experiment are in Appendix A.3 and A.4 respectively.
6.4.5 Discussion
The main drawback of the separating secrets technique is that the separation filter
must be application-dependent. We noted already the challenges in using the
heuristic regular expression above to capture anti-CSRF tokens: it may separate
out non-secrets as well as secrets (which yields suboptimal compression) and it
does not capture unquoted tokens (which is a problem for security).
Moreover, this HTML filter also only captures secrets in a value attribute,
which does not necessarily capture all values that might be considered sensitive.
For example, should the titles of books in a search results page on an shopping
site be considered secret? If so, an alternative separation filter would have to
be developed. To provide complete certainty, secret separation would require
additional markup with which the developer clearly identifies which data should
be treated as secret. Otherwise, any sensitive values which are not separated may
be compressed together with user inputs and other application data, and hence
remain open to the compression-based side-channel.
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6.5 Technique 2: Fixed-Dictionary Compression
The CRIME and BREACH attacks work because the dictionary constructed by
the deflate compression algorithm is adaptive: if the attacker injects a substring
of the target secret into the plaintext nearby the secret itself, then the plaintext
will compress more because of the repeated substring. Some early compression
algorithms were non-adaptive, using a fixed dictionary mechanism. For example,
Pike [Pik80] used a fixed dictionary of 205 popular English words and a variable
length coding mechanism to compress typical English text at a rate of less than
4 bits per character. Another recent algorithm, Smaz [San09], similarly uses a
fixed dictionary consisting of common digrams and trigrams from English and
HTML source code, allowing it to compress even very short strings. Because
the CRIME and BREACH attacks rely on the adaptivity of the compression
dictionary, fixed-dictionary algorithms can o↵er resistance to such attacks while
still providing some compression, albeit not as good as adaptive compression.
In this section, we investigate the use of fixed-dictionary compression in the
context of encryption. We describe the basic idea of fixed-dictionary compression.
We show that fixed-dictionary compression-encryption schemes can satisfy cookie
recovery security for su ciently large cookies. We then present an example of a
modern fixed-dictionary compression algorithm and report on the compression
ratios achieved by our algorithm.
6.5.1 The Scheme
In general, fixed-dictionary compression schemes work by advancing through the
string x and looking to see if the current substring appears in the dictionary D:
if it does, then an encoding of the index of the substring is recorded, otherwise
an encoding of the current substring is recorded. The compression scheme must
specify the encoding rules in a way that unambiguously discriminates between
the two cases to allow for correct decompression.
An abstract version of a fixed-dictionary fixed-width compression algorithm
FD is given in Figure 6.15. FD checks if the current substring of length w appears
in the dictionary D. If it does, it records the index of the substring in D and
advances w characters. If it does not, it records the next ` characters directly,
then advances. (Using ` > 1 but ` < w may be more e cient when it comes to
encodings.) One could treat D either as a set of strings (recording which element
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is matched) or a long string (recording the starting and ending position of the
matching substring); we will use the latter in the rest of this section.
FDD,w,`.Comp(x)
1: y  ✏
2: i 1
3: while i  |x|  w + 1 do
4: if xi:w   D then
5: y  y k encoding of indD(xi:w)
6: i i+ w
7: else
8: y  y k encoding of xi:`
9: i i+ `
10: return y
FDD,w,`.Decomp(y)
1: x ✏
2: i 1
3: while i  |y| do
4: if yi encodes an index then
5: x x k Dyi:w
6: i i+ 1
7: else
8: x x k decoding of yi:`0
9: i i+ `0
10: return x
Figure 6.15: Abstract fixed-dictionary fixed-width compression scheme FD
Note the simplification that ` characters of x are encoded as `0 characters of y.
For example, if D =“cookierecoveryattack”, then FDD,4,2.Comp(“recover
the cookie”) yields 7ver the 1ie.
6.5.2 CR Security of Basic Fixed-Dictionary Technique
Let ⇧ be a symmetric-key encryption scheme. Let D be a dictionary of length d
and FDD,w,` be the abstract fixed-dictionary compression scheme in Figure 6.15.
Suppose the cookie space is binary strings of length 8 , or equivalently byte
strings of length  : CK = {0x00, . . . , 0xFF} .
If ⇧ is a secure encryption scheme, then, intuitively, the only way the adversary
can learn information about the cookie from seeing ciphertexts Enck(·kckk·) and
Enck(·) is from the length of the ciphertext: if some substring of ck appears in the
dictionary D, then ck will compress, and that length di↵erence tells the adversary
that the secret cookie is restricted to some subset of CK matching D.
The situation is subtler in the full CR experiment: the attacker can provide
m0 and m00 and get Enck(Comp(m0kckkm00)). If the last few bytes of m0 followed
by the first few bytes of ck appear in D, then the string will compress more. This
allows the attacker to carry out a CRIME-like attack on the first few bytes of ck.
For example, let w = 4 and suppose D = 1234567890ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRST
UVWXYZ and CK = [0-9A-F] . The attacker can query m0 = 890, m0 = 90A,
m0 = 0AB, . . . . In exactly one case, the adversary’s m0 combined with the cookie’s
first byte will be in the dictionary, telling the adversary ck1. For example, if
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ck1 = B, then when the adversary queries m0 = 90A, the value that is compressed
and then encrypted is m0kckkm00 = 90AB . . . , which is a substring of D.
While this allows the attacker to recover the first byte or two of the secret
cookie with decent probability, it drops o↵ exponentially; a similar argument
applies to the last few bytes of the secret cookie. Theorem 6.5.1 captures this
issue. Theorem 6.5.1 only provides quantifiable security when the cookie length n
is significantly bigger than the compression window w. Additionally, this type of
attack on the first/last few bytes of the cookie precludes indistinguishable security,
which is why we focus on cookie recovery here. (Admittedly, in some settings
recovering the first/last few cookie bytes may still be quite damaging.)
Theorem 6.5.1. Let ⇧ be a symmetric-key encryption scheme. Let D be
a dictionary of d words, each of length `. Let w be a positive integer. Let
CK = ⌦n. Let A be any adversary against the cookie recovery security of the
fixed-dictionary symmetric-key compression-encryption scheme ⇧ FDD,w,`. Then
AdvCR⇧ FDD,w,`(A)  AdvIND-CPA⇧ (B) + 2   , where B is an algorithm, constructed
using adversary A, against the IND-CPA security of the symmetric-key encryption
scheme ⇧, and
   
 
1  d
 
1 
✓
1  1|⌦|w
◆n 3w+1!!
· log2
 
|⌦|n 2w   |⌦|n 2w · d
 
1 
✓
1  1|⌦|w
◆n 3w+1!!
.
For example, for cookies of n = 16 bytes, with a dictionary of d = 4000
words each of length w = 4 bytes, we have     63.999695. Doubling d gives
    63.999391.
Proof.
Probability bounds, no prefix/su x. In this section, we compute the
amount of information given to the adversary from knowing the length of the
compressed cookie, without any adversarially chosen prefix or su x. This can be
computed by calculating the amount of information given by knowing how many
substrings of the cookie appear in the dictionary. For the analysis, we treat D as
a set of strings.
6.5. Technique 2: Fixed-Dictionary Compression 179
First we calculate the probability that a given string is a substring of a
randomly chosen cookie.
Lemma 6.5.1. Let x 2 ⌦w be a word, and let ck $ ⌦n = CK be a random
string of n characters. Then Pr(x   ck)  1 
⇣
1  1|⌦|w
⌘n w+1
.
Proof.
Pr(x   ck) = 1  Pr(x 6  ck)
= 1  Pr((x 6= ck1:w) ^ (x 6= ck2:w) ^ · · · ^ (x 6= ckn w+1:w))
 1  Pr(x 6= ck1:w) Pr(x 6= ck2:w) . . .Pr(x 6= ckn w+1:w)
= 1 
✓
1  1|⌦|w
◆n w+1
We now compute that probability that one of a set of given strings is a
substring of a randomly chosen cookie:
Lemma 6.5.2. Let D ✓ ⌦w with |D| = d be a dictionary of d words of w
characters. Let ck
$ ⌦n = CK be a random string of n characters. Then
Pr(9x 2 D : x   ck)  d
 
1 
✓
1  1|⌦|w
◆n w+1!
.
Proof. Suppose D = {x1, x2, . . . , xd}.
Pr(9x 2 D : x   ck) = Pr((x1   ck) _ (x2   ck) _ · · · _ (xd   ck))

dX
i=1
Pr(xi   ck)
 d
 
1 
✓
1  1|⌦|w
◆n w+1!
Recall the definition of conditional entropy for random variables X and Y :
H(Y | X) =
X
x2supp(X)
Pr(X = x)H(Y | X = x)
=  
X
x2supp(X)
Pr(X = x)
·
X
y2supp(Y )
Pr(Y = y | X = x) log2 Pr(Y = y | X = x) .
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We now compute the amount of entropy about the cookie given knowledge
about the number of substrings of the cookie that appear in the dictionary:
Lemma 6.5.3. Fix D. Let #SUB(ck) denote the number of substrings of ck
that appear in D. Suppose CK is a uniform random variable on CK. Then
H(CK | #SUB(CK))  
 
1  d
 
1 
✓
1  1|⌦|w
◆n w+1!!
· log2
 
|CK|  |CK| · d
 
1 
✓
1  1|⌦|w
◆n w+1!!
.
Proof. Let #s denote the number of cookies ck 2 CK such that #SUB(ck) = s.
First note that
Pr(#SUB(CK) = s) =
#s
|CK| .
Additionally,
Pr(CK = ck | #SUB(CK) = s) =
8<: 1#s , if #SUB(CK) = s ,0, otherwise .
Substituting into the definition of conditional entropy, H(CK | #SUB(CK))
=  
X
s2N
Pr(#SUB(CK) = s)
·
X
ck2CK
Pr(CK = ck | #SUB(CK) = s) log2 Pr(CK = ck | #SUB(CK) = s)
=  
X
s2N
#s
|CK|
X
ck2CK:#SUB(CK)=s
1
#s
log2
1
#s
=
1
|CK|
X
s2N
#s log2#s .
Let # 1 denote the number of cookies ck 2 CK such that #SUB(ck)   1. Then
Pr(#SUB(CK)   1) = Pr(9x 2 D : x   ck) = # 1|CK| (by definition of # 1)
 d
 
1 
✓
1  1|⌦|w
◆n w+1!
(by Lemma 6.5.2)
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Thus, the number of cookies with at least 1 substring in the dictionary is
# 1  |CK| · d
 
1 
✓
1  1|⌦|w
◆n w+1!
.
Consequently, the number of cookies with no substring in the dictionary is
#0 = |CK| # 1   |CK|  |CK|d
 
1 
✓
1  1|⌦|w
◆n w+1!
.
Finally,
H(CK | #SUB(CK)) = 1|CK|
X
s2N
#s log2#s  
1
|CK|#0 log2#0
 
 
1  d
 
1 
✓
1  1|⌦|w
◆n w+1!!
· log2
 
|CK|  |CK| · d
 
1 
✓
1  1|⌦|w
◆n w+1!!
For example, if we have 16-byte cookies (CK = {0x00, . . . , 0xFF}16), and the
dictionary D is a set of d = 4096 words of length w = 4 bytes, then
H(CK | #SUB(CK))   127.998395 .
Concluding our analysis of the information learned given to the adversary
without any adversarially chosen prefix or su x, we give a bound on the amount
of entropy about the cookie given the length of the compressed cookie:
Lemma 6.5.4. Fix D with d words of length w over character set ⌦. Denote
the length of a cookie ck compressed with dictionary D by COMPLEN(ck) =
|FDD,w,`.Comp(ck)|. Suppose CK is a uniform random variable on CK. Then
H(CK | COMPLEN(CK))   H(CK | #SUB(CK))
 
 
1  d
 
1 
✓
1  1|⌦|w
◆n w+1!!
· log2
 
|CK|  |CK| · d
 
1 
✓
1  1|⌦|w
◆n w+1!!
.
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Lemma 6.5.4 follows from the data processing inequality and Lemma 6.5.3.
Probability bounds, prefix/su x. Suppose CK is a uniform random vari-
able on CK = ⌦n. We know that H(CK) = n log2(|⌦|). Trivially, H(CK |
CK1) = (n   1) log2(|⌦|), where CK1 is the first character of CK. Similarly,
H(CK | CK1:a) = (n   a) log2(|⌦|) and finally H(CK | CK1:a, CKn b:b) =
(n  a  b) log2(|⌦|).
Consider the following CRIME-like attack on the beginning of the cookie. Let
D be a dictionary with d words of length w over character set ⌦. Let ck 2 ⌦n.
Let O(·) be an oracle that, upon input a of length w  m, with 1  m  w   1,
returns 1 if and only if akck1:m 2 D.
The CRIME-like attack works as follows:
1. For each x 2 D, query x1:w 1 to the oracle. If a query for x1:w 1 returns 1,
then it is known that ck1:1 2 Z1 = {z : x1:w 1kz 2 D}. If no query returns
1, then return ;.
2. For m = 2, . . . , w   1: For each x 2 D such that xw m 2 Zm 1, query
x1:w m to the oracle. If a query for x1:w m returns 1, then it is known that
ck1:m 2 Zm = {z1z2 . . . zm : x1:w mkz1z2 . . . zm 2 D}. If no query returns 1,
then return Z1, . . . , Zm 1.
3. Return Z1, . . . , Zw 1.
A corresponding attack on the su x is obvious.
Let CRIMEpre(ck) denote the output obtained from running the above prefix
CRIME attacks on ck, CRIMEsuf(ck) denote the output from the corresponding
su x attack. Let CRIME(ck) = (CRIMEpre(ck),CRIMEsuf(ck)).
Noting that in the best case the CRIME attack allows the attacker to learn
the first w   1 and the last w   1 characters of the cookie, some trivial lower
bounds are:
H(CK1:w 1 | CRIME(CK))   0
H(CKn w+1:w 1 | CRIME(CK))   0
However, the CRIME attack provides no information about the remaining char-
acters, so I(CK1:w 1, CKw:n w+1) = 0 and I(CK1:n w+1, CKn w+1:w 1) = 0,
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and thus H(CKw:n w+2 | CRIME(CK),COMPLEN(CK)) = H(CKw:n w+2 |
COMPLEN(CK)).
Finally, we have that
H(CK | CRIME(CK),COMPLEN(CK))
  H(CK1:w 1 | CRIMEpre(CK)) +H(CKw:n w+2 | COMPLEN(CK))
+H(CKn w+1:w 1 | CRIMEsuf(CK))
  0 +H(CKw:n w+2 | COMPLEN(CK)) + 0
and we can obtain a lower bound on H(CKw:n w | COMPLEN(CK)) using
Lemma 6.5.4.
6.5.3 Results on Fixed-Dictionary Technique
Table 6.1 shows the result of applying a fixed-dictionary based compression
algorithm to the top 10 global websites of Alexa Top Sites. The 4000-byte
dictionary was built from the most common 8-, 16-, and 32-character substrings
of the pages. The compression algorithm was based in part on the Smaz [San09]
algorithm and was adapted slightly from Figure 6.15, to allow for variable-length
words to be matched. Specifically, when attempting to encode the substring at
the current position at line 4 in Figure 6.15, we first try variable length words in
order of decreasing length, checking to see if w = 18, then w = 16, then . . . , then
w = 4 characters can be found in the dictionary. This requires the encoding to
include both index and length of the dictionary substring.
• To encode a dictionary word at index 0  j < 4096 of length w = 2w0+4, 0 
w0  7, store 16 bits: 1 k [12-bit encoding of j] k [3-bit encoding of w0]
• To encode 2 lower-ASCII characters z1z2, store 16 bits: 00 k [7-bit encoding
of z1] k [7-bit encoding of z2]
• To encode 1 byte z, store 16 bits: 01000000 k [8-bit encoding of z]
Source code of constructing a fixed-dictionary and fixed-dictionary experiment
are in Appendix A.1 and A.2 respectively.
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6.5.4 Discussion
The main drawback of the fixed dictionary mitigation technique is that in practice
it achieves relatively poor—albeit non-zero—compression compared with adaptive
compression techniques. However, it does not rely on application-dependent or
heuristic techniques for separating secrets.
6.6 Summary
We introduced theoretical models to analyze compression-based side-channel
attacks on high-value secrets embedded inside messages: the notions of cookie
recovery (CR) security, random cookie indistinguishability (RCI), and chosen
cookie indistinguishability (CCI). Each notion allows an attacker adaptive access
to an oracle which encrypts chosen plaintexts alongside a target secret. We also
characterize the relationship among the CCI and CR security notions, as well as
an intermediate notion called random cookie indistinguishability (RCI) and the
ER-IND-CPA notion of Kelley and Tamassia [KT14]. To some extent, the side
channel exposed by compression is fundamentally unavoidable: if transmission
of data is decreased, nothing can hide the fact that some redundancy existed
in the plaintext. Hence, we focus our study on the ability of the attacker to
learn specific “high value” secrets embedded in a plaintext, such as cookies or
anti-CSRF tokens. In our models, we imagine there is a secret value ck, and the
adversary can adaptively obtain encryptions
Enck(m
0kckkm00) (6.1)
for prefix m0 and su x m00 of its choice; the attacker’s goal is to learn about ck.
The first mitigation technique we consider is that of separating secrets. During
compression/encryption, an application-aware filter is applied to the plaintext to
separate out any potential secret values from the data, the remaining plaintext
is compressed, then the secrets and compressed plaintext are encrypted; after
decryption, the inverse of the filter is used to reinsert the secret values in the
decompressed plaintext. Assuming the filter fully separates out all secret values,
we show that the separating secrets technique is able to achieve a strong notion of
protection, which we call chosen cookie indistinguishability (CCI): the adversary
cannot determine which of two cookies ck0 and ck1 of the adversary’s choice was
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encrypted with messages of the adversary’s choice given ciphertexts as in (6.1).
The second mitigation technique we consider is the use of a fixed-dictionary
compression scheme, where the dictionary used for compression does not adapt
to the plaintext being compressed, but instead is preselected in advance based on
the expected distribution of plaintext messages, for example including common
English words like “the” and “and”. We show that, if the secret values are
su ciently high entropy, then fixed-dictionary compression is able to achieve
cookie recovery (CR) security: if the secret cookie is chosen uniformly at random,
the adversary cannot recover the entire secret cookie even given an adaptive
message attack as in (6.1). While cookie recovery security does not meet the
“gold standard” of indistinguishability notions for encryption, it may be su cient
for some settings, for example protecting compressed HTTP tra c from CRIME
and BREACH attacks that try to recover cookies and anti-CSRF tokens.
In the separating secrets technique, if the number of secrets extracted by the
separating filter is relatively small, then the compressibility generally remains
close to that of normal compression of the full plaintext. In the fixed-dictionary
compression technique, compressibility su↵ers quite a bit compared to adaptive
techniques on the full plaintext, although if the dictionary is constructed from a
corpus of text similar to the plaintext, then some compression can be achieved.
Figure 6.16 summarizes experimental results comparing compression ratios
for these two techniques on the HTML, CSS, and Javascript source code of the
top 10 global websites as reported by Alexa Top Sites (http://www.alexa.com/
topsites). On average, the compression ratio (uncompressed : compressed size)
of gzip applied to the full source code was 5.42⇥; applying a separation filter
that extracted all values following value= in the HTML source code yielded
an average compression ratio of 5.20⇥; compression of each page using a fixed
dictionary trained on all 10 pages yielded an average compression ratio of 1.55⇥.
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We now summarize the thesis and discuss some possible research directions.
7.1 Summary
Typically, secure channels are constructed from an authenticated key exchange
protocol which authenticates the communicating parties based on long-term
public keys and establishes secret keys, and a secure data transmission layer
which uses the secret keys to transmit data. In this research we model the partial
leakage of long-term secret keys of key exchange protocol participants due to
various side-channel attacks, and the partial leakage of plaintexts due to data
compression prior to the encryption. We then constructed leakage-resilient key
exchange protocols and encryption schemes satisfying our security models. The
contributions of this research, together with the previous works on leakage-resilient
symmetric-key encryption, can be used to build a stronger leakage-resilient secure
channel suite for communication. Further, this research opens up new research
directions, particularly pointing the research community towards the after-the-fact
leakage of key exchange protocols, and compression-based plaintext leakage of
symmetric-key encryption schemes.
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The main contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows.
Chapter 3: New eCK-secure protocol. We contribute a new key exchange
protocol construction and provide its security proof in the eCK model. This
protocol does not use the so-called NAXOS trick, which has been used for many
eCK-secure key exchange protocols.
Chapter 4: Long-term secret key leakage in the key exchange phase.
This chapter contributes a new leakage security model: the continuous after-the-
fact leakage in restricted-eCK (CAFL) model, which addresses continuous and
after-the-fact leakage of long-term secret keys, while restricting the freshness
condition, more than in the eCK or Moriyama-Okamoto model. Further, we
construct a new generic protocol which is proven-secure in the CAFL model, using
any suitable leakage-resilient public-key encryption scheme. Thus, contributions
in this chapter provides a solution for continuous and after-the-fact leakage of
long-term secret keys of key exchange protocol principals.
Chapter 5: Long-term secret key leakage in the key exchange phase
(handshake layer). This chapter contributes a generic after-the-fact leak-
age security model for key exchange: the generic after-the-fact leakage eCK
((·)AFL-eCK) model, which can be instantiated as a bounded or continuous
leakage variant. This model contains an eCK-style freshness condition, which is
also appears in the eCK and Moriyama-Okamoto models. Thus, it releases the
additional restrictions we enforced in Chapter 4 and its stronger than previously
published models. We present a new generic protocol construction which is
proven secure in the w(·)AFL-eCK model, using any suitable leakage-resilient
public-key encryption scheme and any suitable leakage-resilient signature scheme
(this protocol construction is slightly weaker in security than the desired protocol).
Then, we give a new concrete construction of a key exchange protocol which
is proven-secure in the continuous leakage variant of the (·)AFL-eCK model
(CAFL-eCK model), using a leakage-resilient storage scheme and its refreshing
protocol, and based on Di e-Hellman key exchange (this protocol construction
satisfies the desired security features). Thus, contributions in this chapter provide
solutions for continuous/bounded and after-the-fact leakage of long-term secret
keys of key exchange protocol principals, with more powerful eCK-style security
compared to the model and the protocol presented in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 6: Compression-based leakage attacks in the data transmis-
sion phase (record layer). This chapter contributes security notions to ana-
lyze compression-based leakage on symmetric-key encryption schemes. Then, we
examine two possible mitigation techniques – separating-secrets from user inputs
and fixed-dictionary compression – and prove their security in new security notions.
Further, we report on the amount of compressibility that they can achieve for a
real world example. Thus, this chapter provide provable secure countermeasures
against compression-based leakage attacks on symmetric-key encryption schemes,
and open up new research directions in the context of compression-based leakage
attacks.
7.2 Future Directions
Leakage-Resilient Key Exchange
As future work in the context of leakage-resilient key exchange, it is worthwhile
to investigate following directions:
• In order to achieve after-the-fact leakage resiliency in Chapter 5 using the
split-state technique, the secret is encoded into two parts which contains
two n-element vectors or one n-element vector and one m⇥n-element array,
and only allows leakage independently from each encoding. Because of
this approach the actual exponentiation operation needs many element-
wise exponentiations, and the computation cost is high. Therefore, it is
worthwhile to investigate whether there are other techniques to achieve
after-the-fact leakage resilience, rather than encoding the secret into parts.
Thus, it will be possible to construct more e cient leakage-resilient key
exchange protocols.
• In this research we only consider the partial leakage of long-term secrets
due to side-channel attacks. Since the ephemeral secret keys are short-time
values and are not involved in as many computations as long-term secrets,
the possibility of continuous leakage of ephemeral secret keys, due to side-
channel attacks such as timing, power analysis or EM emission based attacks
may not be possible. Di↵erently, (bounded) leakage attacks which reveal the
memory of the system, particularly cold boot attacks, can leak ephemeral
secret keys to the adversary fully or partially. The Moriyama-Okamoto
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model and the BAFL-eCK model, address the cold boot attacks to some
extent, where the cold boot attacks reveal either
– the full long-term secret key,
– the full ephemeral secret key,
– the full ephemeral secret key and part of the long-term secret key
of a protocol principal. But there are few other situations which have not
been covered by the previous models: the cold boot attacks reveal
– the full long-term secret key and part of the ephemeral secret key,
– part of the long-term secret key and part of the ephemeral secret key
of a protocol principal. Thus, it is worthwhile to investigate about partial
leakage of the ephemeral secret keys.
• In this research we do not consider the partial leakage of session keys, either
during the session key derivation phase or when it is used for encryption.
Even though it is di↵erent from the traditional idea of secret key leakage, it
is worthwhile to investigate the partial leakage of session keys, particularly
as an important aspect for leakage-resilient key exchange.
• Currently, the constructions for achieving leakage-resilient primitives are
based on discrete-logarithm-type assumptions. When quantum computers
become available, such primitives may no longer be secure. Therefore, it is
worthwhile to investigate about quantum-safe leakage-resilient public-key
encryption schemes, key exchange protocols etc.
Compression-based Plaintext Leakage
As future work in the context of compression-based plaintext leakage, it is
worthwhile to investigate following directions:
• As future work, it is worthwhile to investigate on further cryptographic study
of compression, including the investigation of definitions that provide both
cookie indistinguishability and some measure of message indistinguishability.
• Further, developing a suitable framework to separate secrets automatically
from web pages when applying compression-encryption would be an inter-
esting real-world application. Thus, web developers can use that framework
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and achieve security against compression-based leakage attacks to some
extent for known data field which contain secrets.
• Moreover, developing optimum fixed dictionary for web pages would be an
another interesting direction for the real-world applications.
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Appendix A
Source Code
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A.1 Constructing a Fixed-Dictionary
1 import java . n io . f i l e . ∗ ;
2 import java . u t i l . ∗ ;
3 public class Freqs {
4 public stat ic f ina l int RECORD SIZE = 2 ;
5 public stat ic void main ( St r ing args [ ] ) throws Exception {
6 i f ( args . l ength < 3) {
7 System . e r r . p r i n t l n ( ”Usage : java Freqs d i c t S i z e
wordLengths f i l enames > output . d i c t ” ) ;
8 System . e r r . p r i n t l n ( ”  d i c t S i z e : the t a r g e t s i z e o f
the output d i c t i ona ry in bytes ; f o r Spaz t h i s
should be 4000” ) ;
9 System . e r r . p r i n t l n ( ”  wordLengths : comma separated
l i s t o f word l eng th s to count f r e qu en c i e s o f ; e .
g . , 8 ,15 ,20 ” ) ;
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10 System . e r r . p r i n t l n ( ”  f i l enames : l i s t o f f i l enames
to bu i ld d i c t i ona ry from” ) ;
11 return ;
12 }
13 int d i c t S i z e = In t eg e r . pa r s e In t ( args [ 0 ] ) ;
14 St r ing wordlengths [ ] = args [ 1 ] . s p l i t ( ” , ” ) ;
15 HashMap<Str ing , Integer> worths = new HashMap<Str ing ,
Integer >() ;
16 for ( int f = 2 ; f < args . l ength ; f++) {
17 St r ing f i l ename = args [ f ] ;
18 S t r ing s r c = new St r ing ( F i l e s . readAl lBytes ( Paths . get
( f i l ename ) ) ) ;
19 for ( S t r ing wordlength : wordlengths ) {
20 calcWorth ( src , worths , I n t eg e r . pa r s e In t (
wordlength ) ) ;
21 }
22 }
23 pr in tBes t ( worths , d i c t S i z e ) ;
24 }
25
26 stat ic void calcWorth ( St r ing src , Map<Str ing , Integer> f r eq s , int
s eq l en ) {
27 for ( int i = 0 ; i < s r c . l ength ( )   s eq l en ; i++) {
28 St r ing s = s r c . sub s t r i ng ( i , i + s eq l en ) ;
29 i f ( f r e q s . containsKey ( s ) ) {
30 f r e q s . put ( s , f r e q s . get ( s ) + seq l en  
RECORD SIZE) ;
31 } else {
32 f r e q s . put ( s , s eq l en   RECORD SIZE) ;
33 }
34 }
35 }
36
37 stat ic void pr in tBes t (Map<Str ing , Integer> f r eq s , int d i c t S i z e ) {
38 Map<Str ing , Integer> f r e q s s o r t e d = Freqs . sortByValue ( f r e q s )
;
39 Vector<Str ing> best = new Vector<Str ing >( d i c t S i z e ) ;
40 I t e r a t o r<Map. Entry<Str ing , Integer>> i t = f r e q s s o r t e d .
ent rySet ( ) . i t e r a t o r ( ) ;
41 int cu r rD i c tS i z e = 0 ;
42 while ( i t . hasNext ( ) && ( cu r rD i c tS i z e < d i c t S i z e ) ) {
43 Map. Entry<Str ing , Integer> pa i r = i t . next ( ) ;
44 boolean u s e i t = true ;
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45 for ( S t r ing v : bes t ) {
46 i f ( l onge s tSubs t r ( pa i r . getKey ( ) , v ) > 5) {
47 u s e i t = fa l se ;
48 break ;
49 }
50 }
51 i f ( u s e i t ) {
52 bes t . add ( pa i r . getKey ( ) ) ;
53 System . out . p r i n t ( pa i r . getKey ( ) ) ;
54 cu r rD i c tS i z e += pa i r . getKey ( ) . l ength ( ) ;
55 }
56 }
57 System . out . p r i n t l n ( ) ;
58 }
59
60 public stat ic <K, V extends Comparable<? super V>> Map<K, V>
sortByValue (Map<K, V> map) {
61 Lis t<Map. Entry<K, V>> l i s t = new LinkedList<Map. Entry<K, V
>>(map . entrySet ( ) ) ;
62 Co l l e c t i o n s . s o r t ( l i s t , new Comparator<Map. Entry<K, V>>() {
63 public int compare (Map. Entry<K, V> o1 , Map. Entry<K,
V> o2 ) {
64 return  (o1 . getValue ( ) ) . compareTo ( o2 .
getValue ( ) ) ;
65 }
66 }) ;
67 Map<K, V> r e s u l t = new LinkedHashMap<K, V>() ;
68 for (Map. Entry<K, V> entry : l i s t ) {
69 r e s u l t . put ( entry . getKey ( ) , entry . getValue ( ) ) ;
70 }
71 return r e s u l t ;
72 }
73
74 public stat ic int l onge s tSubs t r ( S t r ing f i r s t , S t r ing second ) {
75 i f ( f i r s t == null | | second == null | | f i r s t . l ength ( ) == 0
| | second . l ength ( ) == 0) {
76 return 0 ;
77 }
78 int maxLen = 0 ;
79 int f l = f i r s t . l ength ( ) ;
80 int s l = second . l ength ( ) ;
81 int [ ] [ ] t ab l e = new int [ f l + 1 ] [ s l + 1 ] ;
82 for ( int s = 0 ; s <= s l ; s++)
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83 tab l e [ 0 ] [ s ] = 0 ;
84 for ( int f = 0 ; f <= f l ; f++)
85 tab l e [ f ] [ 0 ] = 0 ;
86 for ( int i = 1 ; i <= f l ; i++) {
87 for ( int j = 1 ; j <= s l ; j++) {
88 i f ( f i r s t . charAt ( i   1) == second . charAt ( j  
1) ) {
89 i f ( i == 1 | | j == 1) {
90 tab l e [ i ] [ j ] = 1 ;
91 } else {
92 tab l e [ i ] [ j ] = tab l e [ i   1 ] [ j
  1 ] + 1 ;
93 }
94 i f ( t ab l e [ i ] [ j ] > maxLen) {
95 maxLen = tab l e [ i ] [ j ] ;
96 }
97 }
98 }
99 }
100 return maxLen ;
101 }
102 }
A.2 Fixed-Dictionary Experiment
1 import java . n io . f i l e . ∗ ;
2 public class Spaz2 {
3 public stat ic f ina l St r ing d i c t i ona ry = ” d i c t i ona ry ” ;
4 public stat ic St r ing decode (byte [ ] c , S t r ing d i c t i ona ry )
throws Exception {
5 byte bytes [ ] = new byte [ 8∗ c . l ength ] ;
6 int bindex = 0 ;
7 int c index = 0 ;
8 while ( c index < c . l ength ) {
9 byte b = c [ c index ] ;
10 i f (b >> 6 == 0) {
11 i f ( c index + 1 >= c . l ength ) {
12 throw new Exception ( ”Need 2
byte record ” ) ;
13 }
14 byte a = c [ c index ] ;
15 a &= 0x3F ;
16 a <<= 1 ;
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17 byte a2 = c [ c index +1] ;
18 a2 >>>= 7 ;
19 a2 &= 0x01 ;
20 a |= a2 ;
21 bytes [ bindex ] = a ;
22 a = c [ c index +1] ;
23 a &= 0x7F ;
24 bytes [ bindex+1] = a ;
25 c index += 2 ;
26 bindex += 2 ;
27 } else i f ( ( b & 0x80 ) > 0) {
28 i f ( c index + 1 >= c . l ength ) {
29 throw new Exception ( ”Need 2
byte record ” ) ;
30 }
31 int j = c [ c index+1] & 0x07 ;
32 int l en = 2 ∗ j + 4 ;
33 int index = c [ c index ] & 0x7F ;
34 index <<= 5 ;
35 int index2 = c [ c index+1] & 0xF8 ;
36 index2 >>= 3 ;
37 index2 &= 0x1F ;
38 index |= index2 ;
39 St r ing d i c t l ookup = d i c t i ona ry . sub s t r i ng (
index , index + len ) ;
40 byte d i c t l ookupbyte s [ ] = d i c t l ookup . getBytes
( ”UTF 8” ) ;
41 System . arraycopy ( d ic t lookupbytes , 0 , bytes ,
bindex , d i c t l ookupbyte s . l ength ) ;
42 c index += 2 ;
43 bindex += dic t l ookupbyte s . l ength ;
44 } else i f ( ( b & 0x40 ) > 0) {
45 i f ( c index + 1 >= c . l ength ) {
46 throw new Exception ( ”Need 2
byte record ” ) ;
47 }
48 bytes [ bindex ] = c [ c index +1] ;
49 c index += 2 ;
50 bindex += 1 ;
51 } else {
52 throw new Exception ( ”Unknown record type ” ) ;
53 }
54 }
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55 return new St r ing ( bytes , 0 , bindex , ”UTF 8” ) ;
56 }
57
58 stat ic boolean do i t (byte [ ] c , int cindex , S t r ing d i c t i onary , byte [ ]
b , int bindex , int s eq l en ) {
59 i f ( c index + seq l en <= c . l ength ) {
60 int d i c t i ndex = d i c t i ona ry . indexOf (new St r ing ( c ,
cindex , s eq l en ) ) ;
61 i f ( d i c t i ndex >= 0) {
62 int cons t ruc ted = 0x00008000 ;
63 cons t ruc ted |= di c t i ndex << 3 ;
64 cons t ruc ted |= ( seq len  4) / 2 ;
65 b [ bindex ] = (byte ) ( ( cons t ruc ted >>> 8) & 0
xFF) ;
66 b [ bindex+1] = (byte ) ( cons t ruc ted & 0xFF) ;
67 return true ;
68 }
69 }
70 return fa l se ;
71 }
72
73 public stat ic byte [ ] encode ( S t r ing s , S t r ing d i c t i ona ry ) throws
Exception {
74 byte [ ] b = new byte [ 2 ∗ s . l ength ( ) ] ;
75 byte [ ] c = s . getBytes ( ”UTF 8” ) ;
76 int c index = 0 ;
77 int bindex = 0 ;
78 int f r e q s [ ] = new int [ 3 0 ] ;
79 for ( int i = 0 ; i < 30 ; i++) { f r e q s [ i ] = 0 ; }
80 while ( c index < c . l ength ) {
81 boolean foundone = fa l se ;
82 for ( int j = 7 ; j >= 0 ; j  ) {
83 int s eq l en = 2 ∗ j + 4 ;
84 i f ( do i t ( c , cindex , d i c t i onary , b , bindex ,
s eq l en ) ) {
85 c index += seq l en ;
86 bindex += 2 ;
87 f r e q s [ s eq l en ]++;
88 foundone = true ;
89 break ;
90 }
91 }
92 i f ( foundone ) continue ;
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93 i f ( ( c index + 2 <= c . l ength ) && ( ( c [ c index ] >= 0x00 )
&& ( c [ c index ] < 0x7F) ) && ( ( c [ c index+1] >= 0x00
) && ( c [ c index+1] < 0x7F) ) ) {
94 b [ bindex ] = (byte ) ( c [ c index ] >> 1) ;
95 b [ bindex ] &= 0x3F ;
96 b [ bindex+1] = (byte ) c [ c index +1] ;
97 b [ bindex+1] &= 0x7F ;
98 b [ bindex+1] |= (byte ) ( c [ c index ] << 7) ;
99 bindex += 2 ;
100 c index += 2 ;
101 f r e q s [2]++;
102 } else {
103 b [ bindex ] = (byte ) 0x40 ;
104 b [ bindex+1] = (byte ) c [ c index ] ;
105 bindex += 2 ;
106 c index += 1 ;
107 f r e q s [1]++;
108 }
109 }
110 byte [ ] r = new byte [ bindex ] ;
111 System . arraycopy (b , 0 , r , 0 , bindex ) ;
112 System . out . p r i n t f ( ” f r e q s : ” ) ;
113 for ( int i = 0 ; i < 30 ; i++) {
114 i f ( f r e q s [ i ] > 0) {
115 System . out . p r i n t f ( ”%dx%d , ” , f r e q s [ i ] , i ) ;
116 }
117 }
118 System . out . p r i n t l n ( ) ;
119 return r ;
120 }
121
122 public stat ic void main ( St r ing args [ ] ) {
123 i f ( args . l ength != 2) {
124 System . e r r . p r i n t l n ( ”Usage : Spaz d i c t i ona ry input ” ) ;
125 return ;
126 }
127 St r ing d i c t i onaryFi l ename = args [ 0 ] ;
128 St r ing inputFi lename = args [ 1 ] ;
129 try {
130 St r ing d i c t i ona ry = new St r ing ( F i l e s . readAl lBytes (
Paths . get ( d i c t i onaryFi l ename ) ) ) ;
131 St r ing input = new St r ing ( F i l e s . readAl lBytes ( Paths .
get ( inputFi lename ) ) ) ;
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132 i f ( d i c t i ona ry . l ength ( ) > 4096) {
133 throw new Exception ( ”Dic t ionary i s too long .
” ) ;
134 }
135 byte [ ] b = Spaz2 . encode ( input , d i c t i ona ry ) ;
136 St r ing output = Spaz2 . decode (b , d i c t i ona ry ) ;
137 int inputLength = input . getBytes ( ”UTF 8” ) . l ength ;
138 int outputLength = b . l ength ;
139 double compress ion = ( (double ) inputLength ) / ( (
double ) outputLength ) ;
140 System . out . p r i n t f ( ” Input l ength : %d ; output l ength :
%d ; compress ion : %.3 fx \n” , inputLength ,
outputLength , compress ion ) ;
141 i f ( ! input . equa l s ( output ) ) {
142 throw new Exception ( ” S t r i ng s do not match . ” )
;
143 }
144 } catch ( Exception e ) {
145 e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
146 }
147 }
148 }
A.3 Separating-Secrets Mitigation Technique
1 import java . i o . ∗ ;
2 import java . u t i l . regex . Pattern ;
3 import java . u t i l . regex . Matcher ;
4 import java . u t i l . z ip . GZIPOutputStream ;
5 import java . u t i l . z ip . GZIPInputStream ;
6 import java . n io . f i l e . ∗ ;
7 public class exp{
8 /∗ method o f s epara t ing s e c r e t s ; s epara t e con ten t s as s i gned
to the ‘ ‘ va lue ” a t t r i b u t e ∗/
9 public stat ic void SepSec ( S t r ing o r i g i n a l f i l e ) {
10 try{
11 Fi leReader f i l e r e a d e r = new Fi leReader (
o r i g i n a l f i l e ) ;
12 BufferedReader in = new BufferedReader (
f i l e r e a d e r ) ;
13 F i l eWr i t e r f i l e w r i t e r n s = new Fi l eWr i t e r (
o r i g i n a l f i l e+” ns ” ) ;
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14 Buf feredWriter b f r n s = new Buf feredWriter (
f i l e w r i t e r n s ) ;
15 F i l eWr i t e r f i l e w r i t e r s = new Fi l eWr i t e r (
o r i g i n a l f i l e+” s ” ) ;
16 Buf feredWriter b f r s = new Buf feredWriter (
f i l e w r i t e r s ) ;
17 Pattern pattern = Pattern . compi le ( ” va lue \\ s
∗=\\ s ∗\” ( [ ˆ\” ]∗ ) \” | value \\ s∗=\\ s
∗ \ ’ ( [ ˆ \ ’ ] ∗ ) \ ’ | value \\ s∗=\\ s ∗ [ ˆ\\ s ]∗ ” ) ;
18 Matcher p matcher ;
19 St r ing s e c r e t , nonsec re t ;
20 St r ing l i n e = in . readLine ( ) ;
21 while ( l i n e != null ) {
22 nonsec re t = l i n e . r e p l a c eA l l ( ” value \\
s∗=\\ s ∗\” ( [ ˆ\” ]∗ ) \” | value \\ s∗=\\
s ∗ \ ’ ( [ ˆ \ ’ ] ∗ ) \ ’ | value \\ s∗=\\ s
∗ [ ˆ\\ s ]∗ ” , ”FILTERED OUT” ) ;
23 b f r n s . wr i t e ( nonsec re t ) ;
24 b f r n s . newLine ( ) ;
25 p matcher = pattern . matcher ( l i n e ) ;
26 while ( p matcher . f i nd ( ) ) {
27 s e c r e t = p matcher . group ( ) ;
28 b f r s . wr i t e ( s e c r e t ) ;
29 b f r s . newLine ( ) ;
30 }
31 l i n e = in . readLine ( ) ;
32 }
33 in . c l o s e ( ) ;
34 b f r s . c l o s e ( ) ;
35 b f r n s . c l o s e ( ) ;
36 }
37 catch ( Exception e ) {
38 System . out . p r i n t ( e ) ;
39 }
40 }
41
42 /∗ g z i p compression ; modi f i ed the code o f Byron Kiour t zog lou ( h t t p ://
examples . j avacodegeeks . com/core j ava / io / f i l e i n p u t s t r e am /compress
 a f i l e  in gz ip format in j ava /) ∗/
43 public stat ic void g z i pF i l e ( S t r ing s ou r c e f i l e p a t h , S t r ing
d e s t i n a t o n z i p f i l e p a t h ) {
44 byte [ ] b u f f e r = new byte [ 1 0 2 4 ] ;
45 try {
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46 FileOutputStream f i l eOutputStream =new
FileOutputStream ( d e s t i n a t o n z i p f i l e p a t h
) ;
47 GZIPOutputStream gzipOuputStream = new
GZIPOutputStream( f i l eOutputStream ) ;
48 Fi le InputStream f i l e I n p u t = new
Fi leInputStream ( s o u r c e f i l e p a t h ) ;
49 int byte s r ead ;
50 while ( ( byte s r ead = f i l e I n p u t . read ( bu f f e r ) )
> 0) {
51 gzipOuputStream . wr i t e ( bu f f e r , 0 ,
byte s r ead ) ;
52 }
53 f i l e I n p u t . c l o s e ( ) ;
54 gzipOuputStream . f i n i s h ( ) ;
55 gzipOuputStream . c l o s e ( ) ;
56 }
57 catch ( Exception e ) {
58 System . out . p r i n t ( e ) ;
59 }
60 }
61
62 /∗ gunz ip decompression ; modi f i ed the code o f Nikos Maravi tsas ( h t t p
:// examples . j avacodegeeks . com/core j ava / io / f i l e i n p u t s t r e am /
decompress a gz ip f i l e  in java example /)∗/
63 public stat ic void unGunzipFile ( S t r ing compressedFi le ,
S t r ing decompressedFi le ) {
64 byte [ ] b u f f e r = new byte [ 1 0 2 4 ] ;
65 try{
66 Fi le InputStream f i l e I n = new Fi leInputStream
( compressedFi l e ) ;
67 GZIPInputStream gZIPInputStream = new
GZIPInputStream ( f i l e I n ) ;
68 FileOutputStream f i l eOutputStream = new
FileOutputStream ( decompressedFi le ) ;
69 int byte s r ead ;
70 while ( ( byte s r ead = gZIPInputStream . read ( bu f f e r ) ) >
0) {
71 f i l eOutputStream . wr i t e ( bu f f e r , 0 , by te s r ead
) ;
72 }
73 gZIPInputStream . c l o s e ( ) ;
74 f i l eOutputStream . c l o s e ( ) ;
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75 }
76 catch ( IOException ex ) {
77 ex . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
78 }
79 }
80
81
82 /∗ method o f r ecove r ing the o r i g i n a l f i l e from s e c r e t s and non 
s e c r e t s ∗/
83 public stat ic void MergeSec ( S t r ing s e c r e t f i l e , S t r ing
n o n s e c r e t f i l e ) {
84 try{
85 F i l eWr i t e r f i l e w r i t e r = new Fi l eWr i t e r (
n o n s e c r e t f i l e+” r e c ov e r . htm” ) ;
86 Buf feredWriter out = new Buf feredWriter (
f i l e w r i t e r ) ;
87 Fi leReader f i l e r e a d e r n s = new Fi leReader (
n o n s e c r e t f i l e ) ;
88 BufferedReader b f r n s = new BufferedReader (
f i l e r e a d e r n s ) ;
89 Fi leReader f i l e r e a d e r s = new Fi leReader (
s e c r e t f i l e ) ;
90 BufferedReader b f r s = new BufferedReader (
f i l e r e a d e r s ) ;
91 Pattern pattern = Pattern . compi le ( ”FILTERED 
OUT” ) ;
92 Matcher p matcher ;
93 St r ing l i n e , s e c r e t ;
94 St r ing recovery ;
95 S t r i ngBu f f e r sb ;
96 l i n e = b f r n s . readLine ( ) ;
97 while ( l i n e != null ) {
98 sb = new St r i ngBu f f e r ( ) ;
99 p matcher = pattern . matcher ( l i n e ) ;
100 while ( p matcher . f i nd ( ) ) {
101 St r ing tex t = p matcher .
group (0 ) ;
102 s e c r e t = b f r s . readLine ( ) ;
103 p matcher . appendReplacement (
sb , p matcher .
quoteReplacement ( s e c r e t )
) ;
104 }
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105 p matcher . appendTail ( sb ) ;
106 recovery = sb . t oS t r i ng ( ) ;
107 out . wr i t e ( r ecovery ) ;
108 out . newLine ( ) ;
109 l i n e = b f r n s . readLine ( ) ;
110 }
111 out . c l o s e ( ) ;
112 b f r s . c l o s e ( ) ;
113 b f r n s . c l o s e ( ) ;
114 }
115 catch ( Exception e ) {
116 System . out . p r i n t ( e ) ;
117 }
118 }
A.4 Separating-Secrets Experiment
1 /∗ experiment ∗/
2 public stat ic void main ( St r ing args [ ] ) {
3 try{
4 f loat o r i g i n a l s i z e , compres sed s i ze ,
m i t i g a t ed s i z e , s e c r e t s i z e ,
n on s e c r e t s i z e , avg1 = 0 , avg2 = 0 ;
5 Fi leReader f i l enames = new Fi leReader ( ”names
. txt ” ) ;
6 BufferedReader f names = new BufferedReader (
f i l enames ) ;
7 F i l eWr i t e r w = new Fi l eWr i t e r ( ”Report . t ex t ” )
;
8 Buf feredWriter out = new Buf feredWriter (w) ;
9 S t r ing l i n e = f names . readLine ( ) ;
10 while ( l i n e != null ) {
11 St r ing temp = new St r ing ( F i l e s .
readAl lBytes ( Paths . get ( l i n e ) ) ) ;
12 o r i g i n a l s i z e = temp . getBytes ( ”UTF 8
” ) . l ength ;
13 g z i pF i l e ( l i n e , l i n e+” . gz ip ” ) ;
14 compre s s ed s i z e = F i l e s . readAl lBytes
( Paths . get ( l i n e+” . gz ip ” ) ) . l ength
;
15 SepSec ( l i n e ) ;
16 s e c r e t s i z e = F i l e s . readAl lBytes (
Paths . get ( l i n e+” s ” ) ) . l ength ;
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17 g z i pF i l e ( l i n e+” ns ” , l i n e+” ns . gz ip ”
) ;
18 n o n s e c r e t s i z e = F i l e s . readAl lBytes
( Paths . get ( l i n e+” ns . gz ip ” ) ) .
l ength ;
19 m i t i g a t e d s i z e = n on s e c r e t s i z e +
s e c r e t s i z e ;
20 unGunzipFile ( l i n e+” ns . gz ip ” , l i n e+”
2 ns ” ) ;
21 MergeSec ( l i n e+” s ” , l i n e+”2 ns ” ) ;
22 out . wr i t e ( ” F i l e Name : ”+l i n e ) ;
23 out . newLine ( ) ;
24 out . wr i t e ( ”
                          ” ) ;
25 out . newLine ( ) ;
26 out . wr i t e ( ” S i z e o f the Or i g i na l F i l e
: ”+o r i g i n a l s i z e+” bytes ” ) ;
27 out . newLine ( ) ;
28 out . wr i t e ( ” S i z e o f the Compressed
F i l e : ”+compre s s ed s i z e+” bytes ”
) ;
29 out . newLine ( ) ;
30 out . wr i t e ( ”Compression : ”+
o r i g i n a l s i z e / compre s s ed s i z e ) ;
31 avg1 += o r i g i n a l s i z e /
compre s s ed s i z e ;
32 out . newLine ( ) ;
33 out . wr i t e ( ” Extracte r and Compressed :
”+n on s e c r e t s i z e+” bytes ” ) ;
34 out . newLine ( ) ;
35 out . wr i t e ( ” S i z e o f the S e c r e t s : ”+
s e c r e t s i z e+” bytes ” ) ;
36 out . newLine ( ) ;
37 out . wr i t e ( ”Total s i z e the mi t i ga t i on
: ”+m i t i g a t e d s i z e+” bytes ” ) ;
38 out . newLine ( ) ;
39 out . wr i t e ( ”Compression : ”+
o r i g i n a l s i z e / m i t i g a t e d s i z e ) ;
40 avg2 += o r i g i n a l s i z e / m i t i g a t e d s i z e
;
41 out . newLine ( ) ;
42 out . wr i t e ( ”
========================================
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” ) ;
43 out . newLine ( ) ;
44 l i n e = f names . readLine ( ) ;
45 }
46 out . wr i t e ( ”Avg Or i g i na l Compression : ”+avg1
/10) ;
47 out . newLine ( ) ;
48 out . wr i t e ( ”Avg mit igated Compression : ”+
avg2 /10) ;
49 out . c l o s e ( ) ;
50 }
51 catch ( Exception e ) {
52 System . out . p r i n t ( e ) ;
53 }
54 }
55 }
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